Robert Lawrence Kuhn
Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn is a public intellectual, international corporate
strategist and investment banker, and a renowned expert on China. He is a
commentator on the BBC, CNN, CGTN, CCTV, CNBC, Fox Business,
Bloomberg, and other media; senior political/economics commentator on China
Global Television Network (CGTN); and a columnist in China Daily and South
China Morning Post.
For 30 years, Dr. Kuhn has worked with China’s state leaders and advised the
Chinese government. He spoke at the launch ceremony of President Xi Jinping’s
book, The Governance of China; he provided live commentary on CNN for Xi’s policy address
during his U.S. state visit (2015); and he introduced to foreign audiences Xi as “core” of the CPC
(2016). He is interviewed extensively on US-China relations, including the trade war (2018).
For the 19 th CPC National Congress (October 2017) and 13 th National People’s Congress (March
2018), Dr. Kuhn was interviewed extensively, including 24 times on CNN and BBC World News /
BBC World Service, and he was quoted in newspapers and websites in U.S., Hong Kong, Italy,
India, etc. His full-page, in-depth analyses of the 19 th CPC National Congress were featured in
China Daily to open the CPC Congress (“Historical Starting Point for New Stage of Development“)
and to close the CPC Congress (“New Era on the Road to 2050”). His essay at the opening of the
Party Congress was published in People’s Daily.
Dr. Kuhn is the author of How China’s Leaders Think (featuring President Xi), and The Man Who
Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin (China’s best-selling book of 2005). He wrote
the Introduction for Understanding the CPC, the book series by China’s ruling party, the
Communist Party of China (2015).
Shanghai Media Group and Dr. Kuhn are co-creators and co-producers of the award-winning, fivepart
series China’s Challenges, broadcast internationally (PBS stations in the U.S.) and in China.
Dr. Kuhn is writer and host; Peter Getzels is director. China’s Challenges won first prize in China
News Awards twice (2013, 2018). A second season won an Emmy Award (Los Angeles, 2016). A
third season (on “Xi Jinping Thought” and China 2020 / China 2050) is broadcast in late 2018.
Dr. Kuhn is the creator, co-producer and host of “Closer to China with R.L.Kuhn” on CGTN (China
Global Television Network, co-created by Adam Zhu), the weekly series with unique access that
features China’s thought leaders and decision makers, broadcast globally and in China. Closer To
China focuses on China’s politics and government, CPC/Party, economics and society, reform and
development, and international affairs and relations, with emphasis on Xi’s policies and philosophy.
A special documentary on President Xi’s “targeted poverty alleviation” campaign, co-produced by
CGTN, Dr. Kuhn and Adam Zhu, is in production. Dr. Kuhn is host and writer. Peter Getzels is
director.
Dr. Kuhn was one of only two Americans, with Henry Kissinger, named as the first “China
Visionaries”. He was selected by Oriental Outlook magazine (Xinhua News Agency) as one of the
all-time, top-ten influential supporters of China’s ruling party/CPC (he is the only one living).
An international corporate strategist and investment banker, Dr. Kuhn works with major
multinational corporations, CEOs and C-Suite executives, in formulating and implementing China
strategies by applying his “politico-strategic framework”. He was president/co-owner of the largest
middle-market M&A firm in the U.S. (sold to Citigroup in 2000).
Dr. Kuhn is creator, writer and host of Closer To Truth (produced and directed by Peter Getzels),
the long-running PBS/public television series on science and philosophy (broadcast continually
since 2000, over 275 TV episodes; more are in production). Dr. Kuhn is author or editor of over 30
books on China, corporate strategy, finance, science and philosophy (including, with the
philosopher John Leslie, The Mystery of Existence: Why is there Anything At All).
Dr. Kuhn is chairman of The Kuhn Foundation which supports new knowledge in science and
philosophy, classical music, and informed relations between the United States and China. The
Kuhn Foundation produced the feature documentary “Khachaturian” on the life and music of the
Armenian-Russian composer Aram Khachaturian, which won the Best Documentary award at the
Hollywood Film Festival.
Dr. Kuhn has a B.A. Human Biology (Johns Hopkins); Ph.D. Anatomy/Brain Research (University
of California at Los Angeles, UCLA); MBA (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT).
CNN – Quest Means Business
Future of U.S.-China Trade Relations
Robert Lawrence Kuhn, August 27, 2018
1
CNBC
Squawk on the Street
US-China Tariffs - US-China Trade War
Robert Lawrence Kuhn, August 22, 2018
1
FOX BUSINESS
Mornings with Maria (Maria Bartiromo)
US-China Tariffs - US-China Trade War
Robert Lawrence Kuhn, August 23, 2018
1

BBC World News
President Xi Jinping-NPC Closing Session
Robert Lawrence Kuhn
March 20, 2018
HOST: Well joining me now
from Beijing is Dr. Robert
Lawrence Kuhn, advisor to
the Chinese government and
author of the book How
Chinese Leaders Think.
Thanks so much for joining us
here on the program. Usually
the NPC is seen as sort of a
choreographed event: we
know what to expect. But
this time it felt very different.
RLK: It certainly was
different. You have to look at
this year’s National People’s
1
Congress - and the so-called
Two Sessions - as part of the
“political season” which
begins with the party
congress in October and goes
now to the government
sessions in March. And
normally there is a
predictability and what
happens at the National
People’s Congress is not very
significant.
RLK: This year is different:
China talks about a “New
Era” – and this is not just
words, it is really the case. If
we look at the vision that Xi
Jinping gave at the party
congress, what we see here
at the National People’s
Congress we see as the
implementation of that vision
across a very broad front.
2
RLK: People have focused on
term limits - understandably
so - but the change is only for
the presidency. Xi Jinping by
having been made “Core” of
the Party in October 2016 -
actually with that designation
undermined “collective
leadership” - and when Xi’s
name was put into the Party
Constitution as the
contemporary arbiter of
Marxism - on which the Party
is based and the Party rules
the country - he then became
the overarching leader, no
matter what position he
would hold.
3
CNN International
President Xi Jinping, China, Term Limits
Robert Lawrence Kuhn – March 12, 2018
HOST: Let’s talk about President Xi Jinping with our
gues,t Robert Lawrence Kuhn, a longtime advisor to the
Chinese government, the author of How China’s Leaders
Think, and the host of Closer to China with R.L. Kuhn on the
China Global Television Network. Thanks for being with
us.
RLK: Hi Natalie. Interesting day we’re having.
HOST: Isn’t it, though? So, I guess the first question
would be to follow up on your book title, how China’s
leaders think. What is Xi Jinping thinking with this move?

RLK: First of all, we have to understand it in context.
There are twenty-one different clauses in this
Constitutional Amendment, and the whole point of it is to
strengthen the governance system of China. Now China is a
party-state system where the party controls the state.
Everyone is focusing on the abolition of term limits, and it
is important, but we need to understand the context within
this party-state system. In October of 2016, Xi Jinping was
made “Core” of the Party, which meant the collective
leadership of the past was no longer operative; that X was,
in essence, for the Party, the decision maker. Then just this
last October at the 19th CPC National Congress, his name
was put into the Party Constitution as “Xi Jinping Thought
on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era,”… it’s a big phrase.
RLK: But what it means is that Xi is the arbiter of Marxism
and party theory. That means in terms of being the Core ot
the Party and the interpreter of Marxism that gives him
ultimate power. He doesn’t even need a formal position when
has those two and the Party continues to run the country.
HOST: Is that a good thing? How can it be a good thing for
the country when one person has the ultimate power?
RLK: There are two issues. One is how it happened: Now
the abolition of presidential term limits coordinates with the
Party and military, together the three largest positions. So
they’re now coordinated because he already had that power
in the Party and the military.
2
Amanpour on CNN
President Xi Jinping, China, Term Limits
Robert Lawrence Kuhn – Minxin Pei
March 5, 2018
HOST: When it comes to trade, one country more
than any other has been the target of Trump’s
rhetorical wrath, and that’s China. But my next
guest tells me that the promised tariffs won’t
bother China much, as we’ve been discussing. In
any way, they in China are dealing with much more
important things, like the proposal for the rubber
stamp Party Congress which starts its new session
today to change the Constitution, and lift all term
limits on President Xi Jinping, effectively making
him president for life. Now, I’ve been talking to
Minxin Pei: he’s a professor of government at
Claremont McKenna College in California, and to
Robert Lawrence Kuhn, who is the author of How
China’s Leaders Think, and he is the host of a show
on the government-run CCTV news channel in
Beijing. Gentlemen welcome to you both. Let me
start by asking you, Robert Lawrence Kuhn there in
Beijing. From the Chinese government perspective,
these tariffs that the president of the United States
has announced, how much does it concern Beijing?

RLK: Well certainly it’s a concern, but I would call it a
minor annoyance as opposed to something extremely
serious. They have a lot on their plate here. The last
thing they want is a trade war with the U.S., but they
have to react. If the U.S. does something, there has to be
something that they will do in retaliation. They will
ratchet it down. They will signal, as you do, that they do
not want to accelerate this, but to save face and to be
appropriate, they’ll have to match it.
HOST: To you Minxin Pei, how do you see this playing
out?
MP: If the investigations find China at fault, or guilty of
some practices, then the US has a wide range of options
to punish China on a trade front. And if these things
happen, then US-China trade war will take place.
Another thing I want to say is that US-China relations
have turned a corner. This is a relationship that has
headed toward a long period of confrontation, and
adversarial relationships. So what is going to happen
on the trade front is part of a much larger picture of
geopolitical rivalry, if not competition.
2
Bloomberg TV Worldwide
President Xi, China, Economy
Robert Lawrence Kuhn – March 5, 2018
HOST: You were there at the Great Hall of the People. What was
your main takeaway from what some have described as Li
Keqiang’s impossible challenge: how to deleverage, how to take
away stimulus, and still keep 6.5% growth?
RLK: I don’t take the 6.5% growth as the primary objective here.
I mean you have to look at what these National Peoples
Congresses are. They’re not setting the vision and the strategy.
That was set at the party congress in October. What we’re dealing
here is the implementation of the policies. If you attend these
every year you know they all look and sound the same because
it’s the same structure, same kind of structure of numbers, so
what you do is look for the differences. What are those subtle
differences between one year and another. That’s what I focus on
at these congresses.
HOST: What’s the main difference you saw?
1
BBC World News
Xi Jinping and the New Politburo Standing Committee
Robert Lawrence Kuhn
October 25, 2017
HOST: We’re going to put a question to Robert Lawrence
Kuhn, who’s a long-time advisor to the Chinese
government. Robert, great to see you again. You were
with us at the very beginning of the Party Congress and
you were at the Congress today when it finished. Did you
have any vision, any inkling that President Xi Jinping
would take on so much authority? Also, what about the
fact that there is no successor candidates among the new
leaders?
RLK: I was interviewed in early 2012 by a well-known
American television network and the question put to me,
in January of that year, was, “isn’t Xi Jinping going to be a
very weak leader because he was not appointed by Deng
Xiaoping and he has no strong base of support?”
1
CNN International
Xi Jinping and the New Politburo Standing Committee
Robert Lawrence Kuhn - October 26, 2017
HOST: The author of How China’s Leaders Think: The Inside
Story of Past, Current and Future Leaders, Robert Lawrence
Kuhn is a longtime advisor to the Chinese government. He
comes to us once again from Beijing. We talked this time
yesterday. Good to have you back. And we discussed
yesterday what we would learn about that lineup of the
standing committee. It hadn’t been revealed at that point
that we spoke, but we now know and is it correct to say the
most significant thing is no sign of a leader in waiting?
RLK: I think the most significant sign is who the people are
and how they relate to each other. It’s a group that actually
respects traditional norms.
RLK: There was thought that Wang Qishan, for example,
might violate norms by being on the Standing Committee
after the traditional retirement age and that’s not the case.
There is balance among the member in terms of their
geographies, even their political affiliations within the party
which internally are important. Two are from Shanghai,
two are from the Communist Youth League - one is actually
from Shanghai and the Youth League as well but he’s really
from Shanghai - two have a long relationship with General
Secretary Xi. And then of course General Secretary Xi has
the overarching power as everyone says - and that is correct
and will be correct for a long time to come.


CHINA DAILY Tuesday, January 23, 2018
VISION CHINA
7
Observers offer fresh insight for new era
Intellectual hails progress
made in past while warning
of challenges that lie ahead
By LI YANG
liyang@chinadaily.com.cn
Robert Lawrence Kuhn has many
titles, ranging from investment
banker to anatomy researcher. But
he is better known in China as a specialist
who knows the country
inside out.
Over the past 29 years, he has
visited almost every provincial
region and spoken with people from
all walks of life, including some who
have gone on to become State leaders.
“It’s been a great gift to my life to
be able to learn so much about China’s
rich civilization, political theories
and the whole development,” he
said.
Kuhn, who is from the United
States, learns as an outsider but
communicates as an insider. In his
talk show Closer to China with R.L.
Kuhn on the China Global Television
Network, he presents China’s
complex story to the world through
candid, intimate discussions with
the country’s decision-makers.
In a hotel suite in Wangfujing,
downtown Beijing, one busy lunchtime
last week, Kuhn shared his
thoughts on Chinese politics with
China Daily, between exercising and
a meeting of the Communist Party
of China, which he had been invited
to attend as an observer.
He spoke passionately about the
19th CPC National Congress, which
was held in Beijing in October,
describing it as “a milestone congress
that set the agenda for more
than 30 years”.
The Party proposed two new concepts
at the congress — “a new era
of socialism with Chinese characteristics”
and Xi Jinping Thought
on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
for a New Era, which has
been written into the Party Constitution.
“To understand China today, it is
critical to appreciate what the new
era means. … I like to understand
new era in two categories: its characteristics
at home and abroad, and
its timeline,” Kuhn said.
He has obviously developed his
own way of explaining terms with
Chinese characteristics. That is to
break down the characteristics,
domestically and internationally,
rather than delve into the term.
He listed a number of challenges
in China’s new era, from pollution to
medical care, among which he said
the biggest is the rising expectations
of the people at home, because “now
that the people have some, they
want more”.
The complex international environment
is the main characteristic
of the new era, as the world is fragmented
by diverse problems and
challenges, he said.
While explaining what he called
the timeline of the new era (2017,
2021, 2049) and expounding his
understanding of Xi Jinping
Thought on Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics for a New Era —
which he broke down into three categories:
serve the people, national
rejuvenation, and governance modernization
— Kuhn showcased his
knowledge of the Party’s files, which
he has clearly learned by heart.
He recited almost every key
point of the 68-page report Xi
delivered to the congress in October.
More important, he made connections
between these points,
presenting them in a vivid way, seasoned
with personal experiences
and thinking.
When asked about the effects of
the anti-corruption campaign, he
immediately listed 10 objectives.
That’s his style of approaching Chinese
issues — divergent thinking
and a vigilance not to lose sight of
the connections between different
points.
British journalist tells China’s story to the world
By LIU XUAN
liuxuan@chinadaily.com.cn
Broadcaster sees choice and confidence in rising nation
By YANG WANGLI
yangwangli@chinadaily.com.cn
For 20 years, Liu Xin has had a singular
goal: to build a bridge of understanding
between China and the
outside world.
The television presenter began
working for China Central TV, the
State broadcaster, in 1997, two years
after becoming the first Chinese to
take part in — and win — the International
Public Speaking Competition.
Early last year, her desire to share
China’s story received a major boost
when she was chosen to host The
Point, a prime-time discussion show
that airs weekdays on the China Global
Television Network.
She said that China entering a new
era means three things: opportunities,
challenges and responsibilities.
“My winning speech in that 1995
national competition was about
choice,” she said. “After 15 years of
reform and opening-up, we Chinese
now enjoy an abundance of choice in
our daily lives.”
After listening to General Secretary
Xi Jinping’s report at the opening of
I like to understand
new era in two categories:
its characteristics
at home and abroad,
and its timeline.”
Robert Lawrence Kuhn, investment
banker and anatomy researcher
Q&A | ROBERT
LAWRENCE KUHN
You hold multiple titles now.
How have you managed to
master so many different
fields? Do they have anything
in common?
There’s one word to describe
the commonality, that is “passion”.
Whatever I’ve done I
want to have passion for it. To
expand that a bit, it’s the passion
to learn. I’m not here to
teach, I love to learn. When I
write a new book, it’s something
I want to learn about. I
use that vehicle to learn. So
passion about learning is the
common denominator. China
has given me a hugely rich life
because of everything I’ve
learned here.
the 19th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China, Liu said
she was impressed with his use of the
word “confidence”.
“It’s the confidence China has developed
through knowing that our system
works. The confidence about who
we are as a people, as a culture. And it’s
the confidence about our future role in
the world,” she said.
“As media workers, we believe we
have a great story to tell. In the past,
people relied on a few correspondents
or experts for information and opinions
on China. But more people are
tuning in to Chinese media for information,
both traditional platforms
such as TV and online.”
As more questions emerge in the
minds of those watching from outside
China, Liu said the opportunities to
tell stories from inside the country are
growing. However, so too are the challenges.
“Because of the ideological differences
between China and the West, China
has always been the subject of
Western media criticism, which is
often downright bashing based on
falsehoods,” she said.
From left: Zhao Jianguo, head of the international communication bureau of the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee; Jiang
Qingzhe, Party chief of the University of International Business and Economics; China Daily reporter Andrew Moody; Guo Weimin, vice-minister of the Information
Office of the State Council; speakers Robert Lawrence Kuhn and Liu Xin; Zhou Shuchun, publisher and editor-in-chief of China Daily; and Zhang Jianmin, head of
translation and interpretation for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pose for a photo at the inaugural Vision China event on Monday at UIBE. FENG YONGBIN / CHINA DAILY
Now that China has defied all kinds
of predictions of a collapse or economic
hard landing, Western observers are
having a hard time explaining the China
phenomenon, she said, adding that
the result is an ignorance-based superiority
complex mixed with bewilderment
and iced with jealousy.
During her 30-minute program, Liu
conducts live interviews with guests in
the studio or via satellite link to get a
Chinese perspective on two to three topics
that affect people around the world.
“I understand the urgency to be
more assertive, but I believe we always
need to be aware of the danger of putting
feelings before reason, putting
opinions before facts,” she said.
“Nationalism is my biggest enemy.
“President Xi has said we need to
improve the quality and effect of development.
I believe this also applies to
China’s international communication.
The Chinese people will work hard
toward a community of a shared future,
regardless of how others view us.”
Meanwhile, Liu has a job to do. “As a
journalist, our duty is to tell China’s
story as it is, one topic at a time, one
show at a time,” she added.
The real fun of
reporting in China is
the closeness to the
actual story, the big
fascinating story of
China merging into
the 21st century.”
Andrew Moody,
China Daily senior reporter
China has always been
the subject of Western
media criticism,
which is often
downright bashing
based on falsehoods.”
Liu Xin, host of The Point on
China Global Television Network
Q&A
ANDREW MOODY
How do you overcome the
challenges of showing the
real China to the world,
especially to those who have
biases against China?
It’s a long-term thing, and
you cannot change this overnight.
There are negative perceptions
about China. It’s
about engagement. If China
has much more interactions
with the rest of the world, then
people will see China as it
actually is. One of the 2035
objectives is to better increase
China’s soft power. Organizations
like China Daily can actually
play a role in improving
China’s soft power. But I do
think it’s a long-term process,
and China doesn’t need to be
too sensitive toward criticism.
Despite living and working in China
for a decade, Andrew Moody’s ability
to speak Mandarin is still at a basic
level. Yet that has not stopped the
award-winning journalist from interpreting
China’s story for the world.
Moody joined China Daily nine
years ago and is now a senior correspondent.
He has written more than
150 cover stories for the paper’s European
Weekly and African Weekly,
examining a wide range of issues
including the Belt and Road Initiative.
The job has provided him with firsthand
experience of how China is
developing as well as the chance to
record reactions from the outside
world, especially in the West, toward
the nation’s growth and changes.
He was at the Great Hall of the
People to hear General Secretary
Xi Jinping deliver a report to the
19th National Congress of the Communist
Party of China in October,
when the concept of a “new era” was
first mentioned.
“The consensus of the various people
I spoke to in the hours after the
speech was that China’s entering a new
era could be a momentous turning
point in world history,” Moody said.
According to his interviews, he
said, people believe that a more confident
China is striding into a world
that it also is helping to shape.
Moody has his own understanding
of the new era. With 40 years of
reform and opening-up, he said China
has reached a point where it can move
on in many ways, such as in foreign
policy, global governance and domestic
reforms. “China has reached a new
junction and has to move forward.”
The British journalist has written
many stories that explain China to the
rest of the world, and these have
brought him many honors, including
being named a State High-End
Project Foreign Expert.
“I like reporting on China because
it’s perhaps the 21st century’s most
fascinating story,” he said. “The real
fun of reporting in China is the closeness
to the actual story, the big fascinating
story of China merging into
the 21st century, the stories that maybe
Western media don’t really have
the chance to interview.”
Moody sees his task as communicating
China to a global audience, and
there are still a number of things that
need to be done, he said.
“I go back to the UK quite a lot, and
I still don’t think that people are
aware of the impact of a much bigger
Chinese economy and China’s being a
more significant player in the world,”
he said. “All I can do is to report and do
stories one by one.”
Q&A | LIU XIN
As a professional journalist,
what do you think China’s
mainstream media could do
to better report China to the
outside world in such a media
transformation age?
It’s challenging. I think we
need to be aware of new technology.
And the content is very
important. If we’re more confident,
we can really be more
sincere, be more at ease with
our problems and our achievements.
So let’s have a sincere
conversation, not shy away
from the problems we’re facing.
That’s why I say let’s tell
the China story as it is. It’s not
100 percent about achievements.
Every day we see mixed
news, we have mixed feelings,
so let’s be factual, let’s be sincere
and let people decide
whether they want to watch us
or not. This is going to take
time, but I think if we follow
the right philosophy, the right
steps, we’re going to make it.
What they say
Vision China
is the
first highend
event
organized
by China
Daily and
UIBE after the two sides
launched a partnership. By
telling China’s stories in an
objective and rational manner,
it aims to help students get to
know a real China and an
objective world, and to understand
China in the new era.
Wang Jiaqiong, president of
the University of International
Business and Economics
I’ve learned
a lot from
Vision China
today.
What
impressed
me most is
how to eliminate bias against
China when telling China’s
stories. The three experts
shared a common opinion,
which is to show a true China
and not care too much about
comments from the outside
world. The sincerest story is
often the most touching one.
Zhu Yue, a senior student
majoring in international politics
from Beijing International
Studies University
It was an
interesting
lecture. It
was good to
understand
certain
aspects
about China. It would be good
to have things like this abroad
because it’s about China. You
don’t have to explain China to
the Chinese people, but you
need to explain it to the outside
world.
Nektarios Palaskas, science
and technology counselor for
the Swiss embassy
This event
was very
interesting.
You invited
distinguished
speakers,
and all of them are of global
thinking and have a vision
about China. China is booming,
and everyone is interested.
I enjoyed hearing the
speakers’ ideas about how
China will be in the future. I
came here with an open mind.
Ratthawoot Nanthaikuakool,
first secretary of Thai embassy

A12 Saturday, March 10, 2018
CONTACT US
Agree or disagree with the opinions on this
page? Write to us at letters@scmp.com
If you have an idea for an opinion article,
email it to oped@scmp.com
Power with purpose
Robert Lawrence Kuhn explains why abolishing presidential term limits may well be good for China
To interview delegates
and officials at the
annual National People’s
Congress in Beijing,
interspersed with
being interviewed in the international
media about China abolishing
term limits for its president,
is to inhabit parallel universes.
Delegates and officials focus
on clusters of issues from controlling
financial risk and reducing
pollution to scientific innovation
and business stimulation, plus
enhancing and institutionalising
China’s anti-corruption campaign
with a powerful National
Supervision Commission. The
international media, no surprise,
focus on the constitutional
amendment ending term limits,
assuming President Xi Jinping will
now serve in a for-life dictatorship,
reminiscent of Mao’s China,
the Soviet Union, the Kim family
in North Korea and some African
countries.
It is no challenge to explain
why abolishing term limits is bad
for China – dependency on one
human being who is not omniscient
but is hostage to fortune,
fewer and weaker checks and
balances, forced conformity in a
complex society with no easy answers,
etc. The system begins
stronger in that hard choices can
be made and consistency maintained,
but it could become brittle
in that officials are more wary and
may say things they do not
believe.
It is a challenge to explain why
abolishing term limits is good for
China, so that’s what I will do.
First, some background. There
are three separate issues being
conflated: the significance of ending
term limits, the intended consequences
and the unintended
consequences. Though terminating
the two-term limit for China’s
presidency captures headlines, it
is more the symbolic, final step
ratifying Xi’s near-absolute power
than the big breakthrough itself.
Many expect this
experiment to
end badly for
China. It is
indeed an
experiment but
its end is not set
Xi’s prior designation as “core” of
the Communist Party in October
2016 and the inscribing of “Xi
Jinping Thought...” into the party
constitution in October 2017 were
more meaningful.
Moreover, the Politburo
Standing Committee, the highest
authoritative body in China,
unambiguously supports Xi.
China watchers see the front page
of People’s Daily – published the
day after the new Standing Committee
marched out on stage –
which featured Xi’s photo on top,
many times larger than the smaller,
subservient photo of all seven
members lined up on the bottom.
All this reconfirms that, in a
system where the party controls
the state – especially where the
party is Marxist and ideology is its
basis for being – Xi, as core of the
party, with his name inscribed in
the constitutions of party and
state as the contemporary arbiter
of Marxism, will be the uncontested,
overarching leader of China
for the rest of his sentient life.
For intended consequences,
the official line is that the purpose
is national cohesion brought
about when the three top leadership
positions – general secretary
of the party, chairman of the Central
Military Commission and
president of the republic – are
aligned temporally and held by a
single person.
This makes sense, but as a
primary, proximal motivation, it is
not entirely persuasive. The
current structure has existed for
decades without outcry or angst
(not to mention that the three positions
could be unified by installing
term limits on the other two).
The “new era”, marked by economic,
social and global complexities,
is said to require firm
and consistent leadership, making
moot inner party struggles
and even mitigating political gossip,
facilitating focus on the tasks
of governance and development.
Specifically, because advancing
reform has become more difficult,
with entrenched interest groups
resisting change, the message
must now go forth that all must
get with the programme, because
you can’t outwit or outwait Xi.
Because, it is said that only Xi
has the vision, experience, competence
and character to bring
about “the great rejuvenation of
the Chinese people”, especially
from 2020 to 2035 and ultimately
to 2050 – bringing China to global
centre stage – Xi’s unimpeded
leadership is deemed essential.
China cannot afford “downtime”
to accommodate a change of
leadership, and after Xi’s success
at the 19th National Party Congress
came the time to make clear
that he will call the shots for the
foreseeable future.
Some argue that doing away
with term limits shows the superiority
of the Chinese system as it
allows flexibility in matching
leadership to requirements
(though what national leader,
when extending his reach, has not
claimed “current requirements”
as justification?).
The party-run Global Times
stated that ending term limits
does not mean China has reverted
to president-for-life tenure. (But
who can deny that however long
Xi holds the top positions seems
largely up to him?)
As for the unintended consequences,
the almost unanimous,
disparaging foreign reaction –
other than US President Donald
Trump’s – did not burnish China’s
international image.
More worrisome would be a
reluctance by officials to offer
constructive opposing views on
central policies.
By stressing term limits, the
international media misses
fundamental changes going on in
China – this year, innovation,
streamlining of government, facilitation
of business (cutting
bureaucracy and reducing taxes),
rural revitalisation and rural land
reform. The 13th National People’s
Congress shows how the
grand vision and mission of the
19th National Party Congress is
translated into specific strategies
and policies. If one sees only term
limits, one cannot visualise the big
picture.
As for Xi maintaining the presidency
perpetually, it doesn’t actually
matter much – this is the deep
insight of how China’s party-state
system works. Xi as core of the
party and “Xi Jinping Thought...”
as the party’s (and now the state’s)
guiding principle means that Xi
can transfer titular party leadership
and/or the presidency to others
and still maintain his
overarching power. It may well be
that, after serving two or even
three more terms, rather than trying
to find and install another
leader like himself, he will move to
bring about true democracy within
the party.
Here’s the best case. Xi will not
be leader-for-life, but leader long
enough to bring about China’s
national rejuvenation and establish
a Chinese kind of democratic
norms. Could Xi continue until
around 2035, when China plans to
have “basically” achieved full modernisation,
heading towards, by
mid-century, 2050, a “great modern
socialist country”?
Many expect this experiment
to end badly for China. It is indeed
an experiment but its end is not
set. It may be a race between
achieving Xi’s grand vision and
some untoward perturbation that
could cause fracture.
All factors considered, I am not
saying abolishing term limits is
absolutely good for China. I am
saying it may be good – because of
China’s special conditions and
Xi’s special capabilities – but if it is
good, it’s just for this once, and it’s
just for so long. That’s the best
case. I’m rooting for Xi.
Robert Lawrence Kuhn is a public
intellectual, international corporate
strategist and investment banker, and
China expert/commentator. He is the
author of How China’s Leaders Think
Private clubs
deserve ‘cushy’
rental deals
Edith Terry says private recreational
clubs are part of Hong Kong’s
heritage and have contributed to
nurturing less popular sports, as
well as a unique hybrid culture
In 1964, a young German, fresh off the plane at his
first job, went in search of a social group. He found a
home away from home in Hong Kong’s oldest
private recreational club, newly relocated from a prime
location on Victoria Harbour, where City Hall is today,
to a modest flagstone boathouse beneath Island Road
on Hong Kong’s south side. Fifty-five years later, Frank
Pfeiffer, a Zen Buddhist and mountain climber, is still
an active member of the Victoria Recreation Club,
established in 1849. He has watched it ring the changes
from Hong Kong’s colonial society in the 1960s, when it
had only two Chinese members and no female
members, to the hybrid institution it is today, under its
first Hong Kong Chinese chairman, Wu Kam Shing.
Its membership is a spectrum of Hong Kong’s
diverse and athletically minded middle class. There is
the Hong Kong Chinese court reporter who visits the
club in Deep Water Bay every morning at 6am on her
way from home in Ap Lei Chau to her workplace in Sha
Tin. There are her fellow swimmers, many elderly, who
swim out to the buoys, rain or shine, hot or cold, every
day. Some 100-150 “paddlers” use the club as a base for
outrigger canoeing, dragon boating and paddle
boarding. Some of the sports were unknown to Hong
Kong before the club nurtured them, others, like
dragon boating, are deeply traditional.
In the current debate over the future of the 67
private recreational clubs that pay minimal rents to the
government, history has been swept aside. True, they
were designed on a colonial template, in which the
diverse ethnic groups were given separate retreats.
Membership at the pinnacle clubs was reserved
primarily for the British. For other ethnic groups, there
was a Chinese Recreation Club, a Club de Recreio, a
Filipino Club, an Indian Recreation Club, and so on.
Hong Kong’s colonial rulers reviewed the lease
system for the private clubs in 1968 and 1979, and in
the run-up to the handover in 1997 when leases were
restricted to 15-year terms. At the handover, a number
of leases were extended to ensure a so-called smooth
transition. The sceptic would argue that this was a
dodge, and indeed, in 2011, during the first post-1997
review of private recreational leases by the Legislative
Council, most of the clubs seemed oblivious to public
concerns as well as new requirements for “opening up”
The government argued
that subsidies were
needed because use of land
for sports and recreation
would never trump
commercial utilisation
What the Western belt and road sceptics are missing
Wenshan Jia says there are opportunities for the whole world to benefit from China’s initiative
China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”is
an original plan to carry out a new
type of “collaborative globalisation”
above and beyond US-led type. It was
proposed five years ago by President Xi
Jinping after the tapering off of US-led
globalisation in 2008.
Xi offered three principles: mutual
consultation, joint construction and
shared benefits. China has since then fully
executed 101 agreements with 86
countries, and total investment in the 24
countries along the belt and road regions
has amounted to US$50 billion, resulting
in 75 industrial and trade zones, and
200,000 jobs.
With its focus on infrastructure, the
initiative is a model not only for developing
countries, but also industrialised ones in
Europe and North America, where ageing
infrastructure needs replacing. It also
adapts to each local, national or regional
condition, situation and need. It is proving
very democratic, more so than the
lopsided US-led globalisation that spurred
a populist, isolationist backlash across the
Western world.
China has done a proper job of
explaining to the West what the initiative is
and extended a sincere invitation to each
country to join. Many think tank scholars
and major media outlets in the West have
found it potentially lucrative and
expressed relatively strong support.
Yet, instead of appreciating China’s
efforts to both inherit the liberal agenda of
globalisation and forge a new path for
global development, many Western
political elite, led by the US, have started a
campaign to resist the initiative. From
Australia to the US , and the UK to
Germany, there are calls for the West to cut
interactions with China to minimise or
resist its so-called “sharp power”. The
labels typically applied to China include
“authoritarian” and “predatory”, citing
Beijing for not upholding “freedom,
democracy and individual rights”, the core
values of the West.
This attitude towards the initiative
reveals not only a contradiction in the
Western mind, but also the narrowing or
even closing of minds.
Isn’t it beneficial to meet the goals of
forging connectivity and cooperation, as
articulated in Xi’s effort to enrich and
expand the meaning of the “free world” by
liberating humankind from geographical,
financial, political and cultural barriers?
The world is no longer the West versus the
rest, as we already live in a world
connected by the internet. The initiative
seeks to make the world more
interconnected for both the West and the
rest, contributing to the construction of a
human community with a shared future.
Recently, the initiative has inspired and
spawned a push for localisation,
particularly the Indo-Pacific strategy led by
the so-called “Quad” of the US, India,
Japan and Australia. Some Western media
view it as a rival or alternative to China’s
belt and road.
But I would argue that it can be part of
China’s initiative as long as the three
Chinese principles (mutual consultation,
The anti-China smear
campaign must be
replaced by a
discourse involving
consultation and
communication
joint construction and shared benefits) are
observed in the Quad strategy. The belt
and road was created to be an all-inclusive
platform, so Beijing has no need to fear
localisation as long as such strategies do
not seek to contain China or disrupt its
plan. It would be wise for the Quad and
China to look for ways to collaborate.
Quad countries need not take an
antagonistic stance towards China; the
anti-China smear campaign must be
replaced by a discourse involving
consultation and communication. The
world has experienced more than enough
damaging talk, not to mention wars.
The core principles of Xi’s belt and road
strategy must be always applied in China’s
interactions with local strategies. If China
is, as German Foreign Minister Sigmar
Gabriel told the Munich Security
Conference in February, “the only country
in the world with any sort of genuinely
global, geostrategic concept”, then
Western leaders should cultivate a
genuinely global strategy in line with
China’s vision, for the betterment of all
humankind.
Wenshan Jia, PhD, is a professor in the
School of Communication, at Chapman
University (California) and a research fellow
at the National Academy of Development
and Strategy, Renmin University of China
to schools and community organisations. Following
the last well-publicised review in 2013 and the current
investigation seeking new venues for public housing,
they are no longer complacent.
Should the private clubs have got their cushy rental
deals in the first place? At the time of the reviews 50
years ago, the government argued that subsidies were
needed because use of land for sports and recreation
would never trump commercial utilisation. What was
true then is even more so today. The high cost of land in
Hong Kong is a drag on innovation and creativity. The
existence of the private recreational clubs means it has
been less of a drag on sports.
Most of the clubs with government leases are
framed around core sports – golf, tennis, horse racing,
swimming, sailing and rowing, to name a few. Hong
Kong athletes whose development was supported by
these clubs have gone to the Olympics and other
international competitions. In the 1940s, the Victoria
Recreation Club was the driving force behind Hong
Kong’s participation in the International Olympic
Committee and the Hong Kong Sports Federation.
Public pressure on the clubs to forge community
ties and contribute to Hong Kong through “opening
up” schemes is appropriate – but not the pressure to
convert their land to high-rise estates. The loss is not
only to the core sports they represent but also to their
unique DNA, which is the foundation of Hong Kong –
diverse, cosmopolitan and adventurous. If you want to
look for a Hong Kong that is not just about money, one
place to look is here.
Edith Terry is the honorary secretary of the Victoria
Recreation Club. She writes in a personal capacity
Stand-up paddlers participate in an event held at the
Victoria Recreation Club. Photo: Jonathan Wong
CHINA DAILY Wednesday, December 27, 2017 VIEWS 9
2017 YEAR-END: Politics
Robert Lawrence Kuhn
Watching China’s year for history
When future historians reconstruct
the long history of China,
they will likely circle 2017
as a year of significance. I’ve
seen it all this year, and attended or even
participated in the major events. I’ve conversed
with Chinese leaders and experts,
and searched for meaning.
I didn’t appreciate the opportunity I’ve
had until I began reviewing the year from
China’s domestic perspective, seeking
themes and trends, discerning from what
we know about the recent past to what we
might forecast about the near-term future.
It takes no flash of insight to see the leadership
and vision of President Xi Jinping
headlining almost every event.
Following is the review of the meaningful
events of 2017.
January: Xi began
the year with a memorable
speech at the
World Economic Forum
in Davos, Switzerland,
mounting a roaring
defense of globalization,
free trade, and
Robert Lawrence
Kuhn
economic openness and
liberalization. It was the
first-ever speech by China’s
head of state at
Davos and, as commentators the world over
noted with amazement and irony, as the
United States under President Donald
Trump was apparently retreating from the
world and abrogating global leadership,
China under President Xi was apparently
defending the international order and promoting
global governance.
March: The annual “two sessions” of the
National People’s Congress, China’s top legislature,
and the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference National Committee,
the top political advisory body, seemed
to radiate more energy than usual, perhaps
in anticipation of the 19th National Congress
of the Communist Party of China in
the fall. A highlight was the adoption of the
draft general provisions of civil law, a step
closer to a long-needed unified civil code.
I sensed delegates’ growing confidence
and assertiveness to represent their particular
sectors in the competitive marketplace
of public ideas and government funding, a
competition that is vital for the development
of China’s kind of consultative democracy.
This was especially true of the CPPCC
National Committee, whose members are
often leading experts in their fields, such
that even though they do not have legal
authority to pass laws, they have moral
authority to exert pressure and affect
change. It did not escape notice that,
throughout the “two sessions”, Xi was recognized
repeatedly as “core” of the CPC Central
Committee and of the whole Party.
Belt and Road to the fore
May: The first “Belt and Road Summit”
(the Belt and Road Forum for International
Cooperation), held in Beijing, was the diplomatic
highlight of the year in China. Some
130 countries participated, including 29
heads of state and government. The goal
was no less than the transformation of the
economic structure of the developing
world: building infrastructure and connectivity,
stimulating development, alleviating
poverty, reducing severe imbalances, promoting
South-South cooperation, and revitalizing
globalization.
Xi called the Belt and Road Initiative “the
project of the century”.
July: China celebrated the 20th anniversary
of Hong Kong’s return to the motherland.
It was a time of reflection for the
cosmopolitan city, long a global leader in
economic freedom and competitiveness.
Hong Kong had flourished: its way of life
preserved, its economy dynamic. But times
change. With Shanghai and Shenzhen on
the rise, and with some claiming the “one
country, two systems” principle is in
decline, Hong Kong faces new challenges.
August: The People’s Liberation Army
celebrated its 90th anniversary. In a move
both practical and symbolic, the PLA established
its first overseas logistics base in Djibouti,
situated strategically on the Horn of
Africa.
Xi Jinping, who is also chairman of the
Central Military Commission, said the PLA
is becoming “strong” informationized
armed forces. “The Chinese people love
peace,” Xi said. “We will never seek aggression
or expansion, but … No one should
expect us to swallow the bitter fruit that is
harmful to our sovereignty, security or
development interests”.
Foreigners are wondering: what is the
PLA’s long-term plan for operating overseas?
What will be the impact of the PLA’s
modernization and reform, especially its
burgeoning blue-water navy with multiple
aircraft carriers?
August: China hosted the BRICS Summit
in Xiamen, East China’s Fujian province.
The five BRICS countries — Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa —
have increasing influence on global economy
and politics, but does BRICS as an organization
make sense? China certainly thinks
so, and promoted the BRICS Summit as
representing a new kind of multilateral
global governance. There are complexities:
political instabilities in Brazil and South
Africa; the growing, comprehensive cooperation
between Russia and China; the sensitive,
multifaceted relationship
between India and China.
Throughout the year, events on the
Korean Peninsula continued to
intrude. While China continued to
call for denuclearization and dialogue,
just hours before Xi gave
the opening speech at the BRICS
Summit, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea detonated its
most powerful nuclear bomb
ever.
19th Party Congress
and the New Era
October: The highlight of the
year was, as expected, the 19th
CPC National Congress. Not quite
expected were the far-reaching
proclamations and, taken together,
the magnitude of their significance. I
witnessed history and see six highlights.
First, Xi’s name and thought were written
into the CPC Constitution — “Xi Jinping
Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
for a New Era”. Xi is now, officially,
the overarching creator and arbiter of political
thought, and combined with his designation
as “core” of the CPC, he is now the
undisputed, unimpeded leader with singular
authority. Xi Jinping “thought” is built
on the twin pillars of people orientation and
national rejuvenation, with the new concept
of development (innovation, coordination,
green, open, sharing) driving a new
kind of economic growth.
Second, the “New Era”, which is intended
as a policy-energizing game changer, is a
conceptual lens with which to view the
range of goals, strategies and concepts that
compose Xi’s way of thinking and the Party’s
new direction.
The “New Era” is envisioned in three temporal
segments: (i) from now until the fulfillment
of China’s first centenary goal of a
“moderately prosperous society” in 2020
(2021 being the 100th anniversary of the
CPC); (ii) from 2020 to 2035, when the CPC
states it will build on the foundation of the
moderately prosperous society so that, after
“15 years of hard work”, the country will
“basically” realize “socialist modernization”;
and (iii) from 2035 to 2050, when the CPC
states it will “work hard for a further 15
years” and “develop China into a country
that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally
advanced, harmonious, and beautiful”.
Realizing this vision at mid-century,
around 2050, with China being respected as
a great, modern, socialist country, is the second
centenary goal (2049 being the 100th
anniversary of the People’s Republic of China).
Third, the new “principal contradiction”
in China’s “New Era” is between “unbalanced
and inadequate development” and
“the people’s ever-growing needs for a better
life”, which includes increasingly broad
demands for “democracy, rule of law, fairness
and justice, security, and a better environment”.
From now on, this new-era
principal contradiction, replacing quantitative
GDP growth with qualitative improvement
of life, is what will guide China’s
domestic affairs and policies.
Fourth, the Party’s leadership role in governing
the country is expanding and the
Party’s stringent approach to governing
itself is intensifying. The Party will be more
deeply embedded within agencies of government
and sectors of society (including
private companies, foreign businesses and
educational institutions), and by reforming
and purifying itself, the Party’s governance
will be stricter and more comprehensive.
The anti-corruption campaign, not only
continues, it has been enhanced.
Fifth, the “New Era” has China moving
closer to center stage of the world and making
greater contributions to humanity,
offering “Chinese wisdom” and “Chinese
solutions” for world problems. China’s
diplomacy will be proactive, championing
the development of a community with a
shared future for humanity and encouraging
the evolution of the global governance
system.
Sixth, I watched the new senior leaders of
China, the seven members of the new
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau
of the CPC Central Committee, walk out on
stage, ending months, really years, of speculation
and rumor. Because everything in
China reports to a Political Bureau Standing
Committee member, and because of the
Party’s principle of collective leadership,
their personalities, composition and balance
determine the vision, strategies and
policies that shape China.
The importance of the Political Bureau
Standing Committee remains true today,
but its importance frankly is also less true
today. It is hard to overstate the consequences
of Xi’s name written into the Party
Constitution, thus inscribing into perpetuity
his predominant status and assuring
his continuing pre-eminence in the coun-
try’s political life.
Following the 19th Party Congress, some
might have expected a respite, a slower
November and December. They were anything
but.
Form is substance
November: The “state visit-plus” of US
President Donald Trump came at a delicate
moment. Amid pomp and pageantry,
including a personal tour of the Palace
Museum (Forbidden City), $253 billion in
business deals were signed, a world record,
though critics complained it was all transactional,
nothing structural. The number,
some said, was more form than substance,
but here, perhaps, form was substance.
Both Xi and Trump hailed the visit as “successful
and historic”.
Yet, on sensitive topics, one could be forgiven
for seeing sunlight between their
positions. On trade, Xi lauded the business
deals and market access, “which will deliver
great benefits for the two peoples”. Trump
sought improved trade with China based on
“a level playing field for our workers” and
solving the “massive trade distortion” —
which, characteristically, Trump blamed on
past US administrations, not on China.
On the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, Xi reiterated China’s firm commitment
for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula
and direct communications, while Trump
said that they “agreed not to replicate failed
approaches of the past” and he called for
“increased economic pressure until North
Korea abandons its reckless and dangerous
path”.
Subsequent to Trump’s visit, China
announced revised regulations that were
indeed structural. China will reduce or
eliminate (over time) limits on foreign
ownership of financial services sectors,
including insurance, commercial banking,
securities, futures, and asset management.
Significantly, the State Council, China’s
Cabinet, established a Financial Stability
and Development Committee to oversee
financial stability and boost risk prevention
(including close monitoring of “shadow
banking” and corporate debt). This new
supra-ministry commission will be empowered
to make decisions related to reform
and development, coordinate issues concerning
monetary policy, and establish
financial policies and related fiscal and
industrial policies, thus improving the
financial regulatory system.
At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Leaders’ Meeting in Vietnam, Xi strengthened
his themes of making economic globalization
more open, balanced and
inclusive; lauded regional multilateralism
for promoting common interests; and
stressed the Belt and Road Initiative for
advancing global connectivity.
What struck me in Xi’s speech was what
he inserted about poverty: “To lift all the
remaining poor people out of poverty is a
solemn commitment made by the Chinese
government to the people. It is uppermost
in my mind, and I have spent more energy
on poverty alleviation than on anything
else.”
“Upper most in my mind?” “More energy
on poverty alleviation than on anything
else?” An extraordinary statement from the
president! Although Xi has been making
high-profile visits to numerous poor counties
and villages, relentlessly championing
“targeted poverty alleviation” for realizing
the “moderately prosperous society”, this
was his clearest statement that poverty alleviation
is his highest priority.
Main contradiction reinforced
Two unpleasant events in Beijing reinforced
the new “principal contradiction”,
highlighting “the people’s ever-growing
needs for a better life” as that surprisingly
powerful lens for viewing Chinese society.
The first was alleged child abuse at a kindergarten.
The second was a fire in which
19 migrant workers died. In both cases, netizens
reacted with anger: in the alleged
child abuse, anger about a perceived coverup;
in the fire, anger for the disorderly and
inconsiderate way of evacuating migrant
workers.
When Xi first announced the new principal
contradiction at the 19th Party Congress,
some dismissed it as arcane Partyspeak.
Public reaction to the alleged child
abuse and to the fire revealed its prescient
and perspicacious wisdom.
The second volume of Xi Jinping: The
Governance of China, a collection of 99 of
Xi’s speeches, conversations, instructions
and letters, was published. The book offers
a resource to follow the development of Xi’s
ways of thinking and ideas and to understand
China’s new guiding philosophy and
the specific elements that compose it.
The month ended with what may seem a
light touch when Xi called for China to
upgrade its toilets. Toilets among the year’s
highlights? Xi was serious and his point is
probative. For China to become a more civilized
society, the hygiene of the people must
be improved (especially in rural areas), and
for China’s tourism industry to blossom,
better bathrooms are needed. Although
China’s leader talking toilets elicits smiles,
and some say it downgrades his dignity, it
demonstrates, above all, Xi’s intrinsic commitment
to improve the quality of life for
the Chinese people.
December: In the first nine days of the
month, Xi engaged with four international
events, stressing common commitment to
build a community of a shared future for all
humanity.
The four engagements
SHI YU / CHINA DAILY
To the “CPC in Dialogue with World Political
Parties High-Level Meeting”, Xi
described four views of the future: a world
that is safe and free of fear; prosperous and
free of poverty; open, inclusive and free of
isolation; and environmentally clean and
beautiful.
At the “Fourth World Internet Conference”,
Xi asserted how the internet posed
new challenges for sovereignty, security and
development.
At the “2017 Fortune Global Forum”, Xi
called for openness and innovation to
enhance global economic growth, pledging
to liberalize and facilitate trade and foreign
investment in China.
And at the “South-South Human Rights
Forum”, Xi emphasized that “human rights
must and can only be promoted in light of
specific national conditions and people’s
needs”.
The CPC’s Dialogue with World Political
Parties was path-setting in that it put the
world on notice that a transformed CPC
under Xi is reaching out globally with pride
and confidence — explaining, especially to
developing countries, the developmental
benefits of party leadership and party building.
The point of debate, as it were, has
shifted from whether the China model of a
perpetually ruling party (with all that
entails) is good for China to how the China
model is good for other countries.
At a meeting of the Political Bureau of the
CPC Central Committee, Xi directed authorities
to improve digital infrastructure, promote
the integration and sharing of digital
resources, and protect data security, in
order to better serve the nation’s economic
and social development as well as to
improve people’s lives. The big vision is to
turn China into a world leader in big data
and a global innovation hub for artificial
intelligence by 2030.
The last major event of the year was the
annual Central Economic Work Conference,
which identified “three tough battles” for
the next three years: preventing and defusing
risks (especially financial risks), eliminating
absolute poverty (China’s 2020 goal),
and curbing pollution (for instance, encouraging
investment in environmental projects).
Setting three-year targets was itself
an innovation (over the traditional one-year
targets), thereby strengthening long-term
thinking, reducing pressures to make hasty
decisions, and giving markets stable expectations.
The priority of reducing absolute debt
was modified to controlling a rise in borrowing,
such that China’s debt-to-GDP ratio
does not further deteriorate. This signaled
that growth would not be jeopardized and
(to the disappointment of some) debt-driven
growth would continue.
To contain financial risk, China will
crackdown on irregular and illegal activities
in its chaotic financial industry and intensify
regulatory scrutiny; continue supply-side
structural reform (reducing overcapacities);
and maintain a proactive fiscal policy, a
prudent and neutral monetary policy, and a
basically stable yuan exchange rate.
Resisting arguments for shrinking Stateowned
enterprises, China will make SOEs
“stronger, better and bigger”; and the government
will seek efficiencies by becoming
more of an investor and less of an operator.
China pledged to open up its markets further
and to balance trade by boosting
imports (US pressures, expressed vividly by
Trump, were not mentioned).
Theoretical foundation
After five years of “practice”, the theoretical
foundation of China’s economic development
is now labeled, “Xi Jinping
Thought on Socialist Economy with Chinese
Characteristics for a New Era”, paralleling
the phrase added to the Party
Constitution two months earlier. The
“thought” is based mainly on Xi’s new concept
of development — innovative, coordinated,
green, open and shared development
— which has been the core of his economic
philosophy.
For the first time at this annual conference,
topics other than economics were on
the agenda. Diverse public concerns were
addressed, such as burdensome homework
for schoolchildren, sex discrimination in
the workplace, and online scams. This was a
clear consequence of how China’s new
“principal contradiction” in the “New Era”
now drives domestic policy; as Chinese citizens
seek a “better life”, the government
must respond.
To pick one message to characterize the
year, it is this. In 2017, under the leadership
of Xi, China set the trajectory, in all vital
areas, of the country’s domestic development
and international engagement for the
next 30-plus years, to mid-century, to 2050.
Every year brings challenges. For China,
no doubt, big ones lie ahead. In 2018, China
will celebrate the 40th anniversary of
reform and opening-up. The world is
watching.
The author is a public intellectual, international
corporate strategist and investment
banker, and China expert/commentator. He
is co-creator (with Adam Zhu) and host of
CGTN’s Closer to China with R.L. Kuhn and
“The Watcher” commentaries.

October 28-29, 2017 5
COMMENT
OPINION
ChinaDaily
chinadaily.com.cn/opinion
Robert Lawrence Kuhn
New era on the road to 2050
Iwitnessed history sitting in the Great
Hall of the People during the 19th
National Congress of the Communist
Party of China. I listened raptly to
Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC
Central Committee, when he delivered his
new-era-defining report. I heard the
amendment to the Party Constitution that
enshrined “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism
with Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era”. I watched members of the new Standing
Committee of the Political Bureau of the
CPC Central Committee walk out on stage. I
was awed by the presence of the leadership,
past and present. And I was overawed by
Xi’s grand vision for China and the country’s
increasing, radiating confidence. Most of all,
I marveled at the remarkable and historic
transformation of China, which means so
much to the Chinese people and which in
this new era will mean so much to the rest
of the world.
Having departed the Great Hall of the
People, I reflected how I, an American,
found myself caught up in the welling Chinese
patriotism of the 19th CPC National
Congress. Certainly, I was experiencing firsthand
this inflection point in Chinese history,
when China envisions itself becoming a
fully modernized country and taking proactive
part in international affairs, and
regaining its leading seat at the high table of
great nations.
What have I just witnessed? Following are
some personal observations.
A general consensus describes four primary
outcomes of the 19th Party Congress:
Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics for a New Era; a new
“contradiction” that defines China’s principal
social challenge; a China that takes “center
stage in the world”; and the Party
enhancing its leadership of society, including
maintaining, indeed intensifying, its
anti-corruption campaign.
To me, however, a highlight was the specificity
of Xi’s vision of China, not only establishing
policies for the next five years, but also
framing the agenda and setting the strategies
for the next 30 years. This congress, Xi said, is
the “confluence” of the “Two Centenary
Goals”: a moderately prosperous society by
2020 (2021 being the 100th anniversary of
the CPC), which will likely be fulfilled within
the term of the 19th Party Congress, and a
great, modern, socialist country by 2050
(2049 being the 100th anniversary of the People’s
Republic of China), which is being
planned by the 19th Party Congress.
In a multi-meaning refinement, the path
to mid-century is now designed in two stages.
In the first stage, from 2020 to 2035, the
Party states it will build on the foundation of
the moderately prosperous society such that,
after “15 years of hard work”, the country will
basically realize “socialist modernization”.
In the second stage, from 2035 to 2050, the
CPC states it will build on a basically achieved
modernization, “work hard for a further 15
years” and “develop China into a great modern
socialist country that is prosperous,
strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious,
and beautiful”. China portrays its
mid-century self as a global leader in every
area of human consequence: economics and
trade, science and technology, military and
defense, culture and governance.
But Chinese leaders, and officials in general,
seem to have a different highlight. While
the “Two Centenary Goals” are certainly vital,
especially with new stages and specificity, they
focus on the amendment to the Party Constitution:
“Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”.
“The (Xi’s) thought is the biggest highlight
of the 19th National Congress of the
CPC and a historic contribution to the Party’s
development,” said Zhang Dejiang, the
third-ranking member of the Standing
Committee of the Political Bureau of the
18th CPC Central Committee. Liu Yunshan,
the fifth-ranking member, said the elevation
of Xi’s thought to the Party’s guiding principle
is of great political, theoretical and practical
significance.
I take a closer look at Xi’s thought: first by
examining each of its elements, then by considering
its unified significance.
“Xi Jinping” is the “core” of the CPC Central
Committee and of the whole Party, and
he thereby at the top level provides the “centralism”
of the Party’s cardinal principle of
democratic centralism.
The “Thought” is the totality of Xi’s fundamental
principles. I see four broad categories:
people orientation, national
rejuvenation, comprehensive development,
and Party leadership.
In his report, Xi listed 14 categories: Party
leadership over all aspects of society; people-centered
policies; deepening reform
comprehensively; new concept of development
(innovation, coordination, green,
open, and sharing); people as masters of the
country; adherence to rule of law, comprehensively
governing the country by law;
socialist value system and cultural confidence;
protecting and improving people’s
livelihoods; harmonious coexistence of man
and nature (ecological civilization); national
security; the Party’s absolute leadership
over the military; “one country, two systems”
and promoting reunification with Taiwan;
international community of a shared
future for all humanity; and comprehensive
and strict Party governance.
The term “thought” in Chinese has special
meaning because before this it had been
associated only with Mao Zedong — “Mao
Zedong Thought”.
“Socialism” is a set of political ideas with a
complex history, unified by public or common
ownership of the means of production
and concern for the masses.
“Chinese characteristics” is the phrase,
originating with Deng Xiaoping, that adapts
Marxism to China’s special conditions — the
Sinicization of Marxism in modern China —
which includes the market playing a decisive
role in the allocation of resources and the
encouragement of non-public, for-profit businesses,
while at the same time State-owned
enterprises still playing a dominant role.
“New Era” is a new idea in the constitutional
amendment, and it is designed to
profoundly transform the essence of socialism
with Chinese characteristics into the
vision, concepts and strategies that compose
Xi’s way of thinking.
The more I reflect, the more I see “New
Era” as a conceptual lens with which to view
the 19th Party Congress. Semi-official Party
analysts say the new era answers five questions.
Robert
Lawrence Kuhn
What “road” to take? Socialism with Chinese
characteristics under new historical
conditions.
What kind of country to build? First, a
moderately prosperous society and then a
modernized socialist country.
What development to realize? Better life
and common prosperity for all.
What goal to achieve? The great rejuvenation
of the Chinese nation.
What contribution to make? Facilitate
world peace and prosperity (exemplified by
the Belt and Road Initiative of building
infrastructure in developing countries).
Thus, Xi Jinping joins only Mao Zedong
and Deng Xiaoping in having his name
affixed to a political philosophy in the Party
Constitution, a blazing sign lost on no one.
It then would follow that the “New Era” into
which China is now entering is the third era
of the CPC and by extension of the People’s
Republic of China.
A seemingly subtle but significant
change is the Party’s judgment of what constitutes
the fundamental “contradiction” in
Chinese society. (“Contradiction” is a Marxist
term expressing a particular way of
political thinking — dialectical materialism
— which identifies “dynamic opposing forces”
in society and seeks to resolve the
resulting tensions).
The principal contradiction has evolved
from one between the ever-growing material
and cultural needs of the people and
backward social production to that between
“unbalanced and inadequate development
and the people’s ever-growing needs for a
better life,” Xi said. The needs for the people
to live a better life are increasingly broad
and have to be met. Not only have their
material and cultural needs grown; their
demands for democracy, rule of law, fairness
and justice, security, and a better environment
are increasing.
This “New-Era” contradiction, replacing
quantitative GDP growth with qualitative
improvement of life, is what will drive China’s
policy.
The mission of a CPC congress is to review
and assess achievements of the previous five
years, and to forecast challenges and set targets
for the subsequent five years (and
beyond). Overall, for the 19th Party Congress,
the ambition of the goals and the comprehensiveness
of the categories
were clear,
amplified by the commitment
to deepen reform.
Here, by category, are
what stood out.
The Party and the
fight against corruption.
Confidence in
socialism and the
increasing role of the
Party in managing all
aspects of the country is unequivocal, and
the increasingly strict governance of the
Party, by reforming and purifying itself, is
unambiguous. Moreover, the anti-corruption
campaign not only continues but also
will be enhanced.
Economy. After more than three decades
of rapid growth, China’s economy has been
transitioning to slower but higher-quality
growth. Supply-side structural reform has
been written into the Constitution. No GDP
growth targets are set. The country focuses
on the real economy (as opposed to speculation,
such as in the real estate sector). China
is not backing away from State-owned
enterprises, rather it will support State capital
in “becoming stronger, doing better, and
growing bigger, thereby turning Chinese
enterprises into world-class, globally competitive
firms”.
Consumption is fundamental in driving
economic growth. The framework of regulations
must be improved, prudent macroeconomic
and monetary policy maintained,
and interest and exchange rates made more
market-based. For economic development,
innovation leads, especially in science and
technology.
Poverty alleviation. Xi has made the
elimination of extreme poverty in China by
2020 a cornerstone of his domestic policy.
After all, how could China claim to have
achieved a moderately prosperous society
by 2020 if millions of its citizens would be
still living in extreme poverty?
Opening-up. China reasserts its commitment
to become more open, including
easing market access and protecting the
rights and interests of foreign investors.
China’s economists see foreign competition
as upgrading the quality and cost efficiency
of Chinese companies, thus better serving
Chinese consumers.
Rule of Law. Strengthening and institutionalizing
the rule of law, and weakening
arbitrary rule of officials, is a priority.
Reflecting Xi’s commitment, the Party is setting
up a central leading group for advancing
law-based governance in all areas,
coordinating the activities of judicial
organs. The goal is to complete the transformation
of China’s legal system by 2035 with
theoretical foundations and practical
enforcement.
Ecology. Beautiful China is one of the
country’s main descriptions for its second
centenary goal by the middle of the century.
This modernization is characterized by harmonious
coexistence between humanity
and nature (such as nature parks) and it
requires substantial bolstering of regulatory
agencies and their enforcement powers.
Armed forces. China’s goal is to transform
the People’s Liberation Army into a
world-class military by mid-century, basically
completing military reform and modernization
by 2035, with information
technology/cyber applications and strategic
capabilities prioritized.
Especially significant for Xi’s mission are
the two “anti’s” — anti-corruption and antipoverty
— the former to support the Party’s
continuing leadership, the latter as a prime
example of what the Party has delivered.
Xi does not downplay a realistic appraisal
of problems, including social imbalances,
industrial overcapacities, financial system
risks, endemic pollution. “Achieving national
rejuvenation will be no walk in the park,”
Xi said, an example of his plainspoken candor.
“It will take more than drum-beating
and gong-clanging to get there.”
The speculations of China watchers, and
the focus of the international media, have
been on the new Standing Committee of the
Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
Because everything in China reports to
a standing committee member, composition
and balance determine the vision, strategies
and policies that will shape China.
This remains true today, but less true
today. It is hard to overstate the significance
of Xi Jinping’s name written into the
Party Constitution. Xi is now, officially, the
originating designator and overarching
arbiter of “Thought” as it relates to “Socialism
with Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era”, which is the guiding political theory of
China and encompasses, essentially, everything
in China. For Xi to be named in the
CPC Constitution is the ultimate in authority,
surpassing even “core” (which already
had superseded all other leaders), thus setting
into perpetuity Xi’s predominant status
and assuring his preeminence in the
country’s political life.
That said, to know China is to know the
members of the Standing Committee. They
are a highly competent, highly experienced
group: six of the seven have run provinces
or province-level municipalities, many of
which, in terms of population and GDP, are
the equivalent of major nations.
Traditional norms of balance and age are
respected. It’s a diverse group — by geography,
education and political career. They
ZHAI HAIJUN / FOR CHINA DAILY
have worked together, in various combinations,
for years. With much now being written
about each member, I’ll just offer some
personal reflections.
First, of course, is Xi Jinping, general secretary
of the CPC Central Committee, whose
prior experience included governor of Fujian
province and Party secretary of Zhejiang
province and Shanghai.
In 2005, I was advised to study the “Zhejiang
model”, which promotes entrepreneurship
to generate economic development. I
met Xi, who was then Zhejiang provincial
Party secretary, and he recommended that I
study China both “horizontally” across
diverse regions and “vertically” through the
history of its development.
“To understand our dedication to revitalize
the country, one has to appreciate the pride
that Chinese people take in our glorious
ancient civilization,” Xi said. “This is the historical
driving force inspiring people today to
build the nation. The Chinese people made
great contributions to world civilization and
enjoyed long-term prosperity,” he said. “Then
we suffered over a century of national weakness,
oppression and humiliation. So, we
have a deep self-motivation to build our
country. Our commitment and determination
is rooted in our patriotism and pride.”
But he cautioned that pride in China’s
recent achievements should not engender
complacency.
Second, premier of the State Council, is
Li Keqiang, who was Party secretary of Henan
and Liaoning provinces. When I visited
Li in Liaoning, he explained the complex
challenges of revitalizing State-owned
enterprises while creating a fertile environment
for private businesses. Li shared the
same experience of Xi as educated youths in
the countryside in the 1970s. The experience
gave them the chance to know better rural
China and the lives of rural people and thus
fostered their people-orientation.
The following members are new:
Li Zhanshu, who was governor of Heilongjiang
province and Party secretary of
Guizhou province, has been director of the
general office of the CPC Central Committee
since 2012.
Wang Yang, vice-premier, is former Party
secretary of Chongqing municipality and
Guangdong province. At the height of the
global financial crisis in early 2009, he
argued it was imperative to restructure
Guangdong’s economy, so that it can move
up the ladder of industrialization and promote
more knowledge-based, high-tech, lowpolluting
businesses.
Wang Huning, secretariat, is director of
the Policy Research Office of the CPC Central
Committee. Wang is well known for providing
intellectual vision and sophistication in
support of practical strategies and policies,
ranging from political philosophy to international
relations.
Zhao Leji, new chairman of the Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection, has
served as head of the CPC Organization
Department, and before that, as Party secretary
of Qinghai and Shaanxi provinces. In
addition to his responsibilities for Party and
government officials, Zhao provided strong
support for the poverty-alleviation mission.
Han Zheng is Party secretary of Shanghai.
Under his leadership, Shanghai has become
a recognized leader in trade, logistics and
finance.
What is the impact of all this on China’s
international relations?
There is no need to speculate. Xi himself,
in his report, openly and boldly tells all who
will listen. China, he says, “has become a
great power in the world”. China’s global
engagement is proactive, confident and
growing. Economics and trade drive China’s
power, exemplified by the much-needed Belt
and Road Initiative, but diplomacy, the soft
power of culture and media, and the hard
power of a blue-water navy projecting power,
are developing rapidly.
As Xi said, the new era sees “China moving
closer to center stage and making greater
contributions to mankind”. The country is
now offering “Chinese wisdom” and “Chinese
solutions” to the international community —
the experiences and lessons of China’s
remarkable development, especially to developing
countries.
Regarding Taiwan, which exemplifies Chinese
sovereignty, Xi painted a bright red line.
“We will resolutely uphold national sovereignty
and territorial integrity and will never
tolerate a repeat of the historical tragedy of a
divided country,” Xi emphasized. “We have
firm will, full confidence, and sufficient capability
to defeat any form of Taiwan independence
secession plot.”
China has asserted again that it is no
threat to any country. No matter how powerful
China becomes, China’s leaders say it will
never seek hegemony or pursue expansionism.
Nonetheless, some foreigners remain
suspicious, wary of China’s long-term ambitions.
Who knows future circumstances, they
worry? Who knows how China may change?
Although I fear self-fulfilling prophecy, I am
encouraged that China appreciates such sensitivities
and works to build confidence.
The 19th Party Congress, especially Xi’s
report, is an epic narrative of what China has
accomplished, what China has yet to achieve,
and what China envisages as necessary to be
a great nation. Xi, now, carries the authority;
he also bears the burden.
Setting that new target date of 2035 for
China to achieve basic modernization, Xi
sees China as standing at a new historic
starting point and socialism with Chinese
characteristics as exploring new horizons.
China has entered a new era and the road
ahead leads, apparently, to great nation status
by 2050.
The author is a public intellectual, international
corporate strategist, and China expert/
commentator. He is co-creator (with Adam
Zhu) and the host of China Global Television
Network’s Closer to China with R.L.Kuhn.
CONTACT US
China Daily
15 Huixin Dongjie Chaoyang, Beijing 100029
News: +86 (0) 10 6491-8366;
editor@chinadaily.com.cn
Subscription:Ā+86 400-699-0203;
subscribe@chinadaily.com.cn
Advertisement:Ā+86 (0) 10 6491-8631;
ads@chinadaily.com.cn
Phone app: chinadaily.com.cn/iphone
China Daily USA
1500 Broadway, Suite 2800, New
York, NY 10036 +1 212 537 8888
editor@chinadailyusa.com
China Daily Asia Pacific
China Daily Hong Kong
Room 1818, Hing Wai Centre 7 Tin Wan Praya Road
Aberdeen,
Hong Kong
+852 2518 5111
editor@chinadailyhk.com
editor@chinadailyasia.com
China Daily UK
90 Cannon Street London EC4N 6HA
+44 (0) 207 398 8270
editor@chinadailyuk.com
China Daily Africa
P.O.Box 27281-00100, Nairobi, Kenya
+254 (0) 20 522 3498 (Nairobi)
editor@chinadailyafrica.com
enquiries@chinadailyafrica.com
subscription@chinadailyafrica.com

CHINA DAILY Wednesday, October 18, 2017 VIEWS 11
Five years on
Robert Lawrence Kuhn
Historical starting point for new stage of development
The 19th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China,
which begins on October 18, will
set the leadership and establish
the policies for the next five years, at least.
While Party national congresses are
always seminal events in the political life
of the country, there is reason to expect
that this congress will have even greater
and longer-reaching impact.
The context of the 19th
CPC National Congress is
the grand vision for China
presented by CPC
Central Committee General
Secretary Xi Jinping,
who is now the “core” of
Robert
Lawrence Kuhn
“the CPC Central Committee
and of the whole
Party”. It is an epic narrative
of what China has
remarkably achieved, what China has yet to
do, and what China envisages as necessary
to become a great nation.
Xi’s grand vision is famously expressed as
“the Chinese Dream”, described as “the
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”,
which has personal and national implications.
It is specified by two overarching
goals: the two centenary goals of establishing
a moderately prosperous society by
2020 — the 100th anniversary of the CPC is
2021 — and establishing China as a “fully
modernized, socialist nation” by the 100th
anniversary of the People’s Republic of China
in 2049.
The first goal, which includes the total
elimination of extreme poverty in the country,
will likely be achieved within the fiveyear
term of the 19th CPC National
Congress. It is the second goal that is of special
interest at this time, because in drawing
the roadmap and formulating the policies
to achieve China’s mid-century goal, this
Congress may set the agenda for the next
30-plus years.
The CPC national congresses are the
highest authority of CPC governance and
decision-making. The CPC constitutional
provision of holding congresses every five
years was reaffirmed by Deng Xiaoping in
the early days of reform (in part to establish
order and collective responsibility after a
period of chaos and political vicissitudes),
and since 1982, Party congresses have been
held scrupulously on schedule.
The congresses establish the senior leadership
of the Party and hence the nation by
electing the CPC Central Committee, which
in turn elects all top Party positions, and
also the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection; review and assess the achievements
and challenges over the five years
since the previous Party Congress; set the
vision, goals and objectives, agenda and priorities
for the subsequent five years; revise
the Party constitution (to keep up with the
times); and project an image of unified purpose
and direction to engender national
confidence and commitment.
The review and assessment of the previous
five years and setting the agenda and
priorities for the subsequent five years are
formally presented in the Report, delivered
by the general secretary representing the
outgoing Central Committee and thus
reflecting the consensus view of the Party
leadership. Ratified by the congress (after
minor modifications), it becomes the guiding
document that drives policy for the
incoming Central Committee.
On the day following a congress, the first
plenum of the new 19th Central Committee
is convened to elect the Party’s new senior
leadership, including the Political Bureau,
the Standing Committee of the Political
Bureau (to which, in essence, everything in
China reports), and the general secretary of
the Central Committee. Also approved are
the Central Military Commission (which
oversees the People’s Liberation Army), the
Secretariat (which runs Party daily operations),
and the head of the Central Commission
for Discipline Inspection.
The planning for the national Party Congress
follows similar patterns. Beginning
more than a year in advance, it involves
both formal and informal processes. The
formal process includes the election or
appointment of about 2,300 delegates
(2,280 delegates at the 19th National Congress)
from among the Party’s over 89 million
members, at all levels and in all sectors,
and the preparation of the Report via an
elaborate system of extensive research in
targeted areas (involving thousands of
experts), solicitation of broad input, drafts
(or sections) circulated to numerous Party
experts and officials for comments, and iterative
intense reviews by higher bodies and
senior leaders. In addition, smaller groups
are assigned the more sensitive tasks of
amending the Party constitution and recommending
candidates for the new Central
Committee and senior leadership positions.
Final decisions for this year’s congress, as
well as final edits of the Report, were made
at the Seventh Plenum of the 18th CPC Central
Committee, held on Oct 11 to 14, days
prior to the opening ceremony of the 19th
CPC National Congress.
To understand the position and role of
CPC Central Committee General Secretary
Xi at the 19th Party National Congress, we
should appreciate what it means for Xi to
be the core. It was in October 2016, at the
Sixth Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee,
that Xi was designated the “core” of
the CPC Central Committee and of the
entire Party. The appellation was an unambiguous
assertion that China requires
strong leadership to maintain stability and
ensure development given China’s unprecedented,
complex challenges: domestically,
slower growth, industrial overcapacity,
endemic pollution, unbalanced development,
income disparity, social injustice,
social service demands; and internationally,
regional conflicts, sluggish economies, volatile
markets, trade protectionism, ethnic
clashes, terrorism, geopolitical rivalries, and
territorial disputes.
Moreover, because China must deepen
reform to achieve the goal of being a moderately
prosperous society, the resistance of
entrenched interest groups must be overcome.
In fact, the necessity of having a leadership
core to maintain stability and
expedite reform was a primary factor relating
to Xi’s elevation to be the core.
In addition, not only does Xi have the
responsibility for China’s transformation;
he is also accountable for it. He has shown
courage in combating rampant practice of
graft, bribery and illicit patronage. Xi’s
relentless anti-corruption campaign is
altering how officials in government and
managers in industry work, and even how
they think. And let no one assume that Xi’s
battle against corruption has been risk-free.
Xi as the core does not change the Party’s
cardinal principle of “democratic centralism”.
The Party says it is encouraging the
democratic solicitation of input and feedback
from Party members, lower-ranked
officials, and the general public; and
strengthening centralism through Xi’s core
leadership.
In a complex world, given the diverse
interests and forces in Chinese society, the
Party asserts that the Chinese Dream cannot
be realized without unity. Strong leadership
is required to build and maintain unity
for China to continue its development.
When Xi received the core appellation, he
was already general secretary of the Party,
chairman of the Central Military Commission,
and president of the country — the
three highest leadership positions in China
— so how does being the “core” augment his
perceived stature or actual power?
The 2016 Party plenum communique
confirmed that “the collective leadership
system … must always be adhered to”.
Nonetheless, there must have been shifts in
terms of both the setting of the agenda and
making final decisions — or else making Xi
the core would have little meaning.
When foreigners dismiss the political
aphorisms of China’s leaders as simplistic
sloganeering, they miss an opportunity to
enrich their understanding. Chinese officials
certainly hold Xi’s frameworks in high
esteem.
Xi’s thought for the Party, the inner-Party
directives, include the “eight regulations”
(against waste and perks); “four self-confidences”
(in the country’s development path,
The China model, Xi
said, successful at home,
also broadens the way
for developing countries
to modernize, thus
providing Chinese
wisdom and Chinese
solutions for problems
facing mankind.
theories, systems, culture of socialism with
Chinese characteristics); opposing the “four
evil winds” (formalism, bureaucracy,
hedonism, decadence); the “four greats”
(struggles, projects, enterprises, dreams).
The combined intent is to make Party
members, especially Party and government
officials, more dedicated, committed, competent
and loyal, with exemplary moral
standards of probity and rectitude. It is no
small order.
The Party’s unremitting anti-corruption
campaign, unprecedented under Xi, has
won strong public support and will certainly
continue. But some foreign analysts mistakenly
see Xi’s anti-corruption campaign
as largely a tool of political power, thus
reflecting a superficial and one-dimensional
understanding of China. Befitting the size
and complexity of the country, for almost
every decision of importance, China’s leaders
have multiple motivations.
For the anti-corruption campaign, these
motivations include respect for the rule of
law and judicial impartiality; effective functioning
of the Party devoid of personal
interests; public trust in the Party; efficient
economic resource allocations (corruption
distorts markets); expediting reform (by
breaking up “interest groups” that resist
reform); maintaining national unity (by
removing officials with non-standard political
ambitions); elevating morality of Chinese
society; restoring ethical standards of
Chinese civilization; and facilitating China’s
emergence as a world-business center and
global role model.
Xi’s thought for the country — his new
ideas, new strategies, new initiatives set
forth over the past five years — can be
encapsulated as the overall vision of the
“Five in One” construction (economic, political,
cultural, social, ecological); governance
of the country via his “Four Comprehensives”
(a moderately prosperous society;
deepening reform, strengthening the rule of
law, strictly governing the Party); and
renewed economic development via the
Five Major Development Concepts (innovation,
coordination, green, open, sharing),
plus “supply-side structural reform”.
SHI YU / CHINA DAILY
Xi’s thought for national rejuvenation
includes a grand vision for global governance,
consisting of eight big diplomatic concepts:
a global community of shared destiny
and future; win-win cooperation; economic
globalization; fairer global governance; a
new kind of major power relationship;
expanding cooperation while managing differences;
multilateralism; and people-topeople
exchanges. Moreover, Xi’s Belt and
Road Initiative — facilitating economic
development in developing countries, especially
by building much-needed infrastructure
— is China’s “project of the century”.
China recognizes it has international
responsibilities and seeks to uphold a common,
comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable
security strategy. China’s own
requirement is to protect the country’s
three sacrosanct “core interests” — its political
system, economic development, and
national sovereignty (territorial integrity).
China appreciates that to be a major
country, with its political influence reflecting
its economic strength, and also to protect
its own core interests, its diplomacy
must be pro-active. China does not claim
that its “China model” can be adopted by
other countries, but the world should
understand Xi’s principles of governance as
optimally suited for China’s domestic conditions.
Party congresses have similar styles and
to casual observers, they can all seem much
the same. But they do have differences,
which are usually subtle and often meaningful.
For the 19th National Congress, some of
the things to look out for are:
Are political frameworks and policies
stated in their expected forms? If so, confidence
in political and economic stability is
reinforced.
How is General Secretary Xi Jinping’s status
as “core” further stressed, as expected?
Who are the members of the new Standing
Committee of the Political Bureau and
what are their portfolios?
Assuming the Party Constitution is
amended to include Xi’s new ideas, new
strategies, new initiatives, will they be given
an overarching label?
What is the composition of the new Central
Committee?
In listing the essential economic, political,
cultural, social and ecological policies,
are there shifts of emphasis that, however
nuanced, suggest changing priorities?
For deepening reform, surely stressed,
what targets are specified? For example,
what will be stated explicitly about Stateowned
enterprise reform?
Environmental protection is a high priority,
but what specific regulations and
enhanced enforcements distinguish the
fight against pollution under Xi from those
of previous congresses?
Many social areas will be highlighted —
for example, education, healthcare, rural
land reform, migrant worker residencies —
but do any stand out?
As already affirmed, the anti-corruption
campaign will continue, but will its intensity
or direction change in any manner, will it
be institutionalized? How will the forthcoming
National Supervisory Commission
work?
What is the relative prominence of military
reform and modernization?
What is the relative prominence of international
affairs, given the high-profile Belt
and Road Initiative and China’s intense,
pro-active diplomacy?
Forecasting the 19th CPC National Congress
is not all guesswork and triangulating
rumors. Following tradition, Xi offered to
Party leaders a preview of his Report.
Speaking on July 26, he outlined China’s
achievements since the previous national
congress: new concepts of development,
deepened reform, enhanced rule of law,
strengthened environmental protection,
and a more capable military.
China, Xi said, has, after suffering century-long
hardships and tribulations, taken
three historic leaps, from standing-up to
becoming better-off to becoming stronger.
Xi called for a comprehensive, strategic and
forward-looking action program, highlighting
the success and vitality of socialism with
Chinese characteristics, the increasing
strength of the Party, and China’s expanding
circle of friends in the international community.
In China, he stressed, political legitimacy
is founded on competence and
accomplishment.
Significantly, Xi asserted that China’s
development stands at a new historic starting
point and that socialism with Chinese
characteristics is entering a new development
stage. The CPC cannot rest on its laurels,
he stressed. The country faces daunting
challenges. He warned the Party against
self-satisfaction and blind optimism.
Xi’s comments resonated with his core
values and bear witness to his consistency.
In 2006, then Zhejiang Party Secretary Xi
told me that China should be proud of its
successes, but its “achievements should not
engender complacency”, adding “we need to
assess ourselves objectively”.
Preparing for the upcoming congress, Xi
recognizes that the people’s desire for a happier
life is stronger than ever. They want
better education, higher incomes, stable
jobs, reliable social insurance, higher quality
healthcare, more comfortable living conditions,
a more beautiful environment and
a richer cultural life.
And there has been an inflection point in
China’s international perspective, reflecting
the nation’s consequential global engagement.
The China model, Xi said, successful
at home, also broadens the way for developing
countries to modernize, thus providing
Chinese wisdom and Chinese solutions for
problems facing mankind.
The influence of the 19th CPC National
Congress and the impact of Xi Jinping’s
thought seem for decades to come.
The author is a public intellectual, international
corporate strategist, and China
expert/commentator. He is co-creator (with
Adam Zhu) and host of CGTN’s Closer to
China with R.L. Kuhn.

16 Wednesday March 21, 2018
FORUM
CPC-led system a political innovation
Editor’s Note:
The Two Sessions, the annual meetings
of China’s top legislative and
advisory bodies, have been under
global spotlight for the past few
weeks. This year’s Two Sessions
are of extraordinary importance as
they have adopted the constitutional
amendments, restructured government
institutions and elected the new
national leadership. To understand
what the institutional changes mean
for China’s future, as well as the
policy agenda for the coming year,
Global Times (GT) Washingtonbased
correspondent Hu Zexi talked
to Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn (Kuhn)
who is a long-time China observer,
and author and editor of over 25
books. Kuhn has been invited to Beijing
to take a closer look at this year’s
Two Sessions.
GT: What kind of policy issues are
you following during the Two Sessions?
Kuhn: The proposed amendments
to the Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China give a road map
of areas deemed critical. Several
of the provisions strengthen the
stability, continuity and robustness of
governance. Beyond these, I looked for
any deviations from expectations, for
example, on State-owned enterprise
reform or local government financing.
I also looked for any reaction to the
increased push-back against China’s
rising global capabilities from certain
countries.
GT: In recent years, the Chinese government
has made more efforts to make
Two Sessions’ agenda better meet public
expectations. For example, the government
will cooperate with media websites
to conduct surveys
about top policy areas
that the public wants
the Two Sessions to
address. How do you
evaluate such efforts?
Kuhn: Irrespective of the nature of the
political system or ideology, transparency
in governance is the best way for
government to deliver effective, efficient
programs, and enhance credibility.
The Chinese government has been
striving to increase transparency, which
deserves praise.
The Two Sessions are a vehicle for
the government to communicate with
the people and engage them through
media in dealing with all the critical
issues.
TWOSESSIONS
2018
GT: How do you see the political belief
of China that democracy should meet the
real or fundamental needs of the public?
Kuhn: Government performance and
democracy are not the same.
The former is indeed assessed by
alleviating poverty, reducing pollution,
improving healthcare and the like.
Democracy is the public participation of
common people in the complex process
of governance.
Thus, true democracy is much
broader than one-person-one-vote.
It includes, primarily, the capacity to
provide substantive input on complex
Illustration: Liu Rui/GT
issues and to provide oversight in the
management of officials.
GT: China for long has argued that
democracy or any other political mechanism
should be developed on the basis
of a country’s specific condition. How do
you see this belief, as well as its practice?
Kuhn: Certainly, political systems differ,
even between countries that have
the same ideology. Nonetheless, there
are great commonalities in the goals
and objectives shared by all countries
and people. I suspect that over time,
measured in not less than decades and
perhaps even centuries, there will be
a convergence of
systems toward
what I call with a
smile, “Optimizationism”
– leaders,
officials, executives
making myriad decisions every day to
optimize outcomes without thinking of
the ideology.
GT: There’s talk about China’s unique
system of multiparty cooperation and
political consultation led by the Communist
Party of China (CPC) during the
Two Sessions. How do you observe this
system?
Kuhn: The benefits of a one-party-rule
are apparent: the coherence of policies,
rapid decision-making and formulation
of strategies that require long-term
consistency for long-term commitment.
But all systems of governance have
trade-offs, and two challenges of oneparty-rule
are assuring that all rational
points of view, including dissenting
ones, are included in the decision-making
process; and systemic checks and
balances for oversight of officials at all
levels of government.
China’s system of multi-party cooperation
and consultation, led by the
CPC, is a political innovation in including
inputs and ideas from diverse segments
of society, while still maintaining
harmony of spirit and consistency in
policies. But because of its scale and
power, the CPC, which is the ruling
party, has a higher obligation to pay
attention to other parties and voices. A
true democracy is measured by how the
majority treats the minority.
GT: As a decades-long observer of China,
what do you think the constitutional
amendment will bring to the country?
Kuhn: This constitutional amendment
is all about strengthening China’s
system of governance, especially the
Party’s leadership of the country and
President Xi Jinping’s leadership of the
Party and the nation.
Going by the whiplash of Western
reactions, one could be forgiven for assuming
that the amendment is all about
abolishing term limits of the president
and vice president. In fact, there are 21
clauses in the constitutional amendment
and to understand where China
is going, one must gauge the meaning
and intent of all of them.
Xi has been consistent in respecting,
indeed in championing, China’s
Constitution, and by now amending it,
he underscores the congruity between
the realities of how China is governed
and what the Constitution says – thus
bolstering Xi’s commitment to the Rule
of Law.
Establishing the National Supervisory
Law and Commissions, expanding
the anti-corruption campaign to all
public organs and organizations, reaffirms
Xi’s commitment to enhancing
the rule of law.
As for term limits, it is not that Xi
will hold the formal titles of leadership
for life, but that he will hold real
leadership long enough to bring about
China’s national rejuvenation and establish
Chinese type democratic norms.
All factors considered, because of
China’s special conditions and Xi’s special
capabilities, abolishing term limits
may be good for China. It is commonly
said that China’s system of governance
can ensure stability and consistency,
which is a necessary requirement
for advancing reform.
GT: What do you see as the underlying
reason for the institutional
restructuring of the government
passed during the Two Sessions?
Kuhn: The sweeping restructuring
of the Chinese government
streamlines the bureaucracy,
eliminates institutional conflicts
of interest between government
bodies, aligns authority with
responsibility, and, significantly,
enhances the leadership of the
Party in the management as well
as the oversight of the government.
Although the restructuring
has multiple motivations, a
prime driver is to support China’s
continuing development under
complex conditions – a slowing
economy, uncertain financial risk,
unacceptable pollution, the special
demands of innovation.
Given China’s challenges at
home and abroad the government
restructure is timely. Some media
outlets describe it as a “reshuffle,”
as if the random rearrangement of
a deck of cards. I beg to differ.
This restructuring is as deliberate as
it is far-reaching – and planned precisely
to address a host of contradictions.
The outcome is to strengthen CPC’s
leadership throughout the country. In
fact, deepening reform is now defined,
for state as well as for Party institutions,
as strengthening the CPC’s leadership
in every sector. The aim is consistency
and uniformity in implementing policy.
The announcement of the restructuring
followed swiftly after the adoption
by the National People’s Congress
of the constitutional amendment, and
although both were long in the works,
their rapid-fire sequence serves to underscore
the preeminence of President
Xi in setting the new agenda, and the
power of the Party in implementing the
new policies.
GT: Environment has always been a
heated topic at the Two Sessions. How
do you see the prospect of green development
in China?
Kuhn: I have been following China’s
environmental problems for over two
decades, and until recent years under
President Xi. While officials would of
course decry pollution, it only became
progressively worse. Companies flouted
the law. The minuscule fines were a
small price for not worrying about the
cost of controlling pollution. Officials
were loath to risk impeding economic
growth. Today is dramatically different.
President Xi has raised ecology and
environment to the highest category of
national priorities. Ecological progress
is among the five top goals (along with
economic, political, cultural and social
progress). Green is the third of the New
(Five Major) Concepts of Development.
The change in attitudes toward pollution
is stunning. For example, fines for
corporate pollution now hurt.
Page Editor:
yujincui@globaltimes.com.cn
Monday, November 21, 2016
A11
Core strength
Robert Lawrence Kuhn says those who see China’s designation of Xi Jinping as core leader to be a variation
of strongman rule misunderstand its significance for a people navigating their way through huge challenges
When, at a recent
party plenum,
President Xi Jinping
(���) was
designated as
“core” of the Communist Party’s
Central Committee, some Western
media were quick to condemn the
rise of a new “strongman”. While
recognising the significance of Xi as
the core was correct, conjuring up
visions of an emerging dictator was
not.
I recalled my meeting with Xi
years earlier, when he was still party
secretary of Zhejiang (��) province.
Even then he was criticising
“empty talk” and advising, “We
should never overestimate our
accomplishments or indulge ourselves
in our achievements”.
I took note of how Xi stressed,
“We need to assess ourselves objectively”.
Hardly, in retrospect, the
ruminations of a gestating dictator.
To understand why Xi is now the
core, one must appreciate the
complex challenges of our times.
China is now facing multiple challenges:
domestically – slow growth,
industrial overcapacity, endemic
pollution, imbalanced development,
income disparity, social
injustice, social service demands;
and, internationally – wars, regional
conflicts, sluggish economies, volatile
markets, trade protectionism,
ethnic clashes, terrorism, geopolitical
rivalries, and territorial disputes
in the South and East China seas.
Most critically, because China
must deepen its reforms to achieve
its oft-promised goal of a “moderately
prosperous society” by 2020,
the resistance of entrenched interest
groups must be overcome. More
subtly, there is what some call a
pervasive “soft resistance” – local
officials who do not do their job and
economic elites who migrate.
If reform had been progressing
smoothly, then why strengthen
central authority by investing Xi
with the status of core leader? Xi has
encountered obstacles; if there
were no obstacles, there would be
no need for a core leader.
I have been speaking to party
officials and theorists about Xi as
core leader. In fact, the necessity of
having a leadership core to maintain
stability and expedite reform is
the first and foremost of what I
found to be four factors relating to
Xi’s elevation.
A second factor is that not only
does Xi have the responsibility for
China’s transformation, he is also
accountable for it. Moreover, he has
shown courage in confronting and
dismantling a vast, corrupt system
of bribery, patronage and illicit
wealth accretion.
A third factor is that Xi as the core
does not end, and even may not di-
minish, the cardinal principle of
Xi Jinping as
core leader is
more a ratification
of reality than
a shift of
fundamentals
Bring down the curtain on this idiotic political drama
If you’re tired of all the politics, I
feel you. It’s draining, to say the
least, especially when the
melodrama in Hong Kong is
dragging out; it has become
downright dreadful when we know
there is no respite in sight.
We were supposed to have a
brief break after last September’s
Legislative Council polls, before the
next big event. Even though a large
number of people will be unable to
cast a vote in the Election
Committee subsector elections,
less than a month away, and in the
chief executive election, scheduled
for late March next year, the city
should by now be focusing on
what’s ahead.
But, thanks to the two recently
disqualified lawmakers, who lacked
the necessary knowledge, ability
and respect for oath-taking, our
(albeit dysfunctional) legislature
has basically been shut down for a
month. The ugly politics that
should have been insulated within
“democratic centralism”. The party
bolsters each of the concepts:
encouraging the democratic solicitation
of input and feedback from
members, lower-ranked officials,
and the public; and strengthening
centralism through Xi’s leadership
of the principal levers of power (his
positions as party general secretary,
head of state, chairman of the
Central Military Commission, and
head of the “leading groups” on
reform, national security and internet
security).
A fourth factor is that a core is
required to manage the party more
strictly and thereby give members
and the public more confidence.
Witness Xi’s relentless and unprecedented
anti-corruption campaign,
which is altering how government
officials and industry managers
work and even think. Let no one
assume that Xi’s battle against
corruption has been risk-free.
Significantly, these four factors
undergirding Xi as the core leader
map onto his overarching political
framework, his strategic blueprint
called “The Four Comprehensives”
– a moderately prosperous society,
reform, rule of law, party discipline.
Xi’s core status arises, we’re told,
through the collective will of the
party and the people. Becoming
party core is not an automatic
consequence of being general secretary;
a core leader must fit the
times and the status must be
earned.
Speaking at a press conference
following the 18th Central Committee’s
sixth plenum last month,
Huang Kunming (���), executive
vice-minister of the committee’s
Publicity Department, said that the
“central and local departments as
well as the military all expressed
their support” for Xi’s position as
party core, adding that this decision
Alice Wu has had enough of the brouhaha over the
oath-taking by two lawmakers. Now that they’ve
been disqualified, HK must focus on battles ahead
the chamber once again spilled out
onto our streets.
And what should have been
decided and concluded on
September 4 is now dragging on
indefinitely, with two or possibly
more by-elections added to the
election overload.
Hell-raising politics is not going
away any time soon, but the sheer
stupidity of the localist pair’s
actions really is one for the books –
Macbeth, in fact:
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and
tomorrow, / Creeps in this petty pace
from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded
time, / And all our yesterdays have
lighted fools
The way to dusty death. Out, out,
was “based on the valuable experience
of the party and we feel keenly
about it”.
Huang explained that “a core is
needed to ensure that the party will
be the governing party”, describing
it as significant for upholding the
Central Committee’s authority and
maintaining the central, unified
leadership of the party and for its
“staying true to its mission”.
Therefore, party theorists
explain, Xi as core leader is more a
ratification of reality than a shift of
fundamentals.
What does Xi as core mean in a
historical context? It was Deng
Xiaoping (���) who introduced
the concept when he designated
Jiang Zemin (���) as “core of the
third generation” of central leaders,
bolstering Jiang’s stature following
his unexpected appointment as
party leader in 1989. At the time,
China was facing the dual impediments
of economic stagnation and
social uncertainty at home, and
economic quarantine and diplomatic
isolation abroad. As Deng
pointed out: “Any leading group
should have a core; a leadership
with no core is unreliable.”
Only then did Deng retrospectively
apply the novel term to Mao
Zedong (���) and to himself, as
core of the first and second generations,
respectively. (Of course,
Mao was so utterly dominant that
calling him core during his lifetime
would have seemed a demotion.
Deng remained core even when he
no longer held any official position.)
Today’s world is more complex.
China faces threats at home and
abroad. Volatility grows and uncertainty
abounds – the Middle East
and Donald Trump are offered as
evidence. The need to secure
China’s stability is more essential
than ever, and thus to strengthen
brief candle! / Life’s but a walking
shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour
upon the stage / And then is heard
no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound
and fury, / Signifying nothing.
They were indeed full of sound
and fury, and they did nothing for
the common good.
What they did opened the door
for an invitation to the courts to
intervene. What they did presented
an opportunity for an
interpretation of the Basic Law by
the National People’s Congress
Standing Committee.
What they did, ultimately, may
well become the precedent for
other legislators to be similarly
Xi’s authority is a primary reason,
I’m told, for designating Xi as core
leader. Party theorists say China
“urgently” requires a political nucleus
that is sophisticated and
nuanced, attuned to contemporary
times. Though conditions now
differ from those in 1989, Deng’s
admonition rings timelessly true.
However, that a core leader is
needed now does not mean one will
always be needed. When China
becomes a fully modernised nation,
perhaps by mid-century, condi-
tions may change again.
True loyalty is
telling leadership
in private what
one really
believes is in their
best interests
I hear frequently of the “painful
lessons of China’s century of blood
and tears” and that for China not to
have a tested and authoritative
leadership core would be “unthinkable”.
Party inner talk says “Xi
Jinping has passed the test of the
people” to be China’s political core,
leadership core, and a core of the
times.
Chinese scholars argue that
“core” is a unique characteristic of
Chinese political theory – however
inapplicable (even inexplicable) in
Western political theory. They call
Western concerns that Xi as core
leader means that “a new emperor
is born” wildly unfounded, even
paranoic. In feudal society, the
emperor ruled unconditionally
barred. And that is why the duo’s
pledge to spend every penny – and
lest we forget, this also means the
mounting cost to the public purse –
to “appeal at all costs” is beyond
rich, coming from them.
Clearly, they have yet to wrap
their heads around the concept of
“personal responsibility”. Sixtus
Baggio Leung Chung-hang is
wrong in believing that their
disqualification from Legco
rendered the election meaningless.
They have no one but themselves
to blame for their defenestration. It
is they who made the election
meaningless.
And, to add insult to the grave
injury they brought on the rest of
us, they are asking for donations. At
some point – if we’re not there
already – we must take serious
offence to be taken as fools, again
and again. The curtain must now
be drawn on this overly played-out
second act.
The irony may be lost on the
with arbitrary imperial power, and
in such a “command-obey” system,
goes the argument, there is simply
no need for a core.
Rather, given today’s party political
structure, the concept of a core
both strengthens cohesion and
serves to prevent a personality cult,
not to promote one. Having a core
means acknowledging that the
party system is not the “emperor
system” – absolute power is rejected
– and that the optimum system, at
least for the foreseeable future, is a
combination of concentrated centralism
and democratic collective
leadership.
Corroborating this functional
balance, in the communiqué issued
following the sixth plenum, the
“collective leadership system” is
reconfirmed. It states: “The implementation
of collective leadership
and personal division of labour is an
important component of democratic
centralism and must always
be adhered to.” And it stresses: “Any
organisation or individual shall,
under any circumstance, not be
allowed to violate this system for
any reason.” The three “any’s” seem
no accident.
Some analysts see contradictions.
On the one hand, the
communiqué calls for democracy
and constructive criticism internally
within the party. On the other,
disobeying the central leadership is
forbidden, backed by vigilant
supervision and tough discipline.
Yet to read these statements as
contradictory is to misunderstand
what is happening here. Xi appreciates
the complex and arduous tasks
that lie ahead. He told me so a
decade ago, and it is obviously truer
today than it was then. The statements
are harmonised, first, by the
party’s motivation to seek optimum
policies for the country, and second,
by keeping most of the divergent
views internal.
True loyalty is telling leadership
in private what one really believes is
in their best interests, not pandering
and fawning by repeating what one
thinks leadership wants to hear.
Though there are concerns, no one
here worries that Xi will become
Mao.
China is now the world’s largest
trading nation and its second-largest
economy. China’s diplomacy is
expanding and its military is growing.
From its Belt and Road initiative
building infrastructure and facilitating
trade in over 60 developing
countries to its leading role in the
UN peacekeeping forces, China, the
“Middle Kingdom”, is involved in
every meaningful matter of international
affairs.
So, what kind of China do we
want? Certainly not one with weak
central leadership and fragmented
citadels of power. With its huge and
imbalanced population, and its
diverse culture and traditions,
China today requires a leader with
sufficient strength and prestige to
secure social stability, drive economic
reform, and guide it in being
a responsible world power. Xi as
core leader should be good for
China and, thus, for the world.
Robert Lawrence Kuhn is a public
intellectual, political/economics
commentator, and an international
corporate strategist. He spoke at the
launch ceremony of President Xi
Jinping’s book, The Governance of
China, and is the host of Closer to
China with R. L. Kuhn, a weekly show
on CCTV News produced by Adam Zhu
pair but it’s pretty obvious who has
been played for total fools. In case
they haven’t noticed, the
lawmakers who served as the duo’s
chaperones have stopped
babysitting them because there is
no value in being their keepers any
more. Escorting the duo’s Legco
gate-crashing attempts served their
purpose: to usher the two straight
to their political end, and the votes
the two rendered meaningless are
now political spoils.
The two took the toxic brew and
there will be no stay of execution
that could stop those ready to
contest their seats.
We must fight our political
fatigue. We can ill afford to be
distracted by those who
continuously try to foolishly make
their own stupid mistakes our
collective problem.
Alice Wu is a political consultant and
a former associate director of the
Asia Pacific Media Network at UCLA
The basic law
of unintended
consequences
Mike Rowse says the continuing
political tussles in HK illustrate the
pain of being caught in a cycle of
actions and reactions, and we must
address the root cause of the grievances
There has been a considerable focus recently on
the Basic Law and the rule of law, and their
interaction. Perhaps neglected in the process has
been a different but relevant concept: the law of
unintended consequences, whereby an action gives
rise to outcomes unforeseen by the instigator.
Hong Kong’s tortuous path towards political reform
is a case in point. The first reference to the idea of
universal suffrage for selection of the chief executive
comes in Article 45 of the Basic Law, promulgated back
in 1990. Looking towards 1997, its purpose was to
reassure. Naturally, attention turned to the subject in
the early part of this century. While people understood
that the move towards universal suffrage had to be in
accordance with the “principle of gradual and orderly
progress”, the reform package put forward in 2014 was
widely perceived as disappointing; the plan to stick
with an unrepresentative nominating committee
deciding who could enter the race was unpalatable.
The State Council’s white paper on the governance
of Hong Kong, intended to set things straight, only
stirred things up and led to the Occupy Central
protests. The government let the action linger, hoping
public anger would pay dividends in the 2016
Legislative Council election. While the 79 days of
disruption did bring the protesters momentary
opprobrium, memories quickly faded. In the election,
the pro-government share of the vote actually fell, and
the attack on the idea of independence led directly to a
near 20 per cent share of the vote for a localist faction.
This was surely not the objective.
Now the government is trying to overturn the
election outcome. The practice of banning some
potential candidates from standing, then using all
means at hand to unseat some of those elected, is a
tactic more usually associated with third-world
countries following a military coup.
Has something been lost in
translation here? Perhaps
we need an interpretation
of the interpretation
In the short term, the judicial review sought by the
chief executive against the decision by Legco president
Andrew Leung Kwan-yuen to give Sixtus Baggio Leung
Chung-hang and Yau Wai-ching another opportunity
to take the oath has been successful. Mr Justice
Thomas Au Hing-cheung ruled in the High Court that
their oaths were invalid, they should not be given a
second chance and their positions should immediately
be vacated. Many observers thought he might decline
to rule at all, and simply refer the matter back to the
Legco president. The problem with one arm of the
administration delving too deeply into the processes of
another is that it inevitably generates more requests to
do so. And, sure enough, we now have legal challenges
against more legislators, plus a challenge against the
chief executive himself.
Given that, in the past, other Legco members who
had politicised their swearing-in and then done it
properly second time round were permitted to take up
their seats, did Leung and Yau have a “legitimate
expectation” that they would enjoy similar treatment?
The Legco president certainly thought so, hence his
original ruling. Now it is for a higher court to decide.
Meanwhile, the National People’s Congress
Standing Committee has sought to clarify Article 104 of
the Basic Law, which requires all people concerned to
“swear to uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong
special administrative region of the People’s Republic
of China and swear allegiance” to it. But the
interpretation is different: it talks of “a legal pledge … to
the People’s Republic of China and its Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region” (emphasis added). Has
something been lost in translation here? Perhaps we
need an interpretation of the interpretation.
If, at the end of the day, there are two (or more)
vacant Legco seats, then we are in by-election territory.
I don’t think the people are fooled for one minute
about what is going on. In each constituency, an
impeccable opposition candidate will stand, win a
majority, and take the oath impeccably. Unfortunately,
this tragedy – or farce – will continue until the
government starts to address the underlying
grievances over the lack of meaningful political reform
instead of just hammering the symptoms, which
generates new grievances in the process.
Mike Rowse is the CEO of Treloar Enterprises and an
adjunct professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
mike@rowse.com.hk
> CONTACT US: Agree or disagree with the opinions on this page? Write to us at letters@scmp.com. If you have an idea for an opinion article, email it to oped@scmp.com
A yellow umbrella, a symbol of the Occupy movement,
is used in a recent protest against Beijing. Photo: Reuters
Wednesday, April 25, 2018
A11
CONTACT US
Agree or disagree with the opinions on this
page? Write to us at letters@scmp.com
If you have an idea for an opinion article,
email it to oped@scmp.com
Looming tech war
Robert Lawrence Kuhn says the ZTE showdown points to a misunderstanding over motives
As someone who works for US-
China understanding and
roots for US-China partnerships,
I’ve been concerned, but
not worried, over what others
have called “a looming trade war”. I’ve not
worried because tariffs don’t work; they are
blunt instruments in a globalised economy,
penalising American companies and
consumers as much as Chinese. Most
American experts oppose tariffs, and President
Donald Trump likes to make big deals
after making big threats.
But I am now worried over what I will
call “a looming tech war”, because the
structural imperatives go deeper.
As everyone who follows China knows,
the US Department of Commerce has imposed
a denial of export privileges
against ZTE, China’s second-largest telecommunications
equipment manufacturer,
thus prohibiting US companies from
selling essential electronic components
and software to ZTE, a crippling sanction.
China has responded resolutely, with
actions that seem selected from expert scenario
planning, and with rhetoric, both indignation
and nationalistic bravado.
From China’s perspective, according to
its Ministry of Commerce, “If the United
States attempts to curb China's development
… it miscalculates. The action targets
China; however, it will ultimately undermine
the US itself,” affecting tens of thousands
of jobs and hundreds of related US
enterprises.
“Targeting technology is like throttling
the neck of the Chinese enterprises,”
wrote China Daily. “The ZTE case should
remind China's decision-makers of the
urgency to become self-sufficient in core
technologies.”
President Xi Jinping has been prescient
about domestic control of core technologies,
especially related to the internet and
more recently to artificial intelligence.
Since taking office in 2012, he has stressed
the “hidden risks” that come with core
technologies not being mastered domestically.
He said, “Heavy dependence on imported
core technology is like building our
house on top of someone else's walls: no
matter how big and how beautiful it is, it
won’t remain standing during a storm.”
Innovation is the first of Xi’s “five major
concepts of development”.
Beijing also claims
that the country itself
is a victim of
discriminatory
policies
From the US perspective, according to
its Department of Commerce, the prohibition
against ZTE is punishment for ZTE violating
US sanctions against Iran and North
Korea, making false statements and obstructing
justice, and then after reaching a
settlement agreement, violating it.
The United States claims it is not resisting
China’s rise, but rather the country’s
unfair or illegal means to achieve it. The US
action enumerated four such practices as
rationale for imposing punitive tariffs, all
relating to technology or intellectual property:
foreign firms in China are required to
form joint ventures and transfer knowledge,
as well as license technology with
below-market terms and conditions, while
the state supports Chinese enterprises in
acquiring foreign hi-tech assets, and sanctions
commercial cyber theft.
President Trump is wildly unpopular
among American elites, especially among
policy experts, who do not need much of an
excuse to criticise him – note the fusillade of
attacks on Trump’s tariffs. But these elites
are not criticising Trump on US moves to
counter what they, with unusual consensus,
perceive to be China’s unfair policies,
and in some cases unlawful programmes,
to become a world leader in state-of-the-art
technologies, especially AI, information
technology, robotics, advanced manufacturing,
new energy vehicles, aviation and
biotechnology.
China claims that it is still a developing
country, so different rules apply, a foundational
principle of the World Trade Organisation.
Beijing also claims that the country
itself is a victim of discriminatory policies
restricting its imports of hi-tech products.
Of course, China had to respond with
appropriate actions as well as confident
words, imposing heavy tariffs on US
sorghum and signalling that additional
agricultural tariffs were at the ready, along
with barely veiled threats against US companies
operating in China.
Here’s my fear. While I have argued that
most mainstream American experts are not
motivated to impede China’s rise, as many
in China believe, I can no longer make that
argument persuasive.
In the US, there has been a dark turn
among experts that US policy towards
China, calibrated over four decades to
shepherd China’s rise, has failed: China,
they have come to believe, has become a
competitor and may become an adversary,
and that US relations with China must now
be managed as with an emergent adversary,
not as with a developing partner.
In China, nationalistic voices are on the
rise, castigating the US for its self-serving
motivation to impede China’s rise, and calling
for China to become more self-reliant,
more rapidly, especially in world-class
semiconductors, so that the country would
not be vulnerable to US “blackmail”.
Welcome to the unhappy world of selffulfilling
prophecy, where the actions of
each side in response to a perceived threat
from the other side increases the likelihood
of that threat morphing from theoretical to
actual.
To both sides, I offer two pieces of
advice. First, take a breath and a fresh look,
because the road on which you are travelling
will not lead to a happy place.
Second, contemplate why the other side
is misinterpreting your actions. To my
American friends, what makes China think
the US is resisting its rise? To my Chinese
friends, what makes the US think that
China is a competitor and may become an
adversary?
Projecting malevolent motives and seeing
sinister conspiracies is the easy way out.
It can solicit cheers and plaudits in one’s
domestic media, but it will impede progress
and is likely to be self-defeating.
The US and China must each figure out
how not to confirm the other’s self-fulfilling
prophecy.
Robert Lawrence Kuhn is a public intellectual,
international corporate strategist and
investment banker, and China expert and
commentator. He is the author of How China’s
Leaders Think and a co-creator (with Adam Zhu)
and host of CGTN’s “Closer to China with R.L.
Kuhn” and “The Watcher” commentaries
Older people still
have lot to offer
in the workplace
Paul Yip says measures to ensure
Hong Kong retirees remain active
through employment may help
prevent poverty and partially offset
the impact of a declining birth rate
Employment is the most robust method for
keeping people out of poverty. In Hong Kong’s
latest poverty situation report, for those with a
job, the poverty rate is only 12.3 per cent, compared to
77.4 per cent among those not working. Among older
adults with a job, it is 12.9 per cent, compared with 48.2
per cent among those without employment.
Chief Secretary Matthew Cheung Kin-chung has
recently raised the possibility of promoting workforce
participation for those aged 50-64 and helping those
aged 65-74 re-enter the job market. Hong Kong’s
workforce participation rate among older adults is 17.7
per cent, lower than in Japan (22.7 per
cent), Singapore (26.8 per cent) and Seoul (31.5 per
cent).
The Japanese government has been very active in
promoting workforce participation among its older
citizens, especially since 27 per cent of its
population was aged 65 or over as of 2017. The
population size has decreased, from 128 million in
2010 to 127 million in 2015, and the United
Nations estimates that the number will continue to fall
until 2061. The number of migrants moving to the
country has not offset the population decrease, leaving
no choice but to improve the labour participation and
productivity rate, especially among older adults and
married women with children.
Though Hong Kong’s total fertility rate is only 1.2
per woman – less than the 1.4 in Japan – we have
benefited from migration from the mainland to keep
our population young. Our life expectancy is also very
similar to Japan’s, at 81 for men and 87 for women. It is
time to explore how to make better use of our older
The most important thing is
to provide an option for
older adults to be active in
the job market
Greater effort is required to foster gender diversity
Kevin Sneader and Anu Madgavkar say the Asia-Pacific region needs more women leaders
Women’s representation in highranking
positions in business
and politics is a global issue, but
an even more pressing one in Asia-Pacific.
Across the region, only one in five people in
leading roles is a woman.
This waste of women’s talent comes at
an economic cost. Many economies in the
region are ageing and skills shortages are
on the rise: making more of women’s
potential can help meet such challenges.
Businesses gain a great deal from
supporting women. McKinsey’s 2018
report “The Power of Parity” found that
companies in the top quarter for gender
diversity on their executive teams are 21
per cent more likely to experience aboveaverage
profitability.
Even in developed economies in the
Asia-Pacific, few women are getting to
the top in business – in Japan, there are no
female CEOs in the top 100 public
companies. In Australia and Singapore, the
share of women CEOs in 2016 was only 6
per cent and 5 per cent respectively. The
Philippines, a traditionally matriarchal
society whose government has been
proactive in tackling gender inequality,
does better in senior positions overall, but
only 3 per cent of CEOs and 15 per cent of
board members are women.
The lower share of women in leading
positions within companies isn’t all about
the glass ceiling – the point at which
women’s careers appear to halt. Rather,
women’s under-representation has its
roots as far back as the education system.
In India, only 44 per cent of students in
tertiary education are female and many
graduates don’t take up employment: only
25 per cent of entry-level positions in
Indian companies are taken by women. In
Japan, the share of women enrolled in
college is higher, at 47 per cent, but women
were only 28 per cent of students attending
the top 10 universities.
The share of women erodes sharply
from entry-level to the boardroom, and the
biggest “breakpoint” is motherhood. In a
2015 McKinsey survey, 45 per cent of Asian
executives cited the “anywhere, anytime”
performance model as the largest barrier
to women moving into senior roles. In
Japan, a survey found that three-quarters
of women respondents said they were not
interested in managerial positions, partly
because promotion would mean working
even longer hours.
The second most cited factor behind
women dropping out of work is the
“double burden” of holding down a job
while looking after the family. In China, 33
per cent of female respondents to a 2017
survey said that they had a lower salary
when they returned to work after having a
baby, and 36 per cent said they had to
accept a demotion. Sixty-three per cent
said they did not want a second child
because this would hurt their career.
Many women struggle to return to work
because childcare options are limited or
too expensive. In Australia, net childcare
costs (paid by two-earner families) were 20
per cent of an average family’s income in
2015, compared with the 13 per cent
average in OECD economies.
The attrition of women from the talent
pipeline starts even earlier than
motherhood, as societal attitudes militate
against women pursuing a career and
prioritise looking after families. In India, 70
per cent of respondents to the 2010-2014
World Values Survey agreed with the
statement, “When a mother works for pay,
the children suffer.”
More can be done to
give women the
freedom to choose a
career as well as
motherhood
There has been some progress. The
share of women on company boards has
been rising, reflecting efforts by both
governments and private-sector
organisations. India has made it
mandatory for companies to have at least
one female director, and the Australian
Securities Exchange Corporate
Governance Council tracks gender
diversity in its constituent companies.
Japanese pharmaceutical company
Takeda hit its target of 30 per cent of new
managers being women (from only 6.2 per
cent in 2015) through a range of initiatives
including flexible working hours.
However, there is much more that can
be done to give women the freedom to
choose a career as well as motherhood.
Narrowing the leadership gender gap will
require concerted action by governments
and companies from encouraging and
helping girls to learn the right skills for a
changing labour market and mentoring
women in their careers, to shifting
attitudes towards women’s roles through
public-awareness campaigns to – perhaps
most importantly – making work flexible.
More help with childcare is urgently
needed. Governments can use public
spending to expand childcare provision
and companies can set up nurseries.
Flexible working practices in companies
are vital. In Australia, financial services
company Suncorp enables flexible
working through “work at home hubs” that
combine home work stations and working
spaces in regional shopping centres.
Such efforts are only likely to be
effective with a root-and-branch shift in
attitudes towards women’s roles in society.
Governments can lead from the front,
setting targets for women’s representation
in business as Japan and Singapore have
done, and more companies can push for
true diversity within their ranks. Doing so is
not only in the interests of their bottom line
but the health of the economies in which
they work.
Kevin Sneader is chairman, Asia-Pacific, of
McKinsey & Company. Anu Madgavkar is a
partner at McKinsey Global Institute
adults. We should create the right environment
for raising the retirement age and extending
employment beyond that age. Some issues, like
excessive health and medical insurance costs for the
older workforce, and long working hours, should be
re-examined.
The government can create a fund to protect
against excessive increases in insurance costs, while
introducing a more flexible working arrangement for
the older workforce.
The most important thing is to provide an option
for older adults to be active in the job market, and give
them the choice of whether to continue in a job. Those
who have had enough could perhaps take on volunteer
work in the community. For those who stay on with
paid employment, more flexible time arrangements
would better suit their needs, while their roles could be
redefined so as not to stand in the way of the career
advancement of younger workers. Some tangible
support might be needed for the business sector,
ideally through a tax-deductible arrangement rather
than the proposed cash support.
For some work, such as in teaching and research,
the situation depends on individual ability. As in
overseas countries, participants should be allowed to
work as long as they meet expectations. At present, a
vigorous review process takes place to determine
whether to extend beyond retirement age.
The education levels of Hong Kong’s older adults is
not high and, among those with very low levels, most
can only find work in low-skilled jobs such as cleaning
and security duties. Nevertheless, these areas face a
shortage of labour and can be a good fit. In such cases,
people’s rights and pay should be better protected, to
avoid companies exploiting this group of workers.
Also, sometimes, older adults are not driven by
money when seeking work. For some, finding meaning
in their work can be sufficient. The Japanese
experience shows that some older adults continue to
work to maintain their independence and fitness. Such
workers, whatever they do, display high levels of
professionalism.
Respecting the wishes of older adults and providing
a quality choice in terms of working would be a winwin
situation for the whole community.
Paul Yip is chair professor (Population Health) in the
Department of Social Work and Social Administration at the
University of Hong Kong
For some, finding meaning in work is important, as with
these women who recycle used clothes to make bags.
Comment›Insight & Opinion › United StatesUS-China trade
US-China trade war could end with
a ‘big deal’ through baby steps
towards mutual understanding
Robert Lawrence Kuhn says the US must accept China’s
need to support technological development, while China
should work with US policymakers who oppose tariffs but
want the country to further open its markets and protect
intellectual property rights
PUBLISHED : Thursday, 30 August, 2018, 5:02am - UPDATED : Thursday, 30 August, 2018, 6:15am
Robert Lawrence Kuhn
President
Xi Jinping
Major Speech
Seattle
September 24, 2015
Robert
Lawrence
Kuhn
Simultaneous
Commentary
Quest
Means
Business
China’s
Xi Jinping
UN Speech
Robert
Lawrence
Kuhn
Interview
September 28, 2015

CNN’S AMANPOUR – May 29, 2013
President Xi Jinping to meet President Barack Obama
Interview with Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn,
long-time adviser to China’s leaders.
http://edition.cnn.com/video/#/video/world/2013/05/29/exp-­‐race-­‐china-­‐us-­‐amanpour.cnn
CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN HOST: Good evening.
I'm Christiane Amanpour. There may officially be only one
superpower today, but another is rapidly advancing. The
United States and China jockey for position at the pinnacle of
the world in what might just be called a race to the top. So
how will the first tete-a-tete go between their leaders, the two
most powerful men on Earth, U.S. President Barack Obama
and China's leader, Xi Jinping, will meet just over a week
from now in an informal setting at the aptly named
Sunnylands Estate just outside Los Angeles. China is
anxious and angry about Obama's much-touted “pivot” to
Asia and about what China perceives to be the U.S. siding
with Japan over disputed islands in the East China Sea. The
United States, for its part, has a laundry list of concerns,
everything from alleged Chinese hacking of even its most
sensitive military secrets to its influence over North Korea
and Pyongyang's nuclear saber-rattling. President Xi says the
U.S.-China relationship is at a crucial juncture and he says
that he wants to forge, "a new type of great power
relationship." So what exactly will that look like? We need
to know because this may just be the most important
relationship in the world today. And in a moment, I will dig
deeper with Robert Lawrence Kuhn, a long-time adviser to
China's leaders.
AMANPOUR: Robert Lawrence Kuhn has tremendous
insight into China's leaders. He's a long-time adviser to the
Chinese government; he's met President Xi several times and
he's the author of the book, "How China's Leaders Think."
That is a big title. Welcome to the studio.
Fareed Zakaria GPS
“Xi Jinping: The Governance of China”
Robert Lawrence Kuhn
October 5, 2014
FZ: What in the world is the leader of the second
largest economy on the planet thinking? That’s a
question many would love to know the answer to,
but in a closed, secretive society, like China, it’s
all but impossible to know. He rarely gives
interviews, and the press in China is far from free.
But now we have something to look at. Chinese
President Xi Jinping has a new book, entitled The
Governance of China, and it’s aiming for
worldwide impact. State media there reports that
the book has been published in nine languages:
Chinese, English, French, Russian, Arabic,
Spanish, Portuguese, German and Japanese.
My next guest, Robert Lawrence Kuhn, says it is a
milestone. Kuhn has advised the Chinese
government for twenty-­‐five years, and is the
author of How China’s Leaders Think. Welcome.
KUHN: Pleasure to be here.
FZ: First, give us a sense of who this man is for
our viewers. Who is Xi Jinping, and why is he a
little different from China’s ordinary leaders?
KUHN: Xi Jinping has been involved in all aspects
of what makes China today. His father was one of
the founders of the country, truly a great
revolutionary and a great reformer in the early
days. Xi Jinping graduated from Tsinghua
University [‘China’s MIT’], with a degree in
chemical engineering. Then he went through
more than two decades working at the local level.
Starting in a county, and then a city, Xiamen,
working his way up for many years in Fujian
province, becoming the governor. Then for five
years Xi was the Party Secretary of, the number
one official responsible for, Zhejiang province,
which is the center of entrepreneurship in China.
So that gives him a great sense of business. And
that was when I first met Xi Jinping, actually, in
2005, and then again in 2006, seeing him doing
the real work of running a province, a local area.
President Xi is a person, when you see him, who
is unassuming; he’s big, he has a strong presence
in a room, but you feel very comfortable with
him. He doesn’t put on airs, he’s very warm and
BBC World News
Robert Lawrence Kuhn
China’s Economy & Politics
President Xi’s ‘Four Comprehensives’
August 25, 2015
HOST: Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn is an advisor to the
Chinese government and author of How China’s
Leaders Think and he joins me now from Beijing. A
cut in interest rates today - but in China any economic
decision is always colored with politics.
RLK: Certainly people are concerned here, but you
have to realize a 43% drop in the Shanghai stock
market is still 25% above its 52-week lows, so what
the economists, government, tries to do is to
distinguish between the so-called real economy and
the stock market. Most people realize China’s stock
market was overvalued, but perception is reality, and
if people have less money on paper, they’ll spend less,
and so the fall will affect the real economy.
And you’re right, the way to look at such situations in
China is not just economically - you can’t look at
China without looking at politics, and here there are
two major areas. One is President Xi Jinping’s state
visit to Washington. This has been a very tense time
in Sino-US relations: South China Sea, cybersecurity,
human rights, lots of issues. But what this economic
uncertainty and volatility will do - I hope - is to make
both presidents focus on what really affects human
beings and human lives, focus on economic areas,
because this is where there can be some commonality
between China and the US. The contentious issues are
real, but economics is more real for people.
Domestically in China, it’s really interesting, because
in recent days, there have been editorials in People’s
Daily talking about extreme resistance to reform and
older leaders who are still involved and maybe
shouldn’t be, and so you have to look at domestic
politics in terms of what Xi Jinping, who is China’s
dominant leader, the president of the country, head
of the party, head of the military, and other titles as
well, and what his overarching policy is.
It’s called the “Four Comprehensives.” We learn from
each one. The first says that China wants to build a
‘moderately prosperous society’. That’s their shortterm
goal. It’s not different than others have said in

⽇报周报杂志
⼈民⽇报海外版 2017 年 05 ⽉ 08 ⽇星期⼀
往期回顾
分类检索
返回⽬录
“ ⼀带⼀路 ” 将成本世纪伟⼤故事
—— 专访美国库恩基⾦会主席罗伯特 · 劳伦斯 · 库恩
本报驻美国记者张朋辉
《⼈民⽇报海外版》 ( 2017 年 05 ⽉ 08 ⽇第 01 版 )
第 01 版 : 要闻
版⾯导航
下⼀版
罗伯特 · 劳伦斯 · 库恩
“ ⼀带⼀路 ” 国际合作⾼峰论坛开幕前⼣ , 本报记者专访了美国库恩基⾦会主席罗伯特 · 劳伦斯 · 库恩。作为此次⾼峰论坛的嘉宾之⼀ , 库恩博⼠密切关注中国倡议的 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 建设 , 对 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 建设及 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 国际合作⾼峰论坛抱有很⾼期待。他认为 ,“ ⼀带⼀路 ” 倡议正当其时 ,“ ⼀带⼀路 ” 建设将成为 21 世纪最伟⼤的故事之⼀。
中国找到了同世界的契合点库恩分析说 , “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 在世界这么受欢迎 , 是因为中国找到了⾃⾝发展经验同世界需要的契合点。他说 ,“ ⼀带⼀路 ” 倡议在全球许多国家受到热烈欢迎 , 主要有 3
个原因 : ⼀是基础设施是很多发展中国家的迫切需要 , 基础设施建设是 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 的重要关注点。⼆是世界上很多国家经济增长缓慢 , 他们希望通过参与 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 建设项⽬刺激经济增长。三是对于许多发展中国家来说 , 中国既是⼀个榜样 , 也是能够带来专长、经验和资本的国家 , 参与 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 建设项⽬是与中国加强合作的理想⽅式。
“ ⼀带⼀路 ” 倡议提出 3 年多来 , 成果超出预期 , 得到国际社会积极评价。库恩说 :“ 习近平主席关于合作共赢的全球化观念 , 从蓝图变成了路线图 , 从计划到付诸实践 , 从纸⾯的概念变成了地⾯的项⽬。过去 3 年 ,‘ ⼀带⼀路 ’ 建设项⽬遍地开花 , 我亲⾃见证了这⼀设想从愿景变成现实。 ” 库恩说 , 他更看重的成就是将正在进⾏的 “ 最
Interview: Xi's engaging, creative diplomatic
approach to benefit China-U.S. ties: U.S. expert
| 2015-09-10 21:06:53 | Editor: Tian Shaohui
by Xinhua writer Luo Jun
BEIJING, Sept. 10 (Xinhua) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping, with an engaging and creative diplomatic
approach, is likely to secure "a big success" in his visit to the United States later this month, said U.S.
expert Robert Kuhn.
In an exclusive interview with Xinhua, Kuhn, author of "The Man Who Changed China: The Life and
Legacy of Jiang Zemin" and "How China's Leaders Think," recalled Xi's previous trip to California as
president and to Iowa as vice president as "one of the best images as for China."
(The photo shows Robert Lawrence Kuhn introducing "Xi Jinping: The Governance of China" at
BookExpoAmerica in New York on May 29, 2015)
"He went to sporting events and I was at one of the luncheons. You really had a wonderful, enriched
feeling about China at that point," Kuhn said.
Now with the United States entering a political season of presidential election, issues of contention
with China and the lack of overall understanding of China's policy has been increasing, but Kuhn
believes that low expectations can become an advantage as people may "get surprised on the positive
8 C H I N A D A I L Y . C O M . C N / O P I N I O N M O N D A Y, O C T O B E R 2 0 , 2 0 1 4 C H I N A D A I L Y
Comment
editorial • opinion
THE FOURTH PLENARY SESSION OF THE 18TH
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China opens on
Monday and will last for four days. The designated theme —
governing through the rule of law — indicates how important
this meeting will be for the future of both the Party and the
country.
That this is the first time in 17 years the Party has designated
such a theme for a plenary session speaks volumes about the
importance the new leadership attaches to it. It is high on the
agenda.
Yet, the more the concept of rule of law has been discussed,
the more obvious it becomes that there is, today, much to be
desired.
More than 50 minister­level or higher officials have either
been indicted or placed under investigation for abuse of power
in the past year or so, underlining the fact that the rule of law is
sorely needed. It is perhaps the only way to eliminate, once
and for all, the most serious threat to good governance and to
secure the blessings of prosperity and justice to the people.
The fact that power today can effectively nullify the law, and
that those in power can circumvent it, not only deprives the
Party of its capacity to govern the country in a consistently fair
and just manner but also disrupts the reasonable running of
the marketplace. Abuse of power makes it impossible for fairness
to prevail in the socialist market economy.
Despite the great achievements China has made over more
than three decades, it will be very difficult for its economy to
grow in a sound manner — and neither will society progress in
a healthy way — unless fair competition and mutual trust can
be secured and ordinary people’s rights and interests can be
guaranteed through the rule of law.
If the country is to achieve further reforms in various fields
and establish and maintain a fair and just society, the powerworshipping
mentality among government and Party officials
must be eliminated. This is a core goal of the leadership.
Unless the overwhelming majority of Party and government
officials not only respect the law, but follow it when making
decisions, governing the country by the rule of law will
amount to little but lip service.
It will be no easy job, and it will take time for the power­oriented
way of doing things to be transformed. But the new Party
leadership has shown it has the courage to face the
challenge. We therefore have reason to expect much from the
current plenary session as they work to put the country on the
right track.
CONTACT US
CHINADAILY
A foundation of law
O T H E R V I E WS
Historic moment
China Daily
15HuixinDongjieChaoyang, Beijing100029
News: +86(0) 106491­8366; editor@chinadaily.com.cn
Subscription: +86400­699­0203; sub@chinadaily.com.cn
Advertisement: +86(0) 106491­8631; ads@chinadaily.com.cn
Phone app: chinadaily.com.cn/iphone
China Daily USA
1500Broadway, Suite2800, New
York, NY10036+12125378888
editor@chinadailyusa.com
China Daily Hong Kong (Asia)
Room1818, HingWaiCentre7TinWan
PrayaRoadAberdeen, HongKong
+85225185111
editor@chinadailyhk.com
editor@chinadailyasia.com
E D I T O R I A L
he convocation of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Com­
Party of China Central Committee, whose theme is
Tmunist
promoting the rule of law, embodies the CPC’s deepening perception
on governance and the law.
www.people.com.cn October 15.
t is the first time that the CPC, as the ruling Party, will make a
Icomprehensive plan on the rule of law in the form of a Party document.
The session, which marks the ruling Party’s significant
strategic layout on how to govern the nation in accordance with
laws and the Constitution, illustrates its new exploration of socialism
with Chinese characteristics. The CPC Central Committee will
focus on discussions on how to promote rule of law in at a plenary
session. ...
It has only six years to 2020, the deadline set for the realization
of a well­off society for China, and 35 years to 2049, the promised
year for China to be a prosperous, democratic, civilized and harmonious
socialist modern nation. All these mean China has
entered a crucial stage of deepened reforms. Only by sticking to
“governance of the nation according to laws” will China realize its
historic mission.
www.xinhuanet.com.cn October 19.
he National People’s Congress, China’s top legislature, should
Tplay a bigger role in the country’s efforts to promote the rule of
law. For example, the NPC can push for deepened reforms within
the framework of the Constitution and laws through legislation to
realize a benign interaction between reforms and the rule of law.
The deeper the water China’s reforms will enter, the more legal
guidance and guarantees these reforms will need. The NPC enjoys
a broad space for maneuvering in this regard.
Beijing News October 17
I
n the last three months, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central
Committee has held two conferences studying major issues
related to comprehensively pushing for the rule of law. As the
theme “Chinaruledbylaw” issetfortheFourthPlenarySessionof
the 18th CPC Central Committee, the overall planning and
prospect of a China governed by law will become increasingly
explicit.
Lianhe zaobao October 14
China Daily UK
90CannonStreetLondonEC4N6HA
+44(0) 2073988270
editor@chinadailyuk.com
China Daily Africa
P.O.Box27281­00100, Nairobi, Kenya
+254(0) 205223498(Nairobi)
editor@chinadailyafrica.com
enquiries@chinadailyafrica.com
subscription@chinadailyafrica.com
R O B E RT L AW R E N C E KU H N
Decoding Xi’s future vision
President Xi’s new book reveals his thinking about the country’s
governance and maps out a path for achieving the Chinese Dream
The Governance of China, President
Xi Jinping’s new book, is
unprecedented. Can analyzing
the book elucidate Xi’s thinking
and illuminate China’s future?
Consider seven frameworks or
perspectives: publishing purposes,
overarching themes, content analysis, chain of
developmental causation, domestic goals, domestic
means and global principles.
Publishing Purposes: substance,
symbol, signal. Substance means Xi’s political philosophy
and wide­ranging policies — organizing 79
speeches and commentaries in 18 chapters — to
discern how Xi intends to realize the Chinese
Dream, “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation”. Symbol means recognizing Xi’s emergence
as China’s leader, with greater authority, confidence
and support than observers had expected
when he first took office two years ago. Signal
means communicating Xi’s way of thinking to
global audiences in nine languages, an original
and explicit outreach to engage the world on multiple
levels.
Overarching Themes: pride, stability, responsibility,
vision. Pride expresses the yearning of the
Chinese people for the “great rejuvenation”. Stability
means maintaining the current political system
(Socialism with Chinese characteristics and the
Party’s leadership). Responsibility means “realizing
a moderately prosperous society by the centenary
of the Party in 2021”. Vision means “turning
China into a prosperous, democratic, culturally
advanced and harmonious modern socialist country
by the centenary of the People’s Republic of
China in 2049”.
Content Analysis. How does Xi impute importance
to topics? By examining what’s in Xi’s book,
can we explore what’s on Xi’s mind? Of the book’s
18 chapters, 11 relate to domestic affairs, seven to
foreign affairs; six have political relevance; six concern
standards of living; and four standards of
L I M I N
behavior. Categorizing the content, about a third is
politics and people; another third on international
relations; about 15 percent each on reform and
development, and society and culture; and about 8
percent on national security and defense. Pervasive
throughout is reform.
Chain of Developmental Causation. The
Chinese Dream is founded on political stability,
which enables far­reaching reform, which in turn
promotes economic development, and which,
when combined with rule of law and Chinese values,
strengthens China’s society, culture, ecology
and even defense. Where is this “chain of causation”
in Xi’s book?
The first and last chapters affirm political stability:
“Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” and
“The CPC Leadership”, both of which assert the
Party’s political primacy and thus assure social stability.
“The Chinese Dream” is the second chapter,
proclaiming the grand mission of national resurgence
and personal well­being. Then, chapters on
deepening reform and economic development,
which lead to chapters on rule of law, advanced culture,
social undertakings and ecological progress.
Domestic Goals: values, morality, prosperity,
fairness, happiness. Values: Xi’s vision is to inculcate
China’s traditional values — “the thoughts of
the ancient sages”, exemplified by Confucianism —
into socialist core values. (“We must take traditional
Chinese culture as the base.”) Morality: Derived
from values, morality is described as “conscious
law”, and “civic morality” is characterized as needing
improvement, while “paragons of morality are
important banners for building public ethics”. (“A
gentleman takes morality as his bedrock” — a traditional
virtue that Xi quotes.) Prosperity: “Common
prosperity is the fundamental principle of
Chinese socialism … We will accelerate China’s
overall prosperity”. Fairness: Because the Chinese
people have always had a perception that “inequality
rather than want is the cause of trouble”, Xi
says, China “should do a better job of promoting
Minister of Commerce Gao Hucheng
arrived in the lobby of the European
Commission’s headquarters at 9
o’clock on Saturday morning. He was
led to the office of outgoing Trade Commissioner
Karel De Gucht, who has been a thorn in the side
of Chinese businesses because of his protectionist
attitude ever since he took over the job in 2010.
De Gucht, 60, will be replaced in a few days by
Swedish politician Cecilia Malmstrom, 46, when
a newly constituted commission gets underway.
In the afternoon, the Chinese side announced a
long­awaited agreement in principle: Brussels
will not launch an investigation into subsidies of
China’s telecommunication imports into the
European market. The EU side still needs to go
through internal procedures for formal approval.
The threat was mainly targeted at Chinese telecommunications
equipment makers Huawei
Technologies Co and ZTE Corp.
While the big picture of relations has been a
positive one, the Europeans have annoyed Beijing
from time to time — for example, by allowing the
Dalai Lama to visit, by attacking China on human
rights and by imposing high trade barriers.
Despite such irritants, Beijing has sent constructive
signals. In the first half of this year, President
Xi Jinping paid the first­ever visit of a
Chinese president to the European Union’s headquarters.
And last week, at the summit of Asian
and European leaders in Milan, Italy, Premier Li
Keqiang hosted a special dinner for Barroso and
European Council President Herman Van Rompuy,
thanking them for their contributions to positive
relations. At the dinner, the leaders were
thought to have touched on the telecommunication
trade dispute, which involves about 1 billion
euros ($1.26 billion) annually.
The path to Saturday’s solution was similar to a
pattern set earlier, in mid­2013, after both sides
worked through an anti­dumping and anti­subsidy
investigation involving China’s multi­billiondollar
solar panel exports to the EU. Brussels
began that investigation in 2012.
Beijing was unhappy that there had been no
high­level invitation to visit Brussels a year after
the launch of the investigation.
In May last year, Li made his first trip to Germany
after taking office and won the support of
the German government, which vetoed Brussels’
decision, following dozens of EU member states.
Li made a last­minute call on Barroso the following
month, as Brussels was about to vote on
whether to end the solar panel dispute through
amicable consultation.
Li’s decisive role was crucial in preventing the
escalation of a trade war. If Beijing had opted to
deal with such disputes in an eye­for­eye, toothfor­tooth
manner, both sides would have been
losers, with the EU taking the brunt. It has
already suffered two economic recessions, and
its jobless rate has been in double digits for a
few years now.
Of course, with the trade volume between China
and Europe expanding, and with investment
pouring into Europe, China’s government, its
businesses and its media must work to make the
most of the rising economic tide.
fairness and justice”. Happiness: The Chinese
Dream, Xi says, is to “bring happiness to the Chinese
people”, to “ensure the people greater happiness”
— but, he cautions, “happiness does not fall
from the sky, nor do dreams come true automatically.”
(In Xi’s book, “values” occurs about 120
times, “morality” 24, “prosperity” 67, “fairness” 44
and “happiness’’ 16.)
Domestic Means: close to the people, realism,
stability, reform, rule of law, combating corruption.
“Close to the people” is an all­encompassing
way of thinking that shapes all decisions. Realism:
“I have repeatedly said that the great rejuvenation
of the Chinese nation can in no way be realized
easily,” Xi says. “While fully affirming our achievements,
we should also be aware of our shortcomings.”
Stability: The precondition for all else,
stability is a recurrent and foundational theme
(“stability” occurs 125 times). Reform: Those who
wonder whether Xi is a “real reformer” should
read “Explanatory Notes … Concerning Comprehensively
Continuing Reform” (page 76). Examples:
the market plays a “decisive role”; farmers
given transactional property rights; the judicial
system separate from the administrative system.
Rule of Law: “A fundamental principle” and “the
basic way to run the country” — the Fourth Plenary
of the 18th CPC Central Committee, focusing on
rule of law, is Xi’s call to action. Combating corruption
is a hallmark of Xi’s administration, enhancing
each of the five other domestic means. It is no
accident that the chapter on combating corruption
is positioned, significantly, between “Close Ties
with the People” and “The CPC Leadership”.
I bear witness to Xi’s consistency. In 2006, Adam
Zhu (my long­term partner) and I met privately
with then­Zhejiang Party Secretary Xi. He stressed
that while China should be properly proud of its
successes, “achievements should not engender
complacency”. Xi said: “We need to assess ourselves
objectively.”
Global Principles. Consider five. Independence
(China remains unaligned). Multi­polar
world (no country dominates). One country, two
systems (Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan). Peaceful
development (“We have made a solemn pledge to
the whole world that we will never seek hegemony”).
Multilateral affairs (cooperation with the
global community). These five global principles
drive China’s “new model of major country relations”
(primarily with the US), “neighborhood
diplomacy” (Japan, Vietnam, Koreas, etc.), and
“cooperation with developing countries” (such as
in Africa). The Silk Road economic belt (land route
and maritime) is President Xi’s new initiative for
multinational development.
Here’s my blurb for Xi’s book: “This book is a
milestone, both in substance and symbol, offering
openly the political philosophy of President Xi Jinping
and recognizing his emergence as China’s
senior leader. While misunderstandings about
China and its leadership abound, there is now no
need to speculate about President Xi. Here is how
he thinks, candidly and comprehensively.” It is the
pride of a patriot.
The author is an international corporate strategist
and political/economics commentator. He is
theauthorof How China’s Leaders Thinkanda
biography of former president Jiang Zemin. He
gave one of the speeches at the launching ceremonyfor
Xi Jinping: The Governance of China,at
theFrankfurtBookFaironOct8.
F U J I N G
Courtesy, not confrontation, best for Europe
So far, there is no unified Chinese business
council in Brussels to represent and lobby for
Chinese investors in Europe. By contrast, a major
US business organization reportedly has 300 staff
members focusing on Brussels’ policymaking.
A lack of communication and influence can
easily lead to misunderstandings. Bureaucrats in
Brussels usually follow Washington’s lead when
making policies that affect China.
Trade commission leaders need to make more
field trips to member states to learn how Chinese
businesses matter.
Take China’s solar panel exports for example.
The industry, which involves about 400,000
workers in China, has offered competitive products
to thousands of European upstream companies
and helped Europe achieve its status as a
green energy leader.
In telecom, Huawei and ZTE are deeply integrated
with European partners. And, incidentally,
Huawei is a steady job creator in Europe, where
young people, in particular, have faced huge
employment challenges.
If De Gucht had kept the big picture in mind,
he would not have made confrontational moves
against China and its businesses.
Overall, the EU recognizes China as strong strategic
partner. This is the starting point for dispute
control. Amicability helps both sides win. With
confrontation, everyone loses.
The author is China Daily chief
correspondent in Brussels.
fujing@chinadaily.com.cn

������������� ������ �������
��� ������ ������� �� ��� ��� ���� �����
P A G E 3 2
Last word
C H I N A D A I L Y E U R O P E A N W E E K L Y J U L Y 1 3 - 1 9 , 2 0 1 2
The insider with an outside view
strategist, Banker and author has intimate knowledge of China — and its leaders
By Andrew Moody
andrewmoody@chinadaily.com.cn
Robert Lawrence Kuhn says
the West often doesn’t
understand the Chinese
leadership’s key priorities
for China. The 67-year-old American
is seen by many as one of the few
figures outside the world’s secondlargest
economy who actually does.
He is regarded as a knowledgeable
insider, having been an adviser to
a number of leading Chinese bodies
since the late-1980s and knowing
many of the country’s top political
figures personally.
“There is rarely alignment between
what topics China’s leaders think are
important about China and what
the world thinks,” says Kuhn, also
an international corporate strategist
and investment banker. “Understanding
China requires knowing the
difference.”
He was speaking recently in the
five-star Grand Hyatt hotel in central
Beijing, which is his home for 90 days
a year. The rest of the time he divides
between his three homes in the United
States and traveling elsewhere.
“They treat me very well here.
Even when I travel around China, I
keep a room here,” he says.
The hotel is well placed near to
China’s seat of government around
Tian’anmen Square where he has an
extensive network of contacts.
His latest book, How China’s Leaders
Think: The Inside Story of China’s
Past, Current and Future Leaders,
which is now out in paperback and
more than 500 pages, goes into
extensive detail about those who
have the responsibility for shaping
modern China.
Kuhn, who cuts a dapper figure,
says many in the West often have an
outdated view about modern Chinese
leaders.
“The reality is that China’s leaders
are meritocratic,” he says.
“Many have strong academic backgrounds
from top universities and
all have significant experience, often
having run two or more provinces or
major municipalities as Party secretary,
governor or mayor.”
Kuhn, who is also a new China
Daily columnist, is much in demand
from major news organizations
around the world, including TV
appearances on BBC, CNBC, Euronews
and Bloomberg TV, and says he
has had complete freedom to express
his opinions.
“I have written three books about
China, dozens of articles and columns;
I’ve produced two major TV
documentaries about China and
given scores of media interviews —
and never has anyone in China even
requested to censor anything I’ve
published or broadcast outside of
China,” he says.
Some in the West, however, have
accused him of being too much of an
insider and not giving the full picture
about China because he was too close
to the leadership.
Robert Lawrence Kuhn says China’s growth is good for the world, but it cannot save the world.
“I deem it vital, considering China’s
importance in the world, that
China’s leaders become more known
to the world, and known not just via
sound-bites and photo ops, but by
seeing them up-close as real people
— hearing their own words, listening
to their stories, getting their ways
of thinking. I’m pleased to facilitate
some of this,” he says.
“I also offer my own analysis. As
for my accuracy and understanding,
readers or viewers can judge for
themselves.”
Kuhn, who was born in New York,
began his career as a scientist. After
studying biology at John Hopkins
University, he did a doctorate in
anatomy and brain research at the
University of California at Los Angeles
in the 1960s. Brain science and
consciousness remain major interests
of his.
His first involvement in China was
through the scientific community in
the late-1980s when he worked with
scientists reforming China’s research
and technology base. He received an
invitation from Song Jian, then a
State councilor and chairman of the
State Science and Technology Commission.
At the time he was developing a
parallel business career and became
president of The Geneva Companies,
a leading US mergers and acquisitions
company, which he eventually
sold to Citigroup in 2000.
At the same time he was cementing
links with leading business and
political figures in China.
His organization, The Kuhn Foundation,
with CCTV (China Central
Television), produced the documentary
In Search of China for PBS in the
US, which was broadcast in 2000.
He is now working on a new fivepart
series China’s Challenges, which
will be broadcast in China in the
autumn and syndicated to PBS stations
in the US next year.
Perhaps Kuhn’s most significant
project was writing a biography of
former president Jiang Zemin, which
was the best-selling book in China
in 2005.
How China’s Leaders Think was
based on interviews with more than
100 leading Chinese political figures,
some of whom he has known for
more than a decade.
“I know many personally and have
worked with several for a number of
years. When you hear them speak
over a period of time, it gives you
a sense of their personalities and
character as well as their intellectual
capabilities, leadership style and
political progress,” he says.
Kuhn sometimes likes to invoke
humor to explain why there is sometimes
friction between Chinese and
American leaders.
“Some people think it is because
feng yongbin / China Daily
of ideological, historical or cultural
reasons that we have communication
problems. As I once pointed out,
perhaps it’s because China’s leaders,
the members of the Politburo Standing
Committee, were trained as engineers,
and most American politicians
were trained as lawyers. Maybe the
problem is that lawyers and engineers
can’t talk to one another!”
Kuhn says the main focus in the
West is often the Chinese economy
and whether it will continue to
motor ahead.
“China should have 10 to 20 more
years of what we should still call relatively
high growth, driven by continuing
the country’s unprecedented
urbanization and modernization.
“Growth rates will naturally ease
from reform’s historic averages —
probably to 6 to 8 percent per annum
— which is less than we are used to,
but which may be optimal because
China can more effectively deal with
its most severe problems, particularly
economic and social imbalances
and sustainable development.
“However, China’s economy is fragile,
vulnerable to exogenous shock.
China’s growth is good for the world,
but it cannot ‘save the world’,” he
says.
Kuhn says there is often a danger
of China being misrepresented
because it is seen through a narrow
perspective.
BIO
Robert Lawrence
Kuhn
International corporate strategist,
investment banker, senior adviser
to multinational corporations and
author
Age: 67
Education:
• Bachelor’s degree in human biology,
Johns Hopkins University, 1964
• PhD in anatomy and brain research,
University of California at Los Angeles,
1968
• Master of sciences in management,
MIT Sloan School of Management,
1980
Career:
• President and co-owner of The Geneva
Companies, a US leading mergers
and acquisitions company (sold to
Citigroup in 2001)
• Chairman, The Kuhn Foundation,
which produces documentaries on
scientific and philosophical questions
as well as on China issues
• Author of The Man Who Changed
China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin
and How China’s Leaders Think, as
well as 25 books on business strategy,
finance and investment banking
Books: The Inflationary Universe: The
Quest for a New Theory of Cosmic
Origins by Alan H. Guth, Lake Views:
This World and the Universe by Steven
L. Weinberg, The Coherence of Theism
by Richard Swinburne, and Infinite
Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology by
John Leslie. Books on consciousness
by John R. Searle, David J. Chalmers
and Colin McGinn.
Film: Khachaturian (2003, directed by
Peter Rosen; Dora Serviarian-Kuhn,
executive producer)
Music: Piano Concerto in D-flat Major
by Aram Khachaturian (1903-78) played
by Kuhn’s wife Dora Serviarian-Kuhn
Food: “I eat tofu all the time. I appreciate
the unbelievably different textures.”
“Western media takes China’s very
real problems and reports them as if
they were, say, 80 percent of China’s
story. I take the same problems —
which are genuine and often intractable
— and they consist of, say, 35
percent of my work,” he says.
“It is not that Western media is
conspiratorially biased or always
anti-China, it is that they often do
not provide proper and sufficient
context,” he says.
Huang Tiantian, Dong Fangyu and
Zheng Yibing contributed to this story.

B6 COVER STORY
Sunday 25 November 2012 Shanghai Daily
On a mission to
explain ‘real’ China
Above: “How
China’s Leaders
Think”
Right: “The Man
Who Changed
China: The Life
and Legacy of
Jiang Zemin”
“
I don’t try to make anybody
happy, but I just want
to tell the truth. I can be
wrong, and maybe my
truth is not balanced.
Lu Feiran
China expert and American public intellectual,
Robert Lawrence Kuhn is best known in
China for two books about Chinese leaders
and their views, including a biography of
former President Jiang Zemin in 2005 and one about
other leaders and their thinking in 2009.
Kuhn, also an investment banker, business consultant,
brain scientist and philosopher, has been
granted unprecedented access to Chinese leaders,
though he does not speak Chinese.
His biography “The Man Who Changed China:
The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin” published in
both Chinese and English, was a best-seller in China
where readers are not accustomed to humanized
biographies of leaders.
It was probably the first biography written by a
foreigner about a living Chinese leader that was
published in China.
Kuhn has also produced documentaries on China,
written extensively for Chinese media and is often
quoted by western media. He is a contributor and
consultant to CCTV, some Chinese newspapers and
the Xinhua News Agency.
Kuhn sees his mission as telling the world about
the real China.
He was in Shanghai late last month for an International
Channel Shanghai (ICS) program he
co-produced and wrote about China’s challenges, in
conjunction with the 18th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China. He held a press conference
and also spoke with Shanghai Daily.
Chinese media sometimes accuse some Westerners
and Western media of China bashing, saying they
misunderstand or are even malevolent.
But 68-year-old Kuhn, a New Yorker, is believed
to have a more neutral view for China. He received
a bachelor’s degree in human biology from Johns
Hopkins University, a master’s of science in management
from the MIT Sloan School of Management,
and a PhD in anatomy and brain research from
UCLA.
His books were published by the Shanghai Translation
Publishing House and Shanghai Century
Publishing Group.
Kuhn said he “never tried to please the Chinese
government, though Western media thought I did.”
“I like feedback, including negative feedback,
because I know that people are engaged,” he told
Shanghai Daily.
“I don’t try to make anybody happy, but I just want
to tell the truth. I can be wrong, and maybe my truth
is not balanced.”
Kuhn’s experience with China started in 1989,
when he was invited by former State Councilor Song
Jian, director of the State Science and Technology
Commission.
The two became friends and Kuhn began traveling
between the US and China, getting to know government
officials and ordinary people.
Kuhn said he felt frustrated because his experience
in China differed from the description in much of
the Western media. “Then they only focused on the
negative side and ignored the rest,” he said.
That disparity inspired him to write Jiang’s biography,
he said. Jiang himself said that Kuhn didn’t
“beautify” him and got his wedding date wrong.
Kuhn spent four years writing “The Man Who
Changed China.” Though he had only met Jiang three
times and did not interview him for the book, he
talked to many people close to Jiang, including relatives,
friends and colleagues, gathering stories and
perceptions. He became close to many of them.
“I thought I had been rather familiar with China
before I started working on the book,” said Kuhn.
“But after I started collecting the information, I
found that my knowledge was very limited.”
Humanized leader
Kuhn said he was determined to depict a real, animated
Jiang, different from the seemingly impassive
figure appearing on state occasions, on Chinese TV
and in newspapers.
“For a very long time, Chinese leaders were either
described as God or the Devil, but never in-between,”
he said. “So I expected to display a Chinese leader
who is a human being.”
Soon after publication, it became a best-seller in
China. After Kuhn held a book-signing in Guangzhou,
Guangdong Province, more than 300 books
were sold in an hour. In Shanghai, more than a
million copies were sold in 2005, the highest in the
social science category.
Chinese readers called the book refreshing because
it told daily life stories and described Jiang’s
youth.
One Internet user called “Burn the scarecrow” said
before reading the biography, he thought Jiang was
“a quiet man standing high above the masses.”
“But after reading the book, my first feeling was
that he was once young like us and he is also an
ordinary man.”
The English version, however, received some criticism,
primarily that Kuhn was “fawning” over Jiang
and the government. Kuhn denied that.
“In fact, the book had a disclaimer, saying all
Wisdom comes with Global People
读环球人物获人生智慧
第 32 期总第 201 期
2012 年 12 月 6 日
美国将军腐化生活
罗阳 , 没喝上最后的庆功酒何亮亮 :“ 廉政公署不可复制 ”
苹果设计团队的秘密领袖有种气质叫 “ 桂纶镁 ”
www.globalpeople.com.cn 售价人民币 10 元港币 20 元邮发代号 :82-667
COVER PEOPLE
封面人物
情地与他们聊天 , 再从庞杂的素材中挑选自己需要的故事 ……
库恩坦言 , 在写这本书的过程中 , 自己与江泽民仅仅在公开场合见过 3 次面。
“1993 年 , 江泽民对古巴进行国事访问 ,
住在古巴国宾馆 , 当时 , 我也在那里。我站在走廊上 , 而他正好也走了出来。那是我们的第一次见面。 ”2000 年 9 月 , 江泽民赴纽约参加联合国千禧年首脑峰会 , 他在一次招待会上第二次见到江泽民。 3 年后 , 库恩又在北京听了江泽民关于几个重要问题的讲话。尽管没采访到江泽民本人 ,
库恩却并不觉得有什么遗憾。在他看来 ,
这本书只是传记而非自传 , 没必要非采访到本人。为了完成这本书 , 库恩总是随身带着手提电脑 , 一有空就开始写作 , 从周一到周五 , 他常常工作至凌晨。每当他在吃完饭后一头钻进书房 , 妻子总会调侃他 “ 又去见江泽民了 ”。整整 4 年 ,3 次重写 ,5
次编辑 , 库恩光资料就搜集了 3000 万字 ,
第一稿 70 万字 ……
2005 年 , 一本 47 万字的《他改变了中国 —— 江泽民传》出版。首批印刷的 20
2006 年 3 月 , 库恩在浙江与习近平会谈。万册 , 仅 10 多天就销售一空。为新书做巡回推广时 , 由于签名数量太多 , 库恩的手肘甚至有些劳损 ,“ 影响了打网球 ”。走访中国 40 多个城市《他改变了中国—— 江泽民传》的成功 , 让库恩有了进一步探寻中国整体形象的想法。他于是带着助手 , 开始走访中国
40 多个城市 , 进行深入的、大规模的调查研究。就是在这次调研过程中 ,2005 年 2 月
26 日 , 库恩在浙江西子宾馆见到了时任浙江省委书记习近平。习近平向库恩介绍了浙江的经济、历史和文化等方面的情况 ,
并感谢库恩多年来从自己独到的角度研究中国、向世界介绍中国 , 在中美两国之间搭起了文化的桥梁。次年 3 月 , 库恩再次来到浙江 , 这一次 , 他的目的是了解 “ 浙江模式 ”。虽然是不期而至 , 但习近平仍挤出时间与他见面。习近平说 , 自己之所以要这么做 , 是要 “ 表示我们对库恩先生关注中国、客观介绍中国的感激之意 ”。库恩回忆说 , 习近平在那次谈话中强
调了中国自改革开放以来发生的翻天覆地的变化。 “‘ 有句老话 , 士别三日当刮目相看。你一个月不来 , 半年不来 , 中国就会有很大的变化。 ’ 他又补充说 ,‘ 但如果结合中国悠久的历史来分析 , 又不会惊讶于它变化之快 , 因为我们经历了几千年才走到这一步。无论我们怎么看待这一速度 ,
中国的发展变化 , 至少在一定程度上 , 是由爱国热情和民族自豪感推动的。 ’”
让库恩印象最深的是 , 在谈及如何以最好的方式向世界介绍中国时 , 习近平提出 , 中国的情况无法用简单的一句话来描述 , 或用单一的方法来概括 , 并借用中国古代寓言 “ 盲人摸象 ” 来说明这个问题。 “ 他把中国富裕的东部沿海比作大象的腿 , 而将中国广袤的西部比作大象宽阔的后背 ,
认为 ‘ 象是一个完整的概念 , 必须全面地了解 , 要避免犯盲人摸象的错误 ’。 ” 对库恩来说 , 这样的比喻是新颖而有用的 , 这个说法 , 他到现在还记得。接连的调研 , 让库恩对中国有了更深入的认识。
2007 年 12 月 9 日 , 时任中宣部部长刘云山在与库恩的一次会谈中提议 , 如果由他来写一部关于中国改革 30 年的书 ,
一定很有意义。库恩知道 , 这次又说到他心坎上了。库恩列出了一份庞大的采访名单 , 每次采访前 , 他会向被采访对象提供三四十个问题的采访提纲 , 后者通常会选择其中的二三十个作答。采访结束后 , 库恩再根据采访录音进行整理 , 并对其中提及的年份、数字和事实进行核实。在与 100 余位省部级官员、企业领袖和专家学者沟通交流 , 并采访了诸多改革开放的亲历者后 , 库恩用 5 个月时间完成了 80 万字的初稿。 “ 我的家人说 , 整整一年 ,
他们只能看到我的后脑勺。 ”
2008 年 12 月 ,《中国 30 年 : 人类社会的一次伟大变迁》中文版在中国发行。第二年 , 为纪念新中国成立 60 周年 , 该书英文版在全球出版发行。截至目前 , 这本书是唯一由外国人详细描述中国改革开放 30 年进程的书籍。
编辑 | 张建魁肖莹美编 | 苑立荣图编 | 傅聪编审 | 刘爱成丁子
31
库恩十年十人政治□ 本刊记者凌云
讲述中国政坛
10 年变迁
. 16 .
2016 年 1 月 11 日 , 库恩在北京接受本刊记者专访。 ( 本刊记者傅聪摄 )