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THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE
ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT
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The Search for Peace in
the Arab–Israeli Conflict
A Compendium of Documents and Analysis
Edited by
TERJE RØD-LARSEN
NUR LAIQ
AND FABRICE AIDAN
1
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3
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© Commentary: Terje Rød-Larsen, Nur Laiq, and Fabrice Aidan 2014
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
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Foreword and Acknowledgements
The idea of compiling an Oxford companion to the Arab–Israeli conflict was first
presented to me in 2005 by Markus Bouillon, who served for me both in my UN
capacity in Jerusalem and at the International Peace Institute (IPI) in New York. Nur
Laiq laboriously and faithfully collected most of the relevant documents and contributed
to the organization of the book and the drafting of the introduction and comments.
Fabrice Aidan, a French diplomat, who served for ten years as my special
assistant and political adviser in my different United Nations capacities played an
instrumental role for the production of this volume. He made essential substantive
inputs to the organization and compilation of the documents and the composition of
the comments, throughout the book, as well as to the introduction. David Makovsky
and Marwan Muasher deserve thanks for reviewing the book and for providing
insightful comments.
I would like also to thank my staff at the International Peace Institute (IPI), Walter
Kemp and Adam Lupel, for their editing contribution. Miklos Pinther, former chief
UN cartographer, who in 2000 oversaw the delineation of the Blue Line between Israel,
Lebanon and Syria, compiled and produced the maps in this volume. Finally, my
executive assistant, Jilla Moazami, gave invaluable administrative support. Without
these colleagues, the book would have never come to print. I am delighted that the
volume came to its conclusion on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the signing of
the Oslo Accords of 1993.
I am grateful to the Government of Norway for generous support to the International
Peace Institute’s (IPI) Middle East program over many years.
I dedicate the book to my beloved wife, Ambassador Mona Juul, my companion in
war and peace, without whom I would never have become involved in the imbroglio of
the Middle East.
Paris
16 September 2013
Terje Rød-Larsen
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Contents
About the Editors
List of Maps
List of Abbreviations
A Chronology of the Arab–Israeli Conflict
The Crooked Course: Step by Step on the Path to Peace
Maps
xiv
xvi
xvii
xviii
xxix
xlii
Part I. Peace Agreements and the Disengagement from Gaza
Arafat–Rabin–Holst Exchange of Letters (Israel–PLO Recognition)
(9 September 1993) 3
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements
(13 September 1993) 6
Letter from Israel’s Foreign Minister to Norway’s Foreign Minister
on the Status of East Jerusalem (11 October 1993) 18
Establishment of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) (5 November 1993) 19
Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of the State of
Israel and the P.L.O., representing the Palestinian people (Paris Protocol)
(Paris, 29 April 1994) 21
Gaza-Jericho Agreement (4 May 1994) 45
Gaza-Jericho Agreement Letters (4 May 1994) 107
Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities
(29 August 1994) 111
Oslo Declaration (13 September 1994) 139
Establishment of the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC) and the
Joint Liaison Committee (JLC) (30 November 1994) 142
Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip (Oslo II Agreement) (28 September 1995) 145
Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH Agreement)
(9 May 1996) 324
Declaration by PM Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat following their
first meeting (4 September 1996) 327
Hebron Protocol (17 January 1997) 329
Note for the Record (17 January 1997) 336
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viii
Contents
Temporary International Presence in Hebron II (TIPH II Agreement)
(21 January 1997) 342
Wye River Agreement (23 October 1998) 348
Letters of Assurance from United States to Israel (October 1998) 356
Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum (4 September 1999) 358
Protocol Concerning Safe Passage between West Bank and Gaza Strip
(5 October 1999) 363
Sharon Address at Fourth Herzliya Conference (18 December 2003) 371
Exchange of Letters between PM Sharon and President Bush (14 April 2004) 376
Disengagement Plan: General Outline (18 April 2004) 381
Rice–Weisglass Letter of Understanding (18 April 2004) 387
Letters from President Bush to King Abdullah II of Jordan (19 May 2004) 390
The Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan (6 June 2004) 394
Agreement on Movement and Access and Agreed Principles for Rafah
Crossing (15 November 2005) 404
Gaza War I: Israel and Hamas Cease-Fires (18 January 2009) 410
Gaza War II: Cease-Fire Agreement (21 November 2012) 416
Part II. Peace Proposals and Ideas
Prime Minister Begin’s Knesset Speech on Home Rule (28 December 1977) 419
Fahd Plan (7 August 1981) 422
Reagan Plan (1 September 1982) 423
Fez Peace Initiative (9 September 1982) 429
Madrid Conference: Invitation and Letters of Assurances (18 October 1991) 433
Beilin–Abu Mazen Agreement (31 October 1995) 441
Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of Peacemakers Final Statement (13 March 1996) 454
Camp David Statement (25 July 2000) 456
Remarks by US President Bill Clinton and President Hosni Mubarak of
Egypt in Delivery of Joint Statements at the Conclusion of the Middle
East Peace Summit (17 October 2000) 458
Clinton Parameters (23 December 2000) 461
Taba Statement (27 January 2001) 466
EU Moratinos Non-Paper on Taba Negotiations (27 January 2001) 468
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ix
Report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Mitchell Report)
(30 April 2001) 476
The Jordanian–Egyptian Proposal (19 April 2001) 479
Palestinian–Israeli Security Implementation Work Plan
(Tenet Cease-Fire Plan) (14 June 2001) 481
Arab Peace Initiative (28 March 2002) 484
The Rose Garden Speech of President George W. Bush (24 June 2002) 486
Ayalon–Nusseibeh Statement of Principles (27 July 2002) 490
A Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the
Israeli–Palestinian Conflict (Road Map) (30 April 2003) 492
Israel’s Response to the Road Map (14 Reservations) (25 May 2003) 499
Geneva Accord: A Model Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement
(1 December 2003) 502
Olga Document (12 July 2004) 530
Quartet Statements following Palestinian Elections of 2006, or the
Three Conditions to Hamas (30 January 2006) 534
Riyadh Declaration (29 March 2007) 537
Annapolis Joint Understanding (27 November 2007) 539
Olmert–Abbas Peace Talks (December 2008) 541
US President Barack Obama’s Speech on a New Beginning (Cairo Speech)
(4 June 2009) 542
Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Speech at Bar Ilan University (14 June 2009) 553
Chair’s Summary of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee on Palestinian
Institutions’ Readiness for Statehood (AHLC) (18 September 2011) 559
President Abbas’s Speech to UN General Assembly on Palestine’s
Membership (23 September 2011) 562
President Abbas’s Speech to UN General Assembly on Palestinian
Non-Member Observer State Status (29 November 2012) 570
Part III. UN Documents on the Question of Palestine
UN General Assembly Resolution 181(II) or the UN Partition Plan
(29 November 1947) 577
UN Security Council Resolution 50 (1948) and the Establishment of UNTSO
(29 May 1948) 599
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Contents
UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) (11 December 1948) 601
UN General Assembly Resolution 273 (III): Admission of Israel to
Membership in the United Nations (11 May 1949) 605
UN General Assembly Resolution 303 (IV) (9 December 1949) 606
UN General Assembly Resolutions 1000 (ES-I) and 1001 (ES-I)
(5 and 7 November 1956) 608
UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) (22 November 1967) 611
UN Security Council Resolution 338 (1973) (22 October 1973) 613
UN General Assembly Resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX)
(22 November 1974) 614
UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 (XXX) (10 November 1975) 617
UN Security Council Resolutions 476 (1980) and 478 (1980)
(30 June and 20 August 1980) 619
UN General Assembly Resolution 46/86 (16 December 1991) 623
UN Security Council Resolution 904 (1994) (18 March 1994) 624
UN Security Council Resolution 1073 (1996) (28 September 1996) 626
UN Security Council Resolution 1322 (2000) (7 October 2000) 628
UN Security Council Resolution 1397 (2002) (12 March 2002) 630
UN Security Council Resolution 1402 (2002) (30 March 2002) 632
UN Security Council Resolution 1405 (2002) (19 April 2002) 633
Report of UN Secretary-General prepared pursuant to UN General
Assembly Resolution ES-10/10 (Jenin Report) (31 July 2002) 634
UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13 (21 October 2003) 679
Report of UN Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution ES-10/13 (24 November 2003) 681
UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/14 (8 December 2003) 691
UN Security Council Resolution 1515 (2003) (19 November 2003) 694
UN Security Council Resolution 1544 (2004) (19 May 2004) 695
International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Barrier (July 2004) 697
UN General Assembly Resolution on ICJ Ruling on the Barrier
(2 August 2004) 759
UN Security Council Resolution 1850 (2008) (16 December 2008) 763
UN Security Council Resolution 1860 (2009) (8 January 2009) 765
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xi
Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict
(led by Judge Richard Goldstone) (25 September 2009) 767
Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010
Flotilla Incident (2 September 2011) 797
UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19: Status of Palestine in the
United Nations (4 December 2012) 802
Part IV. Regional Documents
Sykes–Picot Agreement (16 May 1916) 809
Balfour Declaration (2 November 1917) 812
Churchill White Paper (3 June 1922) 813
Peel Commission (7 July 1937) 817
MacDonald White Paper (17 May 1939) 843
Biltmore Program (11 May 1942) 854
Arab League Charter (22 March 1945) 856
Egypt–Israel General Armistice Agreement (24 February 1949) 863
Lebanon–Israel General Armistice Agreement (23 March 1949) 877
Jordan–Israel General Armistice Agreement (3 April 1949) 884
Syria–Israel General Armistice Agreement (20 July 1949) 894
Khartoum Resolution (1 September 1967) 906
Cairo Agreement (3 November 1969) 908
Rogers Plan (9 December 1969) 911
Egypt–Israel Sinai Disengagement Treaties (18 January 1974) 916
Egypt–Israel Sinai Interim Agreement (4 September 1975) 918
Israel–Syria Separation of Forces Agreement (31 May 1974) 922
Sadat and Begin Speeches to Knesset (20 November 1977) 925
UN Security Council Resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) (19 March 1978) 941
Camp David Accords (17 September 1978) 943
Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and
Israel (17 September 1978) 949
Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty (26 March 1979) 952
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xii
Contents
Protocol for the Creation of a Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)
(3 August 1981) 973
UN Security Council Resolution 497 (1981) (17 December 1981) 975
UN Security Council Resolution 520 (1982) (17 September 1982) 976
London Agreement (11 April 1987) 978
Abrogation of the Cairo Agreement by the Lebanese Parliament
(21 May 1987) 980
The Shultz Plan (4 March 1988) 981
King Hussein’s Address on Jordanian Disengagement from the West Bank
(31 July 1988) 983
Agreements between Egypt and Israel on Taba (26 February 1989) 988
Ta’if Agreement (22 October 1989) 992
Israel–Jordan Common Agenda (14 September 1993) 1002
Washington Declaration (25 July 1994) 1004
Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty (26 October 1994) 1007
Casablanca Declaration (1 November 1994) 1036
Israel–Lebanon Cease-Fire Understanding (26 April 1996) 1040
Israel–Jordan Qualifying Industrial Zone Agreement (21 January 1997) 1042
Government of Israel’s Resolution to Withdraw from Lebanon
(5 March 2000) 1045
Letter from Israeli Foreign Minister to UN Secretary-General on Israel’s
Withdrawal from Lebanon (17 April 2000) 1046
UN Reports on Israel’s Withdrawal from South Lebanon (22 May,
16 June, and 18 June 2000) 1047
Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Implementation of
UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 (22 May 2000) 1048
Second Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Implementation
of UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 (16 June 2000) 1059
UN Security Council Presidential Statement on Israel’s Withdrawal from
South Lebanon (18 June 2000) 1070
European Parliament Votes to Suspend Euro-Israeli Association Agreement
(10 April 2002) 1072
UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) (2 September 2004) 1075
Agreement between Egypt and Israel on Qualifying Industrial Zones
(14 December 2004) 1077
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xiii
Aleppo Understanding (12 March 2005) 1084
UN Security Council Resolution 1680 (2006) (17 May 2006) 1086
Seven-Point Plan of Prime Minister Siniora (25 July 2006) 1088
UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) (11 August 2006) 1090
UN Provisional Geographical Definition of the Shebaa Farms Area
(30 October 2007) 1095
Part V. Israeli and Palestinian Domestic Documents
Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (14 May 1948) 1103
Law of Return (5 July 1950) 1106
Original Palestinian National Charter (28 May 1964) 1110
Palestinian National Charter (17 July 1968) 1114
Arab League Summit Resolution on Palestine Liberation Organization
(28 October 1974) 1122
Hamas Charter (18 August 1988) 1124
Palestinian Declaration of Independence (15 November 1988) 1143
Amendment to Palestinian National Charter (4 May 1996) 1147
Palestinian Basic Law (29 May 2002, 18 March 2003, 13 August 2005) 1149
Outcomes of the London Conference on Palestinian Reform (17 January 2003) 1205
Fatah Declaration of Cease-Fire Initiative (29 June 2003) 1209
Hamas and Islamic Jihad Declaration of Cease-Fire Initiative (29 June 2003) 1211
Israeli Cabinet Communiqué Approving the Removal of Arafat
(11 September 2003) 1213
Hamas Political Program (17 March 2006) 1215
11 May Prisoners’ Document (11 May 2006) 1217
National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners (28 June 2006) 1222
Mecca Accord for Palestinian National Unity Government (8 February 2007) 1227
Program of Palestinian Unity Government (17 March 2007) 1228
Haifa Declaration (15 May 2007) 1234
Ending Occupation, Establishing the State: Program of the Thirteenth
Government of the Palestinian National Authority (Fayyad Plan)
(August 2009) 1240
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About the Editors
TERJE RØD-LARSEN
Terje Rød-Larsen became the President of the International Peace Institute (IPI) in
2005. IPI is an independent, international not-for-profit think tank headquartered in
New York, with regional offices in Vienna and Manama. IPI is dedicated to the
prevention and settlement of conflict. The UN Secretary-General is the honorary
chair of the board of the International Peace Institute. Concurrently, Terje Rød-Larsen
is a UN Under-Secretary-General. He serves as a Special Envoy of the Secretary-
General.
Terje Rød-Larsen began his career as an academic, studying history, philosophy,
public administration, and sociology. He taught Sociology, Political Science, and
Philosophy at the Universities of Bergen and Oslo, before establishing the Fafo Institute
for Applied Sciences in Oslo in 1981.
As Director of Fafo, he initiated a research project into the living conditions of
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The relationships with both Palestinians
and Israelis that he established during the period of preparing and implementing this
project led to a request by the PLO in 1992 that he help establish a secret channel for
negotiations between the PLO and the Government of Israel. Those negotiations
concluded with the Oslo Accords and the signing of the Declaration of Principles at
the White House on 13 September 1993.
In 1993, Mr Rød-Larsen was appointed Ambassador and Special Adviser for the
Middle East Peace process to the Norwegian Foreign Minister. In mid-1994, he was
appointed United Nations Under-Secretary-General, Special Coordinator for Gaza and
the West Bank. In 1996, he was appointed Norwegian Cabinet Minister for Planning
and Cooperation.
In 1999, he moved back to the UN as Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace
Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation
Organization and the Palestinian Authority at the level of Under-Secretary-
General, a post he held until December 2004. In this capacity he negotiated the Israeli
withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000 and established the UN line of withdrawal,
the ‘Blue Line’.
On 14 December 2004, he was appointed by the Secretary-General as his Special
Envoy for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559, on Lebanon and
Syria. In this capacity he negotiated the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in
2005. He also represented the UN Secretary-General in the cease-fire negotiations
during the 2006 war in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel.
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About the Editors
xv
NUR LAIQ
Nur Laiq is the author of Talking to Arab Youth: Revolution and Counterrevolution in
Egypt and Tunisia. Nur focuses on the transitions in the Middle East and North Africa,
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and issues related to US foreign policy.
She has worked as a senior policy analyst at the International Peace Institute in New
York, where she headed the Arab Youth Project. She previously worked with Labour
Party members of parliament in London on foreign policy and on the European
Commission's Middle East desk in Brussels. She has also worked with refugees via
United Nations Refugee Agency in New Delhi. Nur has an MPhil in Modern Middle
Eastern Studies from Oxford University.
FABRICE AIDAN
Fabrice Aidan graduated from the Écoles de Hautes Études Commerciales (HEC),
Paris, School of Management in 1998. He also holds a degree in Arabic and Islamic
studies from the Sorbonne University (Paris IV).
In 2000, he joined the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and became a permanent
member of the Foreign Service. He was first assigned to the Department of North
Africa and the Middle East. In 2002, he served as a Diplomat at the French Mission to
the United Nations in New York.
In 2003, the Government of France seconded him to the United Nations. In this
capacity, he served first in Gaza/Jerusalem as the special assistant of the UN Special
Coordinator for the Middle Peace Process. In 2005, he moved to UN headquarters in
New York as special assistant and senior political adviser to UN Under-Secretary-
General and Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Terje Rød-Larsen, dealing with
the Middle East.
In 2013, after ten years at the United Nations, he returned to the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs as senior adviser to the Director of North Africa and the Middle East.
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List of Maps
1. Middle East Region 2014 xlii
2. Palestine 1900 xliii
3. Sykes–Picot Agreement 1916 xliv
4. The Middle East after the San Remo Conference of 1920 xlv
5. Peel Commission 1937 xlvi
6. Partition Plan 1947 xlvii
7. Armistice Agreements 1949 xlviii
8. Israel and the Occupied Territories 1967 xlix
9. Oslo Accords 1994 l
10. Hebron Protocol 1997 li
11. Wye Memorandum 1998 lii
12. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum 1999 liii
13. Camp David 2000 liv
14. Clinton Parameters 2000 lv
15. Taba Talks 2001 lvi
16. Geneva Accord 2003 lvii
17. Gaza Disengagement 2005 lviii
18. Olmert–Abbas Talks 2007–8 lix
19. Autonomous areas 2012 lx
20. West Bank Barrier 2012 lxi
21. Israeli Settlements 2012 lxii
22. Jerusalem 2012 lxiii
23. Golan Heights 2012 lxiv
24. South Lebanon 2012 lxv
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List of Abbreviations
AHLC
ICJ
IDF
JLC
LACC
LAF
LAS
MFO
OAPEC
OIC
PA
PECDAR
PFLP
PLC
PLO
SLA
TIPH
UN
UNDOF
UNEF
UNGA
UNIFIL
UNRWA
UNSC
UNSCO
UNSCOP
UNSG
UNTSO
Ad Hoc Liaison Committee
International Court of Justice
Israel Defense Forces
Joint Liaison Committee
Local Aid Coordination Committee
Lebanese Armed Forces
League of Arab States
Multinational Force and Observers
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
Organization of Islamic Cooperation
Palestinian Authority
Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction
Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Palestinian Legislative Council
Palestine Liberation Organization
South Lebanon Army
Temporary International Presence in Hebron
United Nations
United Nations Disengagement Observation Force
United Nations Emergency Force
United Nations General Assembly
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East
United Nations Security Council
United Nations Special Coordinator
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
United Nations Secretary-General
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
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A Chronology of the Arab–Israeli Conflict
The following is a chronology of the main events in, and documents on, the Arab–Israel conflict.
Documents which are included in this volume are in italics.
1914–18 First World War.
24 October 1915 Letter from British High Commissioner McMahon to Hussein bin Ali,
Sharif of Mecca.
16 May 1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement.
2 November 1917 Balfour Declaration.
4–7 April 1920 4 days of violent rioting against Jews in Jerusalem.
19 April 1920 Opening of the San Remo Conference.
10 August 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, or the Peace Treaty between the Ottoman Empire
and the Allies.
1–7 May 1921 Major riots in Jaffa between Jews and Arabs.
28 February 1922 Great Britain issues the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Egypt.
3 June 1922 Churchill White Paper.
24 July 1922 The Council of the League of Nations confirms the British mandate in
Palestine.
23 August 1929 Major riots between Muslims and Jews in Jerusalem.
24 August 1929 Hebron Massacre.
23 September 1932 Abdul-Aziz al-Saud founds the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine.
7 July 1937 Peel Commission.
17 May 1939 MacDonald White Paper.
1 September 1939 Beginning of Second World War.
11 May 1942 Biltmore Program.
22 November 1943 Independence of Lebanon.
22 March 1945 Arab League Charter.
8 May 1945 End of Second World War in Europe.
26 June 1945 Signature of the United Nations Charter at the San Francisco Conference.
17 April 1946 Independence of Syria.
25 May 1946 The Emirate of Transjordan becomes the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
29 November 1947 UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (the partition plan).
14 May 1948 Israel declares its independence. End of the British Mandate in Palestine.
15 May 1948 Five Arab states declare war on Israel.
29 May 1948 UN Security Council Resolution 50 and the establishment of UNTSO.
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Chronology
xix
11 December 1948 UN General Assembly Resolution 194.
24 February 1949 Egypt–Israel General Armistice Agreement.
23 March 1949 Lebanon–Israel General Armistice Agreement.
3 April 1949 Jordan–Israel General Armistice Agreement.
27 April 1949 Opening of the Lausanne Conference convened by the United Nations’
Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP).
11 May 1949 The UN General Assembly admits Israel as UN member state through
Resolution A/RES/273 (III).
20 July 1949 Syria–Israel General Armistice Agreement.
12 December 1949 UN General Assembly Resolution 303, on the Internationalization of
Jerusalem.
24 April 1950 Jordan annexes the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
5 July 1950 Israel votes the Law of Return.
20 July 1951 King Abdullah I of Jordan in assassinated in the vicinity of al-Aqsa
Mosque in Jerusalem by a Palestinian gunman.
23 July 1952 Military coup in Egypt by the Free Officers Movement.
18 June 1953 The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) abolishes the monarchy
and proclaims the Republic of Egypt.
23 June 1956 Gamal Abdel Nasser is elected President of the Republic of Egypt.
26 July 1956 President Nasser of Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal.
29 October 1956 Suez Crisis. Israel invades Sinai (Operation Kadesh) with the covert assent
of France and the UK.
30 October 1956 France and the UK launch military operations against Egypt.
5 November 1956 UN General Assembly Resolution 1000 (Suez Crisis).
7 November 1956 UN General Assembly Resolution 1001 (Suez Crisis).
8 March 1957 Israel withdraws its last forces from the Sinai peninsula, ending the Suez
Crisis.
14 July 1958 Military coup against Iraqi monarchy.
3 February 1964 The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) is established by the Arab
League in Cairo, with Ahmed Shuqeiri as its leader.
16 May 1967 President Nasser asks the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to
leave Sinai and the Gaza Strip, where it had been engaged in peacekeeping
functions since the 1956 Sinai conflict.
22 May 1967 Egypt announces a blockade against Israeli shipping in the Strait of Tiran.
5 June 1967 ‘Six Day War’: Israel launches military strikes on Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.
After six days of fighting, Israel captures the Sinai peninsula and Gaza
Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and
about 1,150 square kilometres of Syrian territory on the Golan Heights.
1 September 1967 Khartoum Resolution of the three ‘Noes’.
22 November 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242.
21 March 1968 The battle of Karameh between Israel and Fatah and Jordanian forces.
First direct military confrontation between Israeli and Palestinian forces.
17 July 1968 The Palestinian National Charter.
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xx
Chronology
2 February 1969 Yasir Arafat, leader of the Fatah Party, elected chairman of the PLO.
8 March 1969 President Nasser denounces the 1967 war cease-fire, marking the beginning
of the War of Attrition against Israel.
25 September 1969 Creation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).
3 November 1969 Cairo Agreement.
9 December 1969 Rogers Plan.
7 August 1970 War of Attrition cease-fire.
September 1970 ‘Black September’ in Jordan. The PLO is expelled from Jordan.
28 September 1970 President Gamal Abdel Nasser dies and is replaced by Vice President
Anwar al-Sadat.
16 November 1970 Syria’s Minister of Defense, Hafez al-Assad, leads the ‘Correctionist
Movement’ military coup.
12 March 1971 Hafez al-Assad is elected President of Syria in a referendum.
6 October 1973 October or Yom Kippur War. Egypt and Syria attack Israeli forces in the
Sinai and the Golan Heights.
17 October 1973 OAPEC decides on an oil embargo.
22 October 1973 UN Security Council Resolution 338.
18 January 1974 First Egyptian–Israeli Disengagement of Forces Agreement.
31 May 1974 Israel–Syria Separation of Forces Agreement.
26–29 October 1974 Arab summit at Rabat declares the PLO the ‘sole legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people’.
28 October 1974 Arab League Resolution on Palestine Liberation Organization.
13 November 1974 PLO Chairman Arafat addresses the UN General Assembly in Geneva.
22 November 1974 UN General Assembly Resolutions 3236 and 3237 (PLO).
13 April 1975 Beginning of the Lebanese Civil War.
4 September 1975 Second Egyptian–Israel Disengagement of Forces Agreement.
10 November 1975 UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 (Zionism–Racism).
May 1976 Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh invites Syrian troops into the
country.
17 May 1977 Menachem Begin’s Likud Party wins Israeli national elections after 29
years of Labor Party dominance.
9 November 1977 In a speech in Cairo, President Anwar al-Sadat announces his readiness to
travel to Israel.
20 November 1977 Anwar al-Sadat and Menachem Begin speeches to the Knesset in Jerusalem.
28 December 1977 Prime Minister Begin’s Knesset speech on Home Rule.
14 March 1978 Operation Litany—Israel invades South Lebanon.
19 March 1978 UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 (Lebanon).
17 September 1978 Camp David Accords.
2–5 November 1978 Arab League Summit in Baghdad. Egypt suspended from the Organization.
Its headquarters to be moved to Tunis.
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Chronology
xxi
10 December 1978 President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin are awarded jointly in Oslo the
Nobel Peace Prize.
16 January 1979 Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi leaves Iran after months of domestic
turmoil.
26 March 1979 Signature of the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty in the White House.
1 April 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini proclaims the Islamic Republic of Iran after a
national referendum.
2 April 1979 Prime Minister Begin visits Cairo.
February 1980 Israel and Egypt exchange Ambassadors for the first time.
30 June 1980 UN Security Council Resolution 476 (Jerusalem).
30 July 1980 The Knesset votes the Basic Law on Jerusalem.
20 August 1980 UN Security Council Resolution 478 (Jerusalem).
3 August 1981 Signature of the Protocol to the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt,
establishing the Multilateral Force and Observers (MFO).
7 August 1981 Fahd Plan.
6 October 1981 Assassination of President Sadat. Vice President Mubarak succeeds him.
14 December 1981 The Israel Knesset passes a law annexing the Golan Heights.
17 December 1981 UN Security Council Resolution 497 (Golan Heights).
25 April 1982 Israel completes its pull back from Sinai with the exception of Taba.
6 June 1982 Israel launches Operation ‘Peace in Galilee’; beginning of the Lebanon war.
1 September 1982 Reagan Peace Plan.
9 September 1982 Fez Peace Initiative.
14 September 1982 Assassination of Lebanese President Beshir Gemayel.
17 September 1982 UN Security Council Resolution 520 (Lebanon).
17 May 1983 Israel and Lebanon sign a peace agreement.
19 February 1986 King Hussein of Jordan severs ties with the PLO.
11 April 1987 London Agreement.
21 May 1987 Lebanon’s parliament abrogates the 1969 Cairo agreement with the PLO
and cancels the 17 May 1983 agreement with Israel.
9 December 1987 The first Palestinian uprising (intifada) against Israeli rule in the West
Bank and Gaza begins.
4 March 1988 Shultz Plan.
31 July 1988 Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank.
18 August 1988 Hamas Charter.
15 November 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence.
14 December 1988 The US recognizes the PLO. President Reagan authorizes the State
Department to enter into a dialogue with the organization.
26 February 1989 Israel and Egypt sign agreement returning Taba to Egypt.
23 May 1989 President Mubarak of Egypt attends the Arab League summit in
Casablanca marking the readmission of Egypt to the Arab League.
22 October 1989 Ta’if Agreement.
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Chronology
9 November 1989 Fall of the Berlin Wall.
12 March 1990 The Arab League decides to return its headquarters to Cairo.
20 June 1990 President G.H. Bush suspends dialogue with the PLO.
2 August 1990 Iraq invades Kuwait.
17 January 1991 The US launches Operation Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait.
30 April 1991 The Lebanese parliament orders the disbanding of all militias by this date.
Hezbollah remains active and the South Lebanon Army (SLA) refuses to
disband.
26 August 1991 The Lebanese parliament grants an amnesty for all crimes committed
during the civil war, 1975–90.
18 October 1991 Invitation to the Madrid Peace Conference. The US letters of assurance to
the Palestinians and Israelis.
30 October 1991 The Middle East Peace Conference opens in Madrid. Face-to-face
bilateral talks for the first time between Israeli and Arab delegations, as
well as with a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation.
16 December 1991 UN General Assembly Resolution 46/86 (Zionism-Racism).
26 December 1991 Formal dissolution of the USSR.
23 June 1992 Israeli Labor Party wins the elections. Yitzhak Rabin becomes Prime
Minister.
January 1993 Secret Israeli–PLO talks begin in Oslo, and develop into full-scale official
negotiations in May that year.
20 August 1993 Secret signing of the Oslo Accords in Oslo by Israeli Foreign Minister
Peres, Palestinian Chief Negotiator Qorei and Norwegian Foreign
Minister Holst.
9 September 1993 Israel and the PLO exchange letters of recognition.
13 September 1993 Signature of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self- Government
Agreements in Washington.
14 September 1993 Israel–Jordan Common Agenda.
11 October 1993 Letter from Israel’s Foreign Minister Peres to Norway’s Foreign Minister
Holst on the Status of East Jerusalem.
5 November 1993 Establishment of the AHLC.
25 February 1994 An Israeli opens fire at the Ibrahimi Mosque or Tomb of the Patriarchs in
Hebron, killing 29 Palestinians.
18 March 1994 UN Security Council Resolution 904 on the Hebron Massacre.
29 April 1994 Protocol on Economic Relations between the State of Israel and the PLO
(Paris Protocol).
4 May 1994 Gaza–Jericho Agreement.
18 May 1994 The IDF withdraws from Gaza city and Jericho.
1 July 1994 Yasir Arafat arrives in Gaza.
25 July 1994 Washington Declaration (Jordan–Israel peace talks).
29 August 1994 Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Power and Responsibilities.
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13 September 1994 Oslo Declaration.
14 October 1994 Prime Minister Rabin, Chairman Yasir Arafat, and Foreign Minister Peres
are awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
26 October 1994 Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty.
1 November 1994 Casablanca Declaration.
30 November 1994 Establishment of the LACC.
10 December 1994 Official ceremony to present Nobel Peace Prize to Yizhak Rabin, Shimon
Peres, and Yasir Arafat.
28 September 1995 Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip:
Oslo II.
31 October 1995 Beilin–Abu Mazen Agreement.
4 November 1995 Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin assassinated. Shimon Peres becomes Prime
Minister.
20 January 1996 Yasir Arafat is elected president of the Palestinian Authority (PA).
25 February–
4 March 1996 A series of suicide attacks by Hamas in Israel kill more than 60.
13 March 1996 Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of Peacemakers Final Statement.
11 April 1996 Israel launches Operation Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon.
24 April 1996 The Palestinian National Council (PNC) cancels the clauses of the
Palestinian Charter that are contrary to the recognition of Israel.
26 April 1996 Israel–Lebanon cease-fire understandings.
4 May 1996 Letter from Chairman Arafat to Prime Minister Peres on the Amendment
to Palestinian National Charter.
9 May 1996 TIPH Agreement I.
29 May 1996 Benjamin Netanyahu elected Prime Minister of Israel.
4 September 1996 First meeting of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat.
28 September 1996 UN Security Council Resolution 1073.
17 January 1997 Hebron Protocol.
21 January 1997 TIPH II agreement.
21 January 1997 Israel–Jordan QIZ agreement.
25 September 1997 Israel’s assassination attempt on Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in
Amman.
23 October 1998 Wye River Agreement signed by Arafat and Netanyahu.
14 December 1998 The Palestinian National Council convenes in the presence of President
Clinton to reaffirm the annulling of clauses of the Palestinian Charter
which denied Israel’s right to exist.
7 February 1999 King Hussein of Jordan dies. Abdullah II succeeds him.
17 May 1999 Ehud Barak elected Prime Minister of Israel.
4 September 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum.
5 October 1999 Protocol Concerning Safe Passage.
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Chronology
15 December 1999 President Clinton hosts summit meeting with Israel’s Prime Minister
Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister al-Shara, followed by rounds of peace
talks in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, in January 2000.
5 March 2000 Government of Israel’s resolution to withdraw from Lebanon.
26 March 2000 Bill Clinton and Hafez al-Assad summit in Geneva.
17 April 2000 Letter from Israel’s Foreign Minister to UN Secretary-General on Israel’s
withdrawal from Lebanon.
22 May 2000 Report of the UN Secretary-General on Implementation of Resolutions 425
and 426.
24 May 2000 IDF completes pull-out from Lebanon.
10 June 2000 President Hafez al-Assad dies.
16 June 2000 Second Report of the UN Secretary-General on Implementation of Resolutions
425 and 426.
18 June 2000 The UN Security Council confirms Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in a
Presidential Statement.
10 July 2000 Bashar al-Assad is elected President of Syria in a nationwide referendum.
11–25 July 2000 Camp David II negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasir Arafat.
25 July 2000 Camp David Statement.
28 September 2000 Likud leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif,
prompting major Palestinian riots. Second Palestinian uprising (al-Aqsa
Intifadah) begins.
7 October 2000 Three Israeli soldiers abducted by Hezbollah along the Blue Line.
17 October 2000 Joint Statements at the Conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit in
Sharm el-Sheikh.
10 December 2000 Prime Minister Barak resigns and calls for early elections.
23 December 2000 Clinton Parameters.
21–27 January 2001 Taba Talks.
27 January 2001 Taba Statement.
27 January 2001 Moratinos Non-Paper on Taba Negotiations.
6 February 2001 Ariel Sharon elected Prime Minister of Israel.
19 April 2001 Jordanian–Egyptian Proposal.
30 April 2001 Mitchell Report.
14 June 2001 Palestinian–Israeli Security Implementation Work Plan (Tenet Cease-Fire
Plan).
17 October 2001 Assassination of Israel tourism minister Rehavam Zeevi in Jerusalem by
militants of the PFLP.
17 February 2002 Thomas Friedman of the New York Times publishes interview with
Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia on his peace initiative.
12 March 2002 UN Security Council Resolution 1397.
28 March 2002 Beirut Arab League Summit Declaration on the Arab Peace Initiative.
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29 March 2002 Israel launches operation Defense Shield, placing Arafat under siege in his
Ramallah compound, the Muqata.
30 March 2002 Security Council Resolution 1402.
10 April 2002 European Parliament votes to suspend Euro-Israeli association agreement.
12 April 2002 The Battle of Jenin.
19 April 2002 UN Security Council Resolution 1405 on Jenin.
29 May 2002 Basic Palestinian Law.
24 June 2002 President G.W. Bush’s Rose Garden speech.
27 July 2002 Ayalon–Nusseibeh Statement of Principles.
31 July 2002 Report of the UN Secretary-General prepared pursuant to UN General
Assembly Resolution ES-10/10 (Jenin Report).
17 January 2003 Outcomes of London Conference on Palestinian Reform.
19 March 2003 US and UK invasion of Iraq.
19 March 2003 Yasir Arafat appoints Mahmoud Abbas as the first Prime Minister of the
Palestinian Authority.
30 April 2003 Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the
Israeli–Palestinian Conflict.
25 May 2003 Israel’s response to Road Map.
4 June 2003 A summit is convened by President Bush in Aqaba, Jordan with Prime
Ministers Sharon and Abbas, hosted by King Abdullah II.
29 June 2003 Palestinian cease-fire statements.
6 September 2003 Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas resigns.
11 September 2003 The Israeli cabinet approves removal of Yasir Arafat from the West Bank.
5 October 2003 Ahmed Qorei appointed Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority.
21 October 2003 UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13 (Barrier).
19 November 2003 UN Security Council Resolution 1515 (Quartet’s Road-Map).
24 November 2003 Report of the UNSG pursuant to Resolution ES-10/13 (Barrier).
1 December 2003 The Geneva Accord: A Model Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement.
8 December 2003 UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/14 (Barrier).
18 December 2003 Prime Minister Sharon’s address at the Fourth Herzliyah Conference.
14 April 2004 Exchange of letters between Prime Minister Sharon and President Bush.
18 April 2004 The Disengagement Plan: General Outline.
18 April 2004 Rice–Weisglass Letter of Understanding.
19 May 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1544.
19 May 2004 Letter from President Bush to King Abdullah II of Jordan.
6 June 2004 Israeli Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan.
9 July 2004 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the Barrier.
12 July 2004 Olga Document.
2 August 2004 UN General Assembly Resolution on the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the
Barrier.
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Chronology
2 September 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (Lebanon).
11 November 2004 Yasir Arafat dies. The Executive Committee of the PLO elects Mahmoud
Abbas as its leader.
14 December 2004 Agreement between Egypt and Israel on Qualifying Industrial Zones.
9 January 2005 Mahmoud Abbas elected President of the Palestinian Authority.
14 February 2005 Assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.
12 March 2005 Aleppo Understandings.
7 April 2005 UN Security Council Resolution 1595 establishes an International Independent
Inquiry Commission (UNIIC) into the assassination of Prime
Minister Hariri.
26 April 2005 Syria ends its military presence in Lebanon.
17 August–22
September 2005 Israel pulls out of the Gaza Strip.
15 November 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access.
4 January 2006 Israeli Prime Minister Sharon is incapacitated. Ehud Olmert becomes
interim Prime Minister.
25 January 2006 Hamas wins Palestinian Legislative Council elections.
30 January 2006 Quartet Statement on Palestinian Legislative elections.
16 February 2006 Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas appointed Prime Minister.
17 March 2006 Hamas Political Program.
28 March 2006 Kadima leader Ehud Olmert wins Israeli elections.
29 March 2006 Palestinian Government led by Hamas sworn in.
30 March 2006 Quartet Statement on Hamas.
11 May 2006 Palestinian Prisoners’ Document.
17 May 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1680 (Lebanon/Syria).
25 June 2006 Abduction of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Israel launches Operation
Summer Rains in the Gaza Strip.
28 June 2006 National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners.
12 July 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war starts after Hezbollah attacks an Israeli patrol along
the Blue Line, killing three soldiers and kidnapping two.
25 July 2006 Seven-Point Plan of Prime Minister Siniora.
11 August 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
14 August 2006 Cessation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon.
8 February 2007 Mecca Accord for Palestinian National Unity Government.
17 March 2007 Palestinian Government of Unity sworn in.
17 March 2007 Program of Palestinian Unity Government.
29 March 2007 Riyadh Declaration.
15 May 2007 Haifa Declaration.
30 May 2007 UN Security Council Resolution 1757 establishes Special Tribunal for
Lebanon (STL).
10 June 2007 Violent confrontations between Hamas and Fatah in the Gaza Strip.
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13 June 2007 Shimon Peres is elected President of Israel by the Knesset.
14 June 2007 President Abbas dismisses Prime Minister Haniyeh and declares a state of
emergency.
15 June 2007 Hamas takes control over the Gaza Strip in a coup, after several days
of violent battles with Fatah.
15 June 2007 Salam Fayyad appointed Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority.
30 October 2007 UN Provisional Geographic Definition of the Shebaa Farms Area.
27 November 2007 Annapolis Joint Understanding.
7 May 2008 Hezbollah militants take control of areas of Beirut.
21 May 2008 Doha agreement between Lebanese leaders brokered by Qatar.
21 May 2008 Israel and Syria announce holding indirect talks through Turkish
mediation.
30 July 2008 Prime Minister Olmert announces he is not seeking re-election.
15 October 2008 Establishment of diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon.
16 December 2008 Last meeting of Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas.
16 December 2008 UN Security Council Resolution 1850 on Annapolis process.
27 December 2008 Israel launches Operation ‘Cast Lead’ against Hamas.
8 January 2009 UN Security Council Resolution 1860 on a Gaza cease-fire.
18 January 2009 Gaza cease-fire.
20 February 2009 President Peres tasks Netanyahu to form a Cabinet following 10 February
elections.
1 March 2009 Opening of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).
31 March 2009 Benjamin Netanyahu is sworn in as Prime Minister.
4 June 2009 President Obama’s Cairo Speech.
14 June 2009 Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Speech at Bar Ilan University.
25 August 2009 Ending Occupation, Establishing the State: Fayyad Plan.
25 September 2009 Report of the United Nations fact finding mission on the Gaza conflict: the
Goldstone report.
31 May 2010 Gaza Flotilla Incident.
25 January 2011 Beginning of the Egyptian uprising.
11 February 2011 President Mubarak of Egypt resigns.
15 March 2011 Beginning of the Syrian uprising.
4 May 2011 In Cairo, Palestinian Authority President Abbas and Hamas leader
Meshal sign a reconciliation agreement, which calls, inter alia, for
elections in 2012.
29 July 2011 Formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).
2 September 2011 Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010
Flotilla Incident.
18 September 2011 Chair’s Summary of the AHLC on Palestinian Institutions’ readiness for
statehood.
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Chronology
23 September 2011 President Abbas’s speech to the UN General Assembly on UN membership.
31 October 2011 Palestine becomes a member of UNESCO.
6 February 2012 In Doha, Palestinian Authority President Abbas and Hamas leader
Meshal sign another reconciliation agreement after the failure to
implement the Cairo deal.
20 June 2012 Mohamed Morsi is sworn in as President of Egypt.
14 November 2012 Israel launches Operation ‘Pillar of Defense’ in Gaza.
21 November 2012 Gaza War II: Israel and Hamas unilateral cease-fire.
29 November 2012 President Abbas’s speech to the UN General Assembly on Palestine’s status
at the United Nations.
4 December 2012 UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19: Status of Palestine in the United
Nations.
22 January 2013 Likud Party leader Netanyahu wins parliamentary elections.
13 April 2013 Prime Minister Salam Fayyad resigns.
6 June 2013 Rami Hamdallah is sworn in as Palestinian Prime Minister.
20 June 2013 Rami Hamdallah resigns from his post.
30 June 2013 Massive demonstrations in Egypt against President Morsi.
3 July 2013 Egyptian Army removes President Morsi from power.
30 July 2013 Resumption of Israeli–Palestinian peace talks in Washington facilitated
by President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry.
19 September 2013 Rami Hamdallah forms a new Palestinian Government.
16 January 2014 Opening in The Hague of the trial of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
(STL).
23 April 2014 Fatah and Hamas announce in Gaza a new reconciliation agreement
calling for the formation of a national unity Government and the holding
of elections.
24 April 2014 The Israeli Cabinet suspends peace talks with the Palestinians in protest to
the Gaza agreement.
2 June 2014 Palestinian unity government headed by Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah
is sworn in.
3 June 2014 Bashar al-Assad is re-elected President of Syria in an election whose
legitimacy was widely contested.
8 June 2014 Field Marshall Abdel Fattah a-Sissi is sworn in as President of the Arab
Republic of Egypt following presidential elections held 26–28 May.
12 June 2014 Three Israeli teenagers were abducted in the West Bank. The IDF found
their bodies on 30 June in the vicinity of Hebron. In retaliation, Israel
launched attacks against targets of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
2 July 2014 A Palestinian teenager was abducted and killed in Jerusalem by a group of
Israelis. This triggered a series of violent clashes.
7 July 2014 Israel launches operation ‘Protective Edge’ against Hamas in the Gaza
Strip in retaliation to rocket attacks.
26 August 2014 A ceasefire, brokered by Egypt, was reached to end hostilities between
Palestinian factions and Israel in Gaza.
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The Crooked Course:
Step by Step on the Path to Peace
INTRODUCTION
As Immanuel Kant observed, “out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing
was ever made.” And the Middle East peace process is no exception. It runs a crooked
course. This work provides a paper trail of the meandering and rocky path of the peace
process. Relevant documents related to the Arab–Israeli conflict over the past century
(since the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916) are compiled in this book. It provides an
annotated and chronological overview of attempts to make peace in one of the most
difficult and protracted conflicts in the world, and it includes a full set of accompanying
maps specially made for this edition.
The sheer volume of such a work raises the critical problem of how to present the
documents in a way that facilitates their accessibility and understanding. A simple
chronological ordering would miss important connections between the documents,
which are thus better grouped by common theme. To this end, we have divided the
volume into five thematic Parts. Part I compiles documents related to the formal peace
agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as those related to Israel’s
unilateral disengagement from Gaza. The documents in Part II relate to the many
informal peace proposals and ideas offered over the years that have served to contribute
to more official processes at a later date. Part III compiles the many important United
Nations documents specifically related to the question of Palestine. Part IV sets the
Israeli–Palestinian issue in a broader context, providing regional papers going back a
century, up to the latest documents. Finally, Part V compiles Israeli and Palestinian
domestic documents relevant to the quest for peace in the Middle East.
Grouping the documents by theme highlights the evolution of particular aspects of
the conflict and the peace process over time. When examined as a group, these
documents provide valuable insights on the events, conditions, and actions that have
been most important in influencing the different phases of the peace process.
For guidance, the reader will find a chronological overview of all the documents and
key events.
ON PART I: PEACE AGREEMENTS AND THE
DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA
Nothing about the quest for peace in the Middle East has been simple or easily attained.
Merely bringing Palestinians and Israelis together was a feat that took decades to
achieve. Despite all the efforts exerted by not only the principal parties, but also local
actors, regional neighbors, and international players, agreements between the two sides
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The Crooked Course
have been scarce. This Part chronicles the rare moments when both Israeli and
Palestinian negotiators put pen to paper in an effort to resolve a conflict that has
seemed intractable.
Part I begins with the Oslo peace talks, which in 1993 produced the Declaration of
Principles (DoP) and the mutual recognition of the State of Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people. These two agreements formed the basis for all subsequent talks between the
parties.
In 1992, as the director of the Norwegian research institute Fafo, I initiated, together
with then member of Knesset Yossi Beilin, secret talks between him and local Palestinian
leader Faisal Husseini, at the American Colony Hotel in Jerusalem. These talks, which
were facilitated by Fafo and the Foreign Ministry of Norway, reached a dead end later that
year. The Norwegians realized that without involving the exiled and outlawed Palestinian
leadership in Tunis, nothing could be accomplished. At the time, both Israeli and
American citizens were forbidden to engage with any member of the PLO. In December
1992, I flew to Tunis to meet for the first time with PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat. In that
meeting in his villa, in the darkness of the early morning hours, he authorized the head of
Fatah’s financial wing, Ahmed Qorei (alias Abu Ala), to travel to Oslo for secret talks
facilitated by Fafo in cooperation with the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. The first meeting
took place at Borregaard Manor outside Oslo, in January 1993.
From January to May 1993, secret talks were conducted as a pre-negotiation phase,
in parallel to the Madrid process taking place in Washington. The goals of prenegotiations
in Oslo were twofold: to build trust between the Palestinian and Israeli
representatives; and to explore possible parameters of an agreement. In order to reach
the first goal, the exercise was restricted to a small group, willing to engage in secret
intense interaction over a lengthy period. Unlike the massive delegations in Washington,
the delegations in Oslo were never larger than three to five people on each side,
with continued interaction often from dawn to dusk.
In Oslo, the Palestinians were represented from day one by a delegation of the PLO,
handpicked by its chairman, Yasir Arafat. The rationale behind this unprecedented
step was that the Norwegians had discovered that the PLO was already controlling
every detail, albeit invisibly, of the bilateral and multilateral talks in Washington.
Furthermore we believed that if the PLO and Yasir Arafat were not directly involved
in the talks, they still had the ability and the will to block any agreement. Allowing
others to reach an agreement would be tantamount to political suicide by the PLO.
Therefore, it was necessary to have them at the table. Without them, no agreement
could be reached.
The pre-negotiation phase ended on 1 May 1993. The talks had reached a point
where both parties believed that the other was negotiating in good faith and that an
agreement had to take the shape of a declaration of principles. On that date, the head of
the Palestinian negotiation team, Ahmed Qorei, invited me for a walk in the hills above
Oslo. He made it clear—in the most explicit of words—that the PLO would not
continue into a final round of talks unless the Israelis “upgraded” their delegation to
high-level officials. Up to this point, the Israelis were represented by two academics
(Ron Pundak and Yair Hirschfeld) who did not hold any formal position in the
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government. In the following days, I flew to Israel to convey the request to Yossi Beilin,
then Deputy Foreign Minister. Shortly afterwards, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres
dispatched the Director General of the ministry, Uri Savir, and the head of the
ministry’s legal department, Joel Singer, to Oslo. The Norwegians had, until then,
seen the secret talks in Oslo and their potential outcome only as possible inputs to the
negotiations in Washington. We were puzzled—and pleasantly surprised—to realize
that the parties now wanted to negotiate the full deal under the Oslo framework.
Indeed, in the spring of 1993 the parties started to conduct proper negotiations in
Oslo—out of the public eye—rather than through the formal process in Washington.
Within four months, the Declaration of Principles was initialed in a secret ceremony in
the Government Guest House in Oslo. This was followed by a new set of secret
negotiations in Paris, facilitated by the Norwegian team (Johan Jorgen Holst, Jan
Egeland, Mona Juul, and myself). The outcome was the mutual recognition of the
State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, which paved the way for the
formal signing of the Oslo Accords on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993.
The Declaration of Principles was based on the approach that the easiest issues
should be resolved first, with remaining issues to be addressed later, step-by-step. A
Palestinian Authority for self-rule would be established, first gaining control over Gaza
and Jericho, and then gradually expanding into the West Bank. The details of the
expansion were to be hammered out in the so-called Oslo II Agreement, signed in
Cairo on 28 September 1995.
As unique and effective as this approach proved to be, the Oslo Accords would not
have been possible without the dramatic changes taking place within the international
system at the time. The PLO had been financially dependent on the states of the Arab
Gulf and the Communist bloc. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Arafat’s support of
Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of 1991 resulted in the collapse of funding for the
PLO and an end to remittances to Palestinian families in Gaza and the West Bank.
Simultaneously, the first Intifada between 1987 and 1993 and the emergence of a new
local leadership in Gaza and the West Bank created a threat to the leadership of the
PLO in exile in Tunis. The organization needed desperately to regain its financial
footing, as well as its political stature. These were major incentives to move the
Organization into what was to become the Oslo process.
The Israeli leadership also had its reasons to come to the negotiating table. The rise
of satellite television channels, such as CNN, beamed live images around the world of
Israeli soldiers armed to the teeth combating stone-throwing kids in Gaza and the West
Bank. Support for the government of Israel dropped dramatically in Europe and at
home. Israelis began to feel that they were losing the moral high ground. Israeli leaders
saw that using traditional military means to combat the Intifada came at a high political
and moral cost. They too were in search of a political way out. In short, the Oslo
channel came precisely at the right time, providing a lifeline for both the Israeli and
Palestinian leaderships.
The implementation of the Declaration of Principles started in earnest in 1994, with
Yasir Arafat’s spectacular arrival in Gaza and the rapid establishment of the Palestinian
Authority. I had the pleasure of welcoming him on behalf of UN Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as his newly appointed Special Coordinator for the Occupied
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The Crooked Course
Territories and Personal Representative to the PLO and the Palestinian Authority at
our new headquarters in Gaza city. The PLO had regained its uncontested leadership,
and the Palestinian Authority received a massive financial boost with the influx of
donor money from across the world. Israel received a moral boost as a large number of
countries formally recognized its existence and established diplomatic relations.
A hallmark of the Declaration of Principles was the establishment of a gradual
approach to resolving the conflict. Gradualism now became the keyword for describing
the peace process. By breaking the overall goal of peace into manageable sections that
could be addressed in sequence, the Oslo process allowed for progress to be made and
trust to develop on less contentious issues before tackling more controversial topics like
Jerusalem, borders, security arrangements, and refugees, which could threaten to derail
any talks.
One of the principal advantages of the step-by-step or gradualist approach was that
it enabled the parties to reach compromises through ongoing dialogue and interaction
with each other by starting with the easiest issues and leaving the hardest for last. It
allowed for an incremental change in perceptions and political positions. Although
gradualism allowed success to be achieved in a variety of areas, moving the process
forward, at each stage, depended on the parties taking the bold steps necessary to fulfill
their respective commitments. The main weakness was slow movement in implementation,
with progress falling behind agreed upon timelines. This led to periodic
disillusionment and back-sliding.
A recurrent problem was that the parties had failed to agree on a mechanism to
penalize non-compliance. This critical deficiency undermined progress. As leaders and
the political climate changed, so too did the resolve to implement.
Successful gradualism required the use of ambiguous language on the most contentious
issues: Jerusalem, borders, security, and refugees. The successive Israeli governments
and the Palestinian leadership had substantially different views on the final
status of all four of these issues. The language contained within the Oslo documents, as
well as subsequent agreements, provides room for interpretation. Either side could
claim that the text represents their interests. This allowed leaders to go home to their
respective constituents and retain popular support.
Another practice that proved effective was the use of the annexes attached to agreements
to flesh out disruptive details, or to substantially water down the impact of
certain commitments made within the body of the text. In many cases the annexes are
exhaustively long and detailed but are rarely read by the public, affording the leaders
political space to make agreements that might otherwise face public criticism.
The three Israeli Prime Ministers who were in office from 1993 to 1999—Rabin,
Peres, and Netanyahu—approached the challenges of peace through a concept of
gradualism, postponing the tricky final status issues. Barak, who took office in 1999,
was the first Israeli Prime Minister to address the final status head-on with a “totalist”
approach (read below).
While the Oslo process was based on the concept of gradualism, characterized by
bilateral negotiations—facilitated by a third party—and cumulative small steps demonstrating
good faith, Ariel Sharon eventually took a contrary approach through
“uncompromising unilateralism”. The day after he won the election in February 2001,
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xxxiii
he invited me to meet him at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. During the course of
the conversation, he surprisingly asked what I would do with the peace process if I were
him. I had just re-read his autobiography, Warrior, and answered: “Both as a soldier
and as a politician, you have a history of being bold, daunting, daring and making
surprise moves. In that spirit, I would suggest that you dismantle the settlements and
pull your troops completely out of Gaza.” For a minute I worried that this would anger
him, but he answered very calmly. “I cannot do it.” I asked why. He said: “Because of
the harbor.” I replied, rather perplexed: “But there is no harbor in Gaza.” He said:
“That’s not the point. They could build one if we left Gaza.” Then I realized that,
contrary to common opinion, Sharon had no ideological inhibitions about leaving
Gaza. His concerns were only about security. This gave me high hopes that he would
eventually do it. Three years of stalemate were to follow. And then in December 2003,
out of the blue, Sharon made the sweeping and stunning pronouncement that Israel
would leave Gaza and end its occupation of the Strip.
Ariel Sharon deserves praise for withdrawing from Gaza. But his unilateral move
undermined the possibility of peaceful relations between the inhabitants of the Gaza
Strip and Israel. The PLO and the Palestinian Authority were sidelined. They could not
claim credit for the move, and thus had scant motivation for supporting it. Instead,
militants in Gaza and the West Bank harvested all the benefits. The Disengagement
plan undermined those on the Palestinian side who claimed that the negotiating table
was a more efficient tool than the barrel of a gun in order to resolve the conflict.
ON PART II: PEACE PROPOSALS AND IDEAS
The formal agreements covered in Part I represent the conclusions of long and complex
diplomatic processes. Part II encompasses proposals and ideas that contributed to
breaking taboos and changing opinions that paved the way for precedent-setting
agreements.
In the late 1970s and 1980s several plans and initiatives were put forward which
maintain relevance for the future of the peace process. One idea was a comprehensive
and unified Arab approach which was first proposed in the Fahd Plan (1981), and later
refined in the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002. The latter peace proposal promoted by
then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah al-Saud represented a unified shift in the Arab
States’ approach to Israel. Where there was once rejection, the Arab peace initiative
created the possibility of universal recognition of the State of Israel. All 57 countries of
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) endorsed the initiative.
The aftermath of the Gulf War of 1991 opened new opportunities to address the
complex issue of peace in the Middle East. This was the backdrop for the groundbreaking
Madrid Peace Conference, convened by the United States and the Soviet Union. It
raised new hopes for peaceful resolution to the enduring conflicts of the region. The
conference created an unprecedented platform for peace talks, based on the principle of
“land for peace”. The Israelis would have to cede land to their Arab adversaries in
return for peace and security. The Madrid formula for organizing such talks followed a
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two-track approach: bilateral negotiations in Washington; and the formation of several
multilateral working groups to address specific issues such as water, refugees, the
economy, etc. It is worth noting that the PLO was not accepted at the negotiating
table. Instead the Palestinians were represented by a joint delegation of Jordanian
officials and prominent Palestinians, who allegedly were not associated with the PLO.
In stark contrast to the Oslo process, the Washington talks under the Madrid formula
were public and in the constant glare of the media. This resulted in the parties
continuously posturing to win the favor of the complex power structures that they
reported to, as well as of domestic public constituencies. However, Madrid broke the
taboo of direct bilateral talks between Arabs and Israelis. Madrid failed as a process, but
succeeded as a spectacular event for creating hope, and formed a springboard for the
subsequent secret Oslo talks.
As noted in the comments on Part I, Oslo and all subsequent agreements were
embraced by the three Israeli Prime Ministers before Ehud Barak took office in 1999.
As opposed to the gradualist approach of his predecessors, Barak took the path of
totalism, i.e. aiming at solving all remaining issues in one go. Pursuant to this approach,
as he put it: “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. Heroically, he wanted to
resolve simultaneously all matters with Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinians, and put a
final end to all conflicts.
Shortly after his election, I was invited to meet him at his home in the outskirts of Tel
Aviv. He described his new approach metaphorically: “In order to resolve a problem,
you need to analyze what the problem is, and define your objective. The problem at
hand is that we have an ugly dog in front of us. The objective is to beautify the dog. In
order to do so, you need to analyze why it is ugly. And then you see that it is the tail that
makes the dog ugly. Through this analysis, our task becomes easy: by chopping off the
tail we will have a beautiful dog.” And then he added sarcastically: “But I will not chop
off the tail of the dog the way you Oslo people have been doing it, painfully slice by slice
like a salami. We need to chop it off all in one go.”
In this spirit, in the summer of 2000 President Clinton brought the parties to the
presidential estate at Camp David for marathon talks behind closed doors. The attempt
failed for many reasons. First of all, a few weeks of talks did not provide ample time to
address the thorniest issues (Oslo took six months of negotiation to address the least
difficult issues). Other reasons were internal Palestinian disagreements and difficult
interpersonal relations, in addition to a “take-it-or-leave it” approach by Israel.
Although the leaders left Camp David without diplomatic feathers in their cap,
President Clinton and his team now had a clear sense of what was needed to bridge
the gap between the two parties. In late December 2000, he presented what became
known as the Clinton Parameters. They were a comprehensive set of American ideas
on how to end the conflict. However, time was not on the side of peace. With his second
term coming to an end, Clinton was unable to persuade the parties to conclude an
agreement. In addition, Likud Party leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount /
Haram al-Sharif in September 2000 signaled the second Palestinian uprising. This
reduced the room for maneuver for the Palestinian negotiators.
Following the election of George W. Bush as President of the United States, and
against the backdrop of the new Intifada, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators gathered in
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early 2001 in the small Egyptian seaside town of Taba. They attempted, through
bilateral talks, to capitalize on the basic ideas put forward by President Clinton. In
spite of high hopes inspired by the Taba talks, hope was dashed by Israeli intransigence,
reinforced by the violent uprising across the West Bank and Gaza, as well as internal
tensions within the Palestinian leadership.
In an attempt to revive the peace process, President George W. Bush, in a speech in
the Rose Garden in June 2002, took the bold step of publicly declaring support for an
independent Palestinian state. However, he was convinced that Chairman Arafat was
an impediment to peace, due to the continuing violence against Israelis emanating
from Gaza and the West Bank. The President made further US involvement in peace
negotiations contingent upon Arafat’s removal from power, and the implementation of
democratic reforms in the Palestinian Authority’s political structure. This was consistent
with Prime Minister Sharon’s policies. At this time, parts of the Palestinian
leadership either passively turned a blind eye to the rise of bombings in Israel, or
discreetly encouraged it. Arafat became a pariah for several essential players and was
isolated in his Muqata headquarters in Ramallah.
Under these dire circumstances, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for a
meeting in the conference room of his executive office at United Nations’ Headquarters
in New York with the US, Russia, and the European Union. The frustration was deep
amongst all parties. Bilateral talks did not happen. Trilateral talks did not work. In
response to the breakdown of the peace process, he suggested that the four actors
coordinate a position to restart the process. The idea was to combine the political
power of the US, Russia’s credibility amongst key Arab states, the European Union’s
financial muscle, and the UN’s legitimacy in a potent new international coalition. The
UN Secretary-General coined the phrase the “Middle East Quartet” for this informal
group. The Quartet met both at principals level and at the level of special envoys.
A novel approach to the imbroglio of Middle East peacemaking was launched:
multilateral unilateralism. The concept was launched at a Quartet Envoys’ working
dinner at the Norwegian Ambassador’s residence in Herzliya (a suburb of Tel Aviv) by
US officials William Burns and David Satterfield. The idea was for the Quartet
members to collectively produce an operational peace plan to be presented to the
parties for implementation, without prior consultation. This resulted in the Quartet
peace plan, referred to as the Road Map, which was eventually presented to the parties
as an ultimatum in 2003. In other words, a unified position was imposed by a group of
third parties upon the disputants—thus, multilateral unilateralism.
The Quartet collectively submitted the text to Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud
Abbas. The US ambassador to Israel presented it to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon,
who refused to meet with the Quartet as a whole. The Palestinian side accepted the
proposals in total while the Israeli side came up with fourteen reservations.
The Oslo Accords mapped a path towards a possible peace agreement, setting up
milestones to be passed along the way, and stipulating that the ride on this bumpy road
would take five years. It did not define the end point of the journey, because the parties
were not capable of closing the gaps between their positions at the time. The 2003
Performance-Based Road Map of the Quartet was, in many ways, the paper that
concluded the Declaration of Principles of 1993, by designating the last milestone,
the establishment of a Palestinian state.
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However, compromises among the Quartet members led to ambiguities which gave
the parties the opportunity to make radically different interpretations of their obligations
under the plan. The Israeli side claimed that the Road Map called for security first—a
complete end of Palestinian violence—before any negotiations could start. This strategy
was called sequentialism. The Palestinian side, and the international community at large,
supported a strategy of parallelism that called for progress on both security and political
issues to happen in lock-step. The collision of the concepts of parallelism and sequentialism
made it impossible to reach the final destination envisioned in the Road Map.
With gridlock in the formal negotiating process, civil society groups tried to take the
initiative. One example of several is the Geneva Accords of December 2003 led by PLO
official Yasser Abed Rabbo and former Israeli Minister Yossi Beilin.
The stalemate in the process continued until Ehud Olmert’s election as Prime
Minister in 2006. Through intense negotiations facilitated by US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice and her team, the parties came close to striking a deal which would
have pushed the peace process forward. However, as the end game of this phase of the
negotiations, also known as the Annapolis process, unfolded, Prime Minister Olmert
had to step down because of an indictment for alleged financial misconduct. At the
same time also, a new wave of rockets emanating from Gaza, lead to a military
operation in the Strip (Operation ‘Cast Lead’).
The scene and characters changed in early 2009 with the election of Barack Obama
as President of the United States, and Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister of Israel
for a second time. Shortly after his inauguration, President Obama attempted to
resuscitate the peace process with the appointment of a new high-level special envoy,
Senator George Mitchell. An absolute freeze on settlements, including in Jerusalem,
was made a precondition for bringing the parties to the table. This turned out to be a
self-defeating proposal. For any Israeli Prime Minister, such a major move could only
be the result of, and not the pre-condition for, negotiations.
During this paralysis, the Palestinian leadership looked for alternative ways of
moving forward, and shifted their strategy from bilateralism to unilateralism through
a bid to upgrade the Palestinian status to be on a par with the Vatican at the United
Nations: that of an observer Member State in the General Assembly. This quest reached
its climax during the UN General Assembly sessions of 2011 and 2012. In a speech to
the General Assembly in September 2011, President Abbas called for admission of
Palestine as a Member State of the United Nations. It reflected the growing frustration
among the Palestinian community with the lack of progress since the end of the
Annapolis process in 2008. In December 2012, the Palestinians were granted, with a
large majority, state observer status at the UN.
ON PART III: UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS
ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE
An accurate picture of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict must include an understanding
of the role of the United Nations. Part III provides a comprehensive collection of
Resolutions and documents which have significantly shaped the context of this seemingly
intractable issue.
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Many of the political battles related to the Arab–Israeli conflict have been fought in
the halls of the United Nations. On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly
voted Resolution 181, also known as the Partition Plan. It called for the creation of two
states—one Palestinian and one Jewish.
Other key UN Resolutions include General Assembly Resolution 194 (1948), which
calls for the return of Palestinian refugees; General Assembly Resolution 303 (1949),
which designates Jerusalem to be placed under UN jurisdiction; and, most famously,
Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), which calls on Israel to withdraw from all
territory seized during the Six Day War of 1967.
Paradoxically, some of the Resolutions are seen by both parties as supporting their
side of the argument. For example, in Resolution 242 the interpretation of the clause
calling for “withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent
conflict” has been controversially ambiguous, and the object of widely different interpretations.
The key argument relates to whether the clause requires Israel to withdraw
from all territory occupied in the 1967 war, or only from some parts of the territory
captured. While many Resolutions have had hardly any effect, they nevertheless
continue to be used as points of reference in the different attempts to resolve the
conflict.
ON PART IV: REGIONAL DOCUMENTS
The Israeli–Palestinian issue cannot be seen in isolation: it affects and has been affected
by broader regional dynamics and conflicts for a century. After years of colonial
competition, France and the United Kingdom drew lines in the sand through the
Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916. This agreement divided the region into spheres of
influence, and eventually led to the creation of new countries. In the subsequent thirty
years, several programmatic initiatives were taken in the context of multiple anticolonial
campaigns for national self-determination and political sovereignty, including
the quest of the Jewish people for a national homeland.
The 1948 war between Arab countries and the newly founded State of Israel resulted
in the latter significantly expanding its territory beyond that allotted to it by the UN
Partition Plan. This marked the beginning of more than half a century of Israeli–Arab
tensions and conflicts. Gradually the focus moved from the legitimacy of the state of
Israel to the country’s territorial boundaries. This coincided with broadening support,
not only internationally but also in Israel, for the establishment of a Palestinian state
living peacefully, side by side, with the state of Israel, within mutually secured borders.
Obtaining the regional buy-in to peace with Israel began with the different armistice
agreements signed in the wake of the 1948 war. While these agreements ended the war,
the fighting continued to flare up as the armistice lines established were not internationally
recognized borders.
The Arab–Israeli conflict came to a new head with the Six Day War in June 1967,
when Israel conquered the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West
Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. In the
aftermath, Arab nations unified their position against Israel with the Arab League
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Resolution at the Khartoum Summit, which is referred to as the “Three Noes Document”
due to its clause that states: “no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no
negotiations with it”. On 6 October 1973, Syria and Egypt launched a war against Israel
that ended in a political stand-off between Israel and its Arab adversaries.
In November 1977, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat broke Arab unity when he—
in a move which stunned the world—flew to Israel and addressed the Knesset in a bid
for a peaceful resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Subsequently, in 1978, he signed
the Camp David Accords that established a separate bilateral peace agreement with
Israel.
Camp David highlighted the importance of a third-party broker. When President
Sadat and his counterpart, Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel, reached a
stalemate, US President Jimmy Carter invited the parties to his presidential estate for
trilateral discussions on 5 September 1978. Three scheduled days of negotiations
turned into thirteen days of frustrating and intense talks. Since these tripartite discussions
were unable to break the impasse, President Carter decided to work separately
with both sides. The result was an American proposal which incorporated the requirements
of both parties into a single text. After lengthy negotiations on this document,
President Carter’s shuttle diplomacy resulted in the Camp David Accords of 17
September 1978.
In 1993, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat followed the precedent of President Sadat and
broke ranks with fellow Arab leaders by secretly and bilaterally recognizing the State of
Israel and signing the Oslo Accords. The year after, building on the agreements
between Israel and the PLO, King Hussein of Jordan followed suit by negotiating a
bilateral peace treaty with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel. This culminated in a
spectacular signing ceremony at the desert border crossing of Wadi Araba in August
1994. In the agreement, Israel acknowledged Jordan’s historical role over Muslim holy
sites in Jerusalem and agreed to recognize this role in future permanent status
negotiations with the Palestinians. The two leaders also agreed on steps such as the
opening of border crossings and economic cooperation.
In 1999, Labor Party leader Ehud Barak defeated incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu. As has been described above, the new Prime Minister broke radically
with the concept of gradualism that had been the hallmark of negotiations between
Yasir Arafat and three Israeli Prime Ministers, Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and
Benjamin Netanyahu, favoring a more comprehensive approach to the peace process.
For the first half of 2000, Arafat and the Palestinians were left to wait for a Syrian peace
deal that was not to come. Despite Barak offering Syrian President Hafez al-Assad 99
per cent of the Golan Heights, it still fell short of Assad’s demand for a return to the 4
June 1967 lines, and the Syria track subsequently crumbled. This put Arafat on the
spot: how could he now, in front of the Arab world, accept less for the Palestinians than
Assad had demanded for the Syrians?
The Lebanon track fared better. It began in late 1999 with a dialogue between Prime
Minister Barak and me, as the newly appointed UN Special Coordinator for the Middle
East peace process. The Prime Minister confided to me that, as a part of his comprehensive
quest for resolving all the conflicts that Israel had with its neighbors, he wanted
to end Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon that had started in 1978. Eventually, he
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conceded that only the United Nations, and not Israel alone, could delineate on a map
and demarcate on the ground the line of withdrawal. Such a line had to be, to the best of
the United Nations’ knowledge, in conformity with Lebanon’s international boundaries.
On this basis, and with the consent of the parties, the UN Secretary-General could
then report to the Security Council and eventually recommend that it should confirm
that Israel had ended its occupation. This understanding led to an agreement for the
United Nations to negotiate with the Governments of Lebanon, Syria and Israel.
Through intense, difficult, and stormy tripartite negotiations over five months, the
UN Secretary-General was in May 2000 able to report to the Security Council that the
UN had reached an agreement with Israel, Syria, and Lebanon on a line of withdrawal
(the so-called Blue Line). On this basis, it was determined that Israeli troops had left all
Lebanese territory. Further, he reported that, consistent with UN requirements, Israel’s
Lebanese proxy, the South Lebanese Army (SLA), had been disarmed and disbanded.
Subsequently, the UN Security Council confirmed the end of Israel’s occupation of
Southern Lebanon in fulfillment of Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 of 1978.
In September 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1559. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan appointed me as his special envoy for its implementation. In a
nutshell the resolution called for respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity,
and political independence; the disbanding and disarming of all Lebanese and non-
Lebanese militias; and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. After Israel’s full withdrawal
from Lebanon in 2000, the only remaining foreign troops were Syrian. Immediately
after the resolution was adopted, I engaged in intense negotiations with President
Assad, who until the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on 14
February 2005, was consistently resistant to move on the issue. On 12 March 2005, I
was airborne with a small UN team, among them Fabrice Aidan, on my way to
Damascus for a new round of talks with the President. Midway, the captain informed
me that he was requested to change course and land in Aleppo. Afterwards I was told
that the reason was to avoid the media who were waiting for the arrival of the UN team
in Damascus. I was picked up at Aleppo airport by Walid Muallem, who was then
Deputy Foreign Minister. He brought me to Assad’s villa, where a few hours of
negotiations resulted in the Aleppo understanding, which outlined Syria’s military
withdrawal from Lebanon with specific timelines. Assad honored his word, and
ended twenty-nine years of Syrian military presence in Lebanon consistent with
Resolution 1559.
What is often forgotten in the recurrent doom and gloom in the Middle East, is that
the step-by-step approach, which started with the Camp David Accords of 1978, has
for more than thirty years led to conflict resolution: peace between Israel and Egypt; the
Oslo Accords; the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO; the establishment of the
Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank, which still functions with its
presidency, cabinet, and ministries; peace between Israel and Jordan in 1994, with
the recognition of borders and a long-lasting security cooperation; Israel’s withdrawal
from Southern Lebanon in 2000; and the subsequent Syrian military withdrawal five
years later; as well as Israel’s pull out from the Gaza Strip. All these steps would have
been difficult, if not impossible, without the previous ones.
In 2000 the attempts to put a final end to the Syrian–Israeli and the Palestinian–
Israeli conflicts both failed. This exposes the risks of a totalist approach to solving such
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conflicts. These heroic attempts, facilitated by President Bill Clinton and his team,
created a crisis of expectations, leading to the second Intifada and violent confrontation
between Israelis and Palestinians, with tragic loss of life on both sides. This illustrates a
fundamental dilemma in the choice between a gradualist and a totalist approach.
Totalism’s “all or nothing” approach is inherently risky. When it backfires, it easily
leads to a relapse into violence. Gradualism is less spectacular and appealing, with its
incremental and long-term approach. However, it is precisely these characteristics
which make it less risky, and more successful under some circumstances.
While totalism failed in 2000, with tragic consequences, it nevertheless broke down a
number of taboos, such as addressing explicitly the partition of Jerusalem and the issue
of Palestinian refugees.
ON PART V: ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN
DOMESTIC DOCUMENTS
Part V seeks to provide a fuller context to the quest for peace in the Middle East. All
politics are local, and the Arab–Israeli conflict typifies this axiom. The ability of
negotiators to come to conclusions is only half the story. Documents such as the
original Palestinian National Charter or Israel’s Declaration of Independence shaped
attitudes, policies, and action on both sides.
Furthermore, the Part includes important policy statements that signal revisions of
previous policies such as Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s vision
for a new Palestinian state. In August 2009, Fayyad introduced the “Program of the
Thirteenth Government” (the Fayyad Plan), which established a path to develop a
functional Palestinian state within a two-year time frame. The blueprint sought to
establish and improve governing institutions, end Palestinian economic dependence on
Israel, and enhance overall infrastructure. It was a move to create a de facto Palestinian
state within the existing Palestinian territory, regardless of any formal recognition of
such an entity. Fayyad sought proactive steps to “end the occupation, despite the
occupation”. He stressed it was not meant as a unilateral declaration of statehood.
Indeed, substantial developments did take place during Prime Minister Fayyad’s
tenure. In 2011, both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund made
statements that the Palestinian Authority was capable of running the economy of an
independent state, and that it was on track to developing the necessary functions of a
state.
The Middle East peace process continues to run its crooked course. There is no quick
fix. Yet, as this volume demonstrates, many brave attempts have been made to bring
peace to this troubled region.
By compiling annotated documents related to the quest for peace in the Middle East,
a useful record and reference tool are created. Our hope is also that this volume will
inspire future students, analysts, policy makers, and negotiators to learn from, and
draw on, the experiences of the past.
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As we continue to move on the crooked path, no doubt, this compendium will have
to be updated in the future. Hopefully, one of those additions will be a peace agreement
that will eventually allow us all to close the book on the protracted conflicts in the
Middle East.
Oslo
13 September 2013
Terje Rød-Larsen
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Maps
SOFIA
BULGARIA Varna
GREECE Istanbul
40º
30º
Black
Sea
Samsun
ANKARA
40º
Trabzon
RUSSIA
50º
GEORGIA
TBILISI
YEREVAN
ARMENIA
AZERBAIJAN
BAKU
Caspian Sea
40º
ATHENS
30º
Crete
Rhodes
Mediterranean
Matruh
Izmir
Antalya
Alexandria
Sea
CAIRO
El Faiyum
Asyut
EGYPT
CYPRUS
Nile
Konya
Port Said
TURKEY
NICOSIA
El Minya
Luxor
Adana
BEIRUT
LEBANON
Haifa
ISRAEL
Tel Aviv
GAZA
Suez
Taba
Qena
Latakia
Tripoli
JORDAN
Red
SYRIA
Homs
Tadmur
DAMASCUS
WEST BANK
'AMMAN
JERUSALEM
Aqaba
Tabuk
Sharm el Sheikh
Quseir
Aleppo
IRAQ
AZERBAIJAN
Van
Tabriz
Mosul
TEHRAN
Kirkuk
Tigris
BAGHDAD
Al Hillah
Hail
SAUDI ARABIA
IRAN
Hamadan
Esfahan
Al Kut
Ahwaz
Basra
Abadan 30º
KUWAIT Bushehr
KUWAIT
Euphrates
Arabo-Persian Gulf
Dhahran BAHRAIN
DOHA
QATAR
RIYADH
20º
30º
Wadi Halfa
SUDAN
Aswan
Sea
Yanbu
Jeddah
Port Sudan
Medina
40º
Mecca
MIDDLE EAST REGION
(2014)
Taif
Map 1. Middle East Region 2014
0 100 200 300 KILOMETERS
0 100 200 300 MILES
20º
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
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PALESTINE
(1900)
34º 36º
Tyre
Beirut
L e b
a n o n
Mt. Hermon
Damascus
i a
Akko
Haifa
Nazareth
Golan
Sea of
Galilee
S y r
32º
Mediterranean
Sea
Jaffa
Nablus
Jericho
Jordan Valley
Irbid
Amman
32º
Jerusalem
n
Gaza
Hebron
Dead
Sea
El Arish
Beersheba
Negev
Wadi Arabah
Karak
o r d a
T r a n s j
Maan
30º
Sinai
30º
Aqaba
Arabia
Gulf of Aqaba
Gulf of Suez
0 25 50 KILOMETERS
0 25 50 MILES
28º
H e j
a z
28º
34º
Red Sea
36º
Map 2. Palestine 1900
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
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40º
48º
SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT
(1916)
Direct French control
40º
T U R K E Y
Under French influence (area A)
Direct British control (including
the ports of Haifa and Acre)
Under British influence (area B)
40º
International administration
Tabriz
Adana
Alexandre�a
Aleppo
Mosul
CYPRUS
Mediterranean Sea
Acre
Haifa
Latakia
Beirut
Damascus
Euphrates
M e s
o p o
t a
m i a
Feluja
Tigris
Baghdad
P E R S I A
Kermanshah
Jaffa
Jerusalem
Gaza
32º
Amman
Syrian Desert
32º
Basra
Abadan
Aqaba
0 50 100 150 KILOMETERS
0 50 100 150 MILES
Al Jawf
Arabia Peninsula
SOURCE: Agreement shown on "Map of Eastern
Turkey in Asia, Syria and Western Persia," signed
Fr. Georges-Picot and Mark Sykes, 8 May 1916.
40º48º
Kuwait
Arabo-
Persian
Gulf
Map 3. Sykes–Picot Agreement 1916
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
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40º
Black Sea
MIDDLE EAST AFTER
SAN REMO CONFERENCE
(1920)
40º
A
r m
SOVIET UNION
e n
i a
48º
League of Nations
mandates
French
Caspian Sea
40º
British
32º
T U R K E Y
CYPRUS
(1943)
Adana
Alexandre�a
Latakia
LEBANON
(1943)
Mediterranean Beirut
Sea
Acre
PALESTINE
(ISRAEL) Jaffa
(1948)
Jerusalem
Gaza
Aleppo
Damascus
Amman
(1946)
TRANSJORDAN
SYRIA
(1946)
K u
Euphrates
r d i
s t
a n m i
Mosul
Tigris
MESOPOTAMIA
Baghdad
Feluja
(IRAQ)
(1930)
a
(1932)
Under British protection
Year of independence
P E R S I A
Kermanshah
Basra Abadan
32º
EGYPT
(1922)
Red Sea
Aqaba
HEJAZ
Al Jawf
NEDJ
(SAUDI ARABIA)
(1932)
SOURCE: San Remo resolution (April 1920)
and Treaty of Sèvres (August 1920).
0 50 100 150 KILOMETERS
0 50 100 150 MILES
40º48º
Kuwait
KUWAIT
(1961)
Arabo-
Persian
Gulf
Map 4. The Middle East after the San Remo Conference of 1920
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
34º
35º
Tyre LEBANON Baniyas 36º
33º
PEEL COMMISSION
(1937)
Partition plan
Arab state
Under Arab state
administration
Jewish state
Ras
an Naqura
Acre
Haifa
Megiddo
Nazareth
Safad
Tiberias
Afula
Lake
Hula
Lake
Tiberias
Al Qunaytirah
SYRIA
Irbid
33º
Nazareth
Mandatory enclave
and corridor
Under Mandatory
administration
Tulkarm
Jenin
Beisan
Jarash
Nablus
Tel Aviv
Jaffa
32º (Arab)
Lydda
32º
Ramla
Ramallah
Jericho
Amman
Ashdod
Jerusalem
Bethlehem
Madaba
Al Majdal
M e d i t e
n S e a
r r a n e a
Gaza
Khan Yunis
Hebron
Beersheba
Dead Sea
Jordan River
Karak
R D A N
31º
El Auja
N S J O
31º
T R A
EGYPT
Maan
30º 30º
0 10 20 30 KILOMETERS
0 10 20 30 MILES
34º
Aqaba
SOURCE: Map no. 8, "Partition: Provisional
Frontier," of the Palestine Royal Commission
Report (1937).
36º
Map 5. Peel Commission 1937
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
34º
35º
Tyre LEBANON Baniyas 36º
33º
UN PARTITION PLAN
(1947)
Arab state
Jewish state
Nahariya
Acre
Haifa
Safad
Tiberias
Nazareth
Lake
Tiberias
Al Qunaytirah
33º
SYRIA
City of Jerusalem
Municipality of
Jerusalem
Hadera
Afula
Beisan
Jenin
Irbid
Netanya
Tulkarm
Nablus
Qalqiliya
Tel Aviv
Jaffa
Salt
32º (Arab)
32º
Rishon Le Zion
Rehovot
Ashdod
Ramla Ramallah
Jericho
AMMAN
Jerusalem
Ashqelon
Bethlehem
Madaba
M e d i t e
n S e a
r r a n e a
Gaza
Hebron
Dead Sea
Khan Yunis
A N
El Arish
31º
Rafah
Beersheba
Karak
S J O R D
31º
El Auja
T R A N
EGYPT
Maan
30º 30º
0 10 20 30 KILOMETERS
0 10 20 30 MILES
SOURCE: UN map no. 103 (1947)
34º
Taba
Aqaba
Map 6. Partition Plan 1947
36º
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
33º
34º
ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS
(1949)
General Armistice Agreements
between Israel and Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria
M e d i t e
Armistice demarcation line
Former Palestine Mandate
International boundary
Demilitarized zone Hadera
n S e a
r r a n e a
Ashqelon
Gaza
35º 36º
Tyre
LEBANON
Al Qunaytirah
Nahariya
Acre
Haifa
Nazareth
Afula
Jenin
Bethlehem
Hebron
Tiberias
Beisan
Safad
Dead Sea
Lake
Hula
Lake
Tiberias
33
Lake Hula
Irbid
SYRIA
El Khalisa
Yesud HaMa'ala
Mishmar
Netanya Tulkarm
HaYarden
Rosh Pinna
Nablus
Qalqiliya
Tel Aviv
Jaffa
32º Salt
32
Rishon Le Zion
Rehovot
Ashdod
Ramla
Ramallah
Jericho
Lake
Tiberias
no man's land Jerusalem
Tiberias
Jordan River
ISRAEL
Samakh
Dan
Baniyas
Kafer
Naffakh
SYRIA
Kafer Hareb
Khan Yunis
Rafah
El Arish
Beersheba
ISRAEL
Karak
0 5 KM
0 3 MI
31º
31º
El Auja
JORDAN
EGYPT
Maan
30º 30º
SOURCES: UN map nos. 219-X (1949)
and 761 (1955)
0 10 20 30 KILOMETERS
0 10 20 30 MILES
34º
Taba
Aqaba
36º
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
Map 7. Armistice Agreements 1949
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
34º
34º
ISRAEL AND
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
(1967)
Territories occupied by Israel (June 1967)
Sinai Peninsula returned to Egypt (April 1982)
▲ UNEF I deployment (May 1967)
Armistice demarcation line (1949)
Tyre
BEIRUT
L. Tiberias
Haifa
Nazareth
L E B A N O N
36º
34º
DAMASCUS
SYRIA
Al Qunaytirah
Golan
Heights
Irbid
32º
Mediterranean Sea
Tel Aviv
ISRAEL
Nablus
West
Bank
Jericho
Jordan River
JERUSALEM
32º
AMMAN
Suez Canal
Port Said
El Arish
▲
Gaza
Strip
▲
▲
▲
▲
▲
▲
▲
▲
El Auja
▲
Beersheba
Hebron
Dead
Sea
Karak
R D
A N
J O
30º
Suez
Sinai
Peninsula
▲
Maan
30º
EGYPT
▲
Aqaba
▲
Taba
Gulf of Suez
Gulf of Aqaba
SAUDI ARABIA
28º
▲
28º
▲
SOURCES: UN map nos. 979 (1957)
Sharm el Sheikh Strait of Tiran
and 2902 (1976)
0 25 50 KILOMETERS
0 25 50 MILES
Red Sea
34º 36º
Map 8. Israel and the Occupied Territories 1967
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
r
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
OSLO I (1994) and OSLO II (1995)
INTERIM AGREEMENTS
35º
Haifa
Nazareth
Lake
Tiberias
Oslo I: Gaza and Jericho (May 1994)
Palestinian autonomy
Israeli civil and security control
Israeli settlement
Jenin
Israeli security zone
Oslo II: West Bank (September1995)
Tulkarm
A: Palestinian autonomy
32º
M e d
B: Palestinian civil jurisdiction
Israeli security control
C: Israeli civil and security control
Safe passage route
i t e r
r a n e a n S e a
Tel Aviv
Qalqiliya
ISRAEL
Ramla
Nablus
Ramallah
West
Bank
Jericho
J o r d a n R i v e
32º
Jerusalem
20 miles
Ashqelon
Bethlehem
FISHING ZONE
1.5 miles
closed area
Gaza
Hebron
D e a d S e a
1 mile
closed area
Gaza
Strip
A N
Beersheba
R D
J O
EGYPT
31º
SOURCES: Maps 1, 2, and 6 of the "Agreement
on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area" (4 May
1994); "An Atlas of Palestine" (ARIJ, 2000); "The
New Atlas of Israel" (Survey of Israel, 2011)
0 5 10 15 KILOMETERS
31º
0 5 10 15 MILES
35º
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
Map 9. Oslo Accords 1994
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
HEBRON PROTOCOL (1997)
H-1: Area transfered to Palestinian civil jurisdiction
H-2: Area retained by Israel for security and public order
9
Joint Mobile Unit area
of operation in H-2
Joint Mobile Unit
special place
Checkpoint
106
Police station
Agreed adjacent area
reference point
Jewish holy site
100
101
old Route 35
102
103
Ras al Jura
2
104
1
3
Joint Patrol Road
4
Shaaba
105
Palestinian
Police HQ
5
Israeli Border
Police HQ
Area H-1
11
10
Hebron
12
9
8
Harat
al Sheikh
6
7
▲▲
Abu
Sneinah
OLD CITY
Area H-2
13
14
106
108
15
107
HQ
District Coordination Office
Joint Mobile Unit
Joint Coordination Center
SOURCE: Appendix 1, "Protocol
Concerning the Redeployment in
Hebron" (17 January 1997)
0 1 KILOMETER
0 1 MILE
Map 10. Hebron Protocol 1997
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
e r
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM
(1998)
35º
Haifa
Nazareth
Lake
Tiberias
Partial implementation of redeployment (October 1998)
Palestinian autonomy
(Result of redeployment from Area B to Area A)
Palestinian civil jurisdiction, Israeli security control
(Result of redeployment from Area C to Area B)
Jenin
Oslo I and II Agreements (1994-1995)
A: Palestinian autonomy
B: Palestinian civil jurisdiction
Israeli security control
Tulkarm
C: Israeli civil and security control
32º
Safe passage route
Israeli security zone (Gaza Strip)
Tel Aviv
Qalqiliya
ISRAEL
Nablus
West
Bank
J o r d a n R i v
32º
M e d
i t e r
r a n e a n S e a
u
Ramla
Jerusalem
Ramallah
Bethlehem
Jericho
Ashqelon
Gaza
w
v
Hebron
D e a d S e a
Gaza
Strip
A N
Beersheba
R D
J O
EGYPT
31º
SOURCE: "An Atlas of Palestine" (ARIJ, 2000)
0 5 10 15 KILOMETERS
0 5 10 15 MILES
31º
35º
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
Map 11. Wye Memorandum 1998
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
SHARM EL SHEIKH MEMORANDUM
(1999)
35º
Haifa
Nazareth
Lake
Tiberias
Phase I redeployment
Palestinian civil jurisdiction, Israeli security control
(Result of redeployment from Area C to Area B)
Nature reserve
(Result of redeployment from Area C to Area B)
Proposed Phase II redeployment
Jenin
Palestinian autonomy
(To be redeployed from Area B to Area A)
Nature reserve
(To be redeployed from Area C to Area B)
Tulkarm
Oslo I and II Agreements (1994-1995)
A: Palestinian autonomy
Qalqiliya
Nablus
R i v e r
32º
B: Palestinian civil jurisdiction
Israeli security control
C: Israeli civil and security control
Safe passage route
Israeli security zone (Gaza Strip)
Tel Aviv
ISRAEL
West
Bank
J o r d a n
32º
Ramla
M e d
i t e r
r a n e a n S e a
Ashqelon
u
Jerusalem
Bethlehem
Ramallah
Jericho
Gaza
w
v
Hebron
D e a d S e a
Gaza
Strip
A N
Beersheba
R D
J O
EGYPT
31º
SOURCE: "An Atlas of Palestine" (ARIJ, 2000)
0 5 10 15 KILOMETERS
0 5 10 15 MILES
31º
35º
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
Map 12. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum 1999
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
CAMP DAVID TALKS
(2000)
35º
Haifa
Nazareth
Lake
Tiberias
Proposal made by Israel (July 2000)
Areas to be annexed to Israel
Temporary Israeli security zone (12 to 20 years)
Jenin
Areas intended for Palestinian state
Areas A and B of Oslo Agreements
Safe passage route
Tulkarm
32º
Israeli settlemet
1967 boundary
Qalqiliya
Tel Aviv
ISRAEL
Nablus
West
Bank
J o r d a n R
r
i v e
32º
M e d
i t e r
r a n e a n S e a
Ashqelon
u
Ramla
Ramallah
Jerusalem
Bethlehem
Jericho
Gaza
w
v
Hebron
D e a d S e a
Gaza
Strip
A N
Beersheba
R D
J O
EGYPT
SOURCES: Negotiations Affairs Department of the
Palestine Liberation Organization; Foundation for
Middle East Peace; "Le Monde Diplomatique"
31º
0 5 10 15 KILOMETERS
0 5 10 15 MILES
31º
35º
Map 13. Camp David 2000
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
CLINTON PARAMETERS
(2000)
35º
Haifa
Nazareth
Lake
Tiberias
Proposed parameters (December 2000)
Palestinian state
Areas annexed to Israel
Jenin
32º
Z
M e d
Safe passage route
International military presence (36 months)
Tulkarm
1967 boundary
Qalqiliya
Tel Aviv
i t e r
r a n e a n S e a
ISRAEL
Ramla
Nablus
PALESTINE
West
Bank
Ramallah
Z
Z
Z
Z
Jericho
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
J o r d a n R i v e
r
32º
u
Jerusalem
Ashqelon
Bethlehem
Gaza
w
v
Hebron
D e a d S e a
Gaza
Strip
A N
Beersheba
R D
J O
EGYPT
SOURCES: D. Ross "The Missing Peace"
and "An Atlas of Palestine" (ARIJ, 2000)
31º
0 5 10 15 KILOMETERS
0 5 10 15 MILES
31º
35º
Map 14. Clinton Parameters 2000
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
TABA TALKS
(2001)
35º
Haifa
Nazareth
Lake
Tiberias
Proposal made by Israel (January 2001)
Areas to be annexed to Israel
Areas intended for Palestinian state
Jenin
Areas A and B of Oslo Agreements
Safe passage route
Israeli early warning station
Tulkarm
32º
Israeli settlemet
1967 boundary
Qalqiliya
Tel Aviv
ISRAEL
Nablus
West
Bank
J o r d a n R i v e
r
32º
M e d
i t e r
r a n e a n S e a
Ashqelon
Ramla
Ramallah
Jerusalem
Bethlehem
Jericho
Gaza
Hebron
D e a d S e a
Gaza
Strip
A N
Beersheba
R D
J O
EGYPT
SOURCES: Charles Enderlin "Shattered Dreams"; EU
(Moratinos) "Non-Paper"; "Le Monde Diplomatique"
31º
0 5 10 15 KILOMETERS
0 5 10 15 MILES
31º
35º
Map 15. Taba Talks 2001
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
GENEVA ACCORDS
(2003)
35º
Nazareth
Palestine
Jenin
Israel
2003 Geneva Accord line
1967 line, where it differs from
the Geneva Accord line
Designated road for Israeli civilians
Israeli early warning station
Tulkarm
Qalqiliya
Nablus
Eval
Mountain
J o r d a n
R i v e r
32º
Tel Aviv
West
Bank
32º
M e d
i t e r
r a n e a n S e a
Ashqelon
Ramla
ISRAEL
Ramallah
Jerusalem
Baal
Hatsor
Bethlehem
Jericho
J O R D A N
Gaza
Strip
Gaza
CORRIDOR
Hebron
D e a d S e a
Beersheba
Giv'at
Ze'ev
Beit
Hanina
Pisgat
Ze'ev
31º
EGYPT
SOURCES: The Geneva Initiative and "The New
Atlas of Israel" (Survey of Israel, 2011)
Ramot
Sheikh
Jarrah
Jerusalem
East
Talpiyyot
Shu'afat
Mount
Scopus
Old City
Ma'ale
Adummim
0 5 10 15 KILOMETERS
Gilo
0 5 10 15 MILES
35º
Map 16. Geneva Accord 2003
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
34º30'
GAZA DISENGAGEMENT PLAN
(2005)
Israeli settlement
1.5 miles
closed area
r
Area C: Israeli civil and security control
Israeli controlled area
g
EREZ
Israeli controlled road
r Checkpoint
Jaballa
Gaza
31º40'
Fishing limit since 2009
r
r
x
x
ISRAEL
31º40'
1 mile
closed area
r
r
Khan Yunis
r
Deir al Balah
r
r
r r
r
r r
r
Post disengagement
g
x
Israeli security zone
Crossing point, open
Crossing point, closed
Palestinian built-up area
SOURCES: Maps 6 of the "Agreement on the Gaza
Strip and the Jericho Area" (4 May 1994); "The
Gaza Strip" (Miftah, 2004); "Gaza Stip"
(UN-OCHA, 2005); "Gaza Strip" (UN-OCHA, 2011)
31º30'
MARITIME ACTIVITY ZONE (OSLO I)
Mediterranean
Sea
20 miles
RAFAH
Rafah
g
EGYPT g
Airport
non-operational
x
FISHING ZONE
1 mile
closed area
1.5 miles
closed area
Gaza
ISRAEL
0 2.5 5 KILOMETERS
0 2.5 5 MILES
34º20'
EGYPT
Map 17. Gaza Disengagement 2005
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
35º
Haifa
Lake
Tiberias
OLMERT-ABBAS TALKS
(2007–2008)
Nazareth
"Projection of Israeli Proposal for Territory"
presented by Palestinian Chief Negotiator
Saeb Erakat at the International Peace Institute
on 25 June 2010
Jenin
Area to be swapped from
Palestine to Israel
Area to be swaped from
Israel to Palestine
Area in Jerusalem not
presented by the Israeli side
Israeli settlement
Israeli settlement to be evacuated
1967 boundary
Tel Aviv
Qalqiliya
Tulkarm
Salfit
Nablus
Tubas
PALESTINE
J o r d a n
R i v e r
32º
M e d
i t e r
r a n e a n S e a
ISRAEL
Ramla
Ramallah
West
Bank
Jericho
32º
Jerusalem
Ashqelon
Bethlehem
Gaza
Strip
Gaza
Hebron
D e a d S e a
A N
Beersheba
R D
J O
EGYPT
31º
0 5 10 15 KILOMETERS
0 5 10 15 MILES
31º
35º
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
Map 18. Olmert–Abbas Talks 2007–8
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
AUTONOMOUS AREAS OF
WEST BANK AND GAZA
(2012)
35º
Haifa
Nazareth
Lake
Tiberias
Governorate limit
Oslo Agreement
Areas A and B
Area C and nature reserves
JENIN
Barrier, constructed and planned
Israeli settlement area behind barrier
Jerusalem municipal area
Israeli security zone (Gaza)
1967 Armistice line
Tel Aviv
TULKARM
QALQILIYA
SHALFIT
NABLUS
West
TUBAS
J o r d a n
R i v e r
32º
M e d
i t e r
r a n e a n S e a
ISRAEL
Ramla
RAMALLAH
Bank
JERICHO
32º
EAST
JERUSALEM
Ashqelon
BETHLEHEM
Gaza
Strip
GAZA NORTH
GAZA
HEBRON
D e a d S e a
DEIR AL BALAH
KHAN YUNIS
A N
RAFAH
Beersheba
R D
J O
EGYPT
31º
SOURCES: "The Occupied Palestinian Territory" UN-
OCHA, 2010); "An Atlas of Palestine" (ARIJ, 2000)
0 5 10 15 KILOMETERS
0 5 10 15 MILES
31º
35º
Map 19. Autonomous areas 2012
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
35º 35º30'
WEST BANK BARRIER
(2012)
Barrier route as of mid-2011
Jenin
32º30'
Completed
Under construction
Approved
Planned
2003 plan
(shown where differs
from 2011 route)
Israeli settlement
1967 Armistice line
Tulkarm
Nablus
R i v e r
Qalqiliya
J o r d a n
Tel Aviv
32º
West
Bank
32º
Ramla
Ramallah
Jericho
JORDAN
ISRAEL
Jerusalem
Bethlehem
Hebron
D e a d S e a
31º30'
31º30'
SOURCES: "West Bank - Access and Closure" (UN-OCHA 2011);
"Route of the Security Fence" (IDFMU 2005, 2011); "The West Bank,
Settlements and the Separation Barrier" (B'TSELEM 2011)
Jerusalem
0 5 10 KILOMETERS
0 5 10 MILES
35º 35º30'
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
Map 20. West Bank Barrier 2012
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
35º 35º30'
ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS
(2012)
Jenin
32º30'
Built-up area
Municipal area
Jerusalem municipal
boundary
1967 Armistice line
Tulkarm
Tubas
Qalqiliya
Nablus
West
J o r d a n
R i v e r
Tel Aviv
Shalfit
32º
Bank
32º
Ramla
Ramallah
Jericho
JORDAN
ISRAEL
Jerusalem
Bethlehem
D e a d S e a
31º30'
Hebron
31º30'
SOURCES: "West Bank - Access and Closure" (UN-OCHA 2011);
"The West Bank, Settlements and the Separation Barrier"
(B'TSELEM 2011)
0 5 10 KILOMETERS
0 5 10 MILES
35º 35º30'
Map 21. Israeli Settlements 2012
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
35º10'
Ramallah
35º15'
JERUSALEM
(2012)
Psagot
Planned E-1 area
City boundary, 1947
Proposed city limit by
the United Nations, 1947
Municipal boundary,
expanded since 1967
Armistice demarcation line, 1949
Al Jib
Bir Nabala
Kafr
Aqb
Jerusalem
Airport
Atarot
Kochav
Ya'akov
Ar Ram
Binyamin
Jaba
Approximate built-up areas
Palestinian
Israeli
Adam
31º50'
Biddu
Beit
Hanina
Neve
Ya'aqov
Hizma
31º50'
Har
Adar
Pisgat
Ze'ev
Ramot
Reches
Shu'afat
Shu'fat
Anata
ISRAEL
31º45'
Bet Zayit
Har
Nof
Qiryat
HaYovel
West
Jerusalem
Beit Safafa
Ramat
Eshkol
Sheikh
Jarrah
French
Hill
East
Jerusalem
Silwan
East
Talpiot
Old City
Mount
Scopus
Al Eizariya
Abu Dis
Sawahra
E-1
Ma'ale
Adummim
West Bank
Qedar
31º45'
Gilo
Sur Bahir
Ba�ir
Har
Gilo
Beit Jala
Har Homa
Al Ubeidiya
Husan
Bethlehem
Beit Sahur
Neve
Daniel
31º40'
Efrata
35º10'
Teqoa
35º15'
SOURCES: UN map nos. 101 (1947) and
3640 (1997); "An Atlas of Palestine"
(ARIJ, 2000); "The New Atlas of Isreal"
(Survey of Israel, 2011); "Greater
Jerusalem" (Ir Amim, 2009)
0 1 2 KILOMETERS
0 1 2 MILES
31º40'
Map 22. Jerusalem 2012
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
GOLAN HEIGHTS (2012)
Israeli occupied area
LEBANON
Israeli settlement
UNDOF area of operation (1974–)
UNTSO observer post
Demilitarized zone (1949)
Al Ghajar
Wadi al Aassal
35º45'
Majdal
Shams
M o u n t H e r m o n
Hadar
Line of withdrawal of Israeli
Forces from Lebanon (2000)
Armistice demarcation line (1949)
Former Palestine Mandate (1923)
International boundary
Mazra'at Bayt Jinn
UNDOF HQ
33º15'
Ramin
Dan
Qiryat
Shemona
Baniyas
Masadah
Buq'ata
Jubata al Khashab
Khan Amabah
Camp Faouar
33º15'
'Alma
Ne'ot
Mordekhay
Hula
Gonen
Valley
Ramot
Na�ali
Yesud
HaMa'ala
Kafr
Naffakh
Qunaitira
Golan
Jaba
Masharah
Umm Batinah
Nab' as Sakhr
Al Harrah
Buraykah
33º
Ayyelet
HaShahar
Gadot
Heights
Al Kushniyah
SYRIA
33º
Zefat
Hor Bet Ma'on
32º45'
Yavne'el
Rosh
Pinna
ISRAEL
Jordan River
Lake
Tiberias
Tiberias
Ashdot
Ya'aqov
'En Gev
Wadi as Safa
Kafr Harib
Fiq
Al Hamra
Yarmuk River
Khisfin
N a h al Nov
Aqraba
JORDAN
SOURCES: UN map no. 2916 Rev. 75
(2011), CIA map no. 724711 (4–92)
35º45'
Butmiyah
Ar Rafid
Wadi ar Ruqqad
0 1 2 3 KILOMETERS
0 1 2 3 MILES
LEBANON
Tasil
ISRAEL
West
Bank
Locator map
SYRIA
JORDAN
Map 23. Golan Heights 2012
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi
Litani
Litani
Shebaa
Farms
Wadi al Aassal
Hasbani River
S e a
r a n e a n
M e d i t e r
An Naqurah
Ar Rashidiyah
Sur
SAYDA
Ansar
Az Zrariyah
Ad Duwayr
Shabriha Srifa
NABATIYAH
t H e r m o n
SOUTH LEBANON (2012)
35º15'
An Nabatiyah
at Tahta
Kafr Sir
Habbush
M o u n
Line of withdrawal of Israeli Forces (2000)
Armistice demarcation line (1949)
Former Palestine Mandate (1923)
International boundary
Approximate area under
Israeli control (1978–2000)
UNIFIL area of operation
(1978–2000)
UNDOF area of operation
(1974–)
Shebaa Farms area
Demilitarized zone
UNTSO observer post
UNIFIL HQ
Al Bazuriyah
Kafr Tibnit
Zawtar
ash Sharqiyah
MARJAYOUN
At Tayyibah
Metulla
Jwayya
Misgav'am
Baniyas
Dan
Majdal Silm
Qiryat
SYRIA
Qana
Hula
Shemona
SUR Tibnin Golan
Shaqra
Ramin
Kefar
Szold
Heights
Yatar
BINT JBAIL
Bint Jbail
35º30'
LEBANON
Mays
al Jabal
Yi�ah
Marjayoun
Al Qulay'ah
Al Khiyam
Al Ghajar
Gonen
Qilya
Hasbayya
HASBAYYA
Shebaa
35º45'
Majdal
Shams
LEBANON
Locator map
33º15'
Jordan River
Rosh HaNiqra
Nahariyya
Bezet
Hanita
Yarin
SOURCES: UN map nos. 3000 (1978),
4141 (2000), 2916 (2011), and UN
map of "Shebaa Farms Area" (2007)
35º15'
Zarit
Ma'alot
Rumaysh
ISRAEL
Yarun
Dovev
Yir'on
Jish
Avivim
'Alma
35º30'
Malkiyya
Ramot Na�ali
Yesud
HaMa'ala
ISRAEL
West
Bank
SYRIA
JORDAN
0 2 4 6 KILOMETERS
0 2 4 6 MILES
© IPI (Map by Miklos Pinther)
Map 24. South Lebanon 2012