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#Post#: 9--------------------------------------------------
The Evolution of Phenomenology from Transcendental Phenomenology
, and Periods of Continental Philoso
By: StircrazyReality Date: July 17, 2017, 1:28 am
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I just had a breakthrough in understanding Husserl, Heidegger,
Phenomenology's move away from Transcendental Phenomenology and
the tradition of Continental Philosophy (In particular how the
course 'Descartes and Continental Philosophy' does not study any
of the Continental Philosophers that we touched on in
Existentialism; Answer there are periods of Continental
Philosophy [Which raises the question for me, does one need to
study all prior periods to understand a later period, i.e. for
me, do I need to study Descartes to deeply ground my study of
Being and Time, an issue I am still struggling with])
[center]I note that I am testing the style of this post. It is
simply sharing some thoughts.[/center]
My guiding question in my recent study has been, how did
Phenomenology become more than simply Transcendental
Phenomenology. Transcendental Phenomenology was the start of the
Phenomenological method. Edmund Husserl made the 'discovery', in
an effort to ground Objectively Valid Results. I do not feel
confident enough yet to give a definitive comment on Husserl and
his objectives, and so I shall give an extensive quote from
Cartesian Meditations. This section is from "The necessity of a
radical new beginning of philosophy". Such a Herculean task was
one that Husserl felt that Phenomenology was suited for, that
is, the task of setting a new place to begin from for all
philosophy could be achieved with Phenomenology.
[sub]The splintering of present-day philosophy, with its
perplexed
activity, sets us thinking. When we attempt to view western
philosophy as a unitary science, its decline since the middle of
the nineteenth century is unmistakable. The comparative unity
that it had in previous ages, in its aims, its problems and
methods,
has been lost. When, with the beginning of modern times,
religious
belief was becoming more and more externalized as a
lifeless convention, men of intellect were lifted by a new
belief,
their great belief in an autonomous philosophy and science. The
whole of human culture was to be guided and illuminated by
scientific insights and thus reformed, as new and autonomous.
But meanwhile this belief too has begun to languish. Not
without reason. Instead of a unitary living philosophy, we have
a philosophical literature growing beyond all bounds and almost
without coherence. Instead of a serious discussion among
conflicting theories that, in their very conflict, demonstrate
the
intimacy with which they belong together, the commonness of
their underlying convictions, and an unswerving belief in a true
philosophy, we have a pseudo-reporting and a pseudo-criticizing,
a mere semblance of philosophizing seriously with and for one
another. This hardly attests a mutual study carried on with a
consciousness of responsibility, in the spirit that caracterizes
serious collaboration and an intention to produce Objectively
valid results. "Objectively valid results" the phrase,
after all, signifies nothing but results that have been refined
by
mutual criticism and that now withstand every criticism. But
how could actual study and actual collaboration be possible,
where there are so many philosophers and almost equally many
philosophies ? To be sure, we still have philosophical
congresses.
The philosophers meet but, unfortunately, not the philosophies.
The philosophies lack the unity of a mental space in which they
might exist for and act on one another. It may be that, within
each of the many different "schools" or "lines of thought", the
situation is somewhat better. Still, with the existence of these
in isolation, the total philosophical present is essentially as
we
have described it.[/sub]
This is a link to the full text
HTML http://www.24grammata.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Husserl-Cartesian-Meditations-24grammata.com_.pdf.<br
/>Go to page 17 if you wish to see the context of this section,
a
short few pages on a new radical Cartesian Step.
In any case, these are a part of the conditions that gave rise
to phenomenology.
A key foundation of Husserl's thought is the theoretical
attitude of natural science. This however is not a foundation of
existentialist phenomenology. My question then was, how did
Phenomenology get away from the influence of the attitude of
natural science, an attitude which would aim to objectify and
make absolute. The answer lies in Heidegger's diagnosis of the
traditional fixation on what is present-at-hand. Transcendental
phenomenology is disengaged. This makes all contemplation of
things, contemplation of 'presence-at-hand'. However this
specific mode of seeing objects is 'special' and not fundamental
according to Heidegger. I agree with Heidegger. To know a hammer
one has to pick up a hammer and start hammering. No amount of
contemplating a hammer is going to give you the insight that you
can gain from hammering. For Heidegger, and the existential
Phenomenology that arose out of a certain reading of his work,
values, practical aspects, emotional responses, etc. are
fundamental constituents of the world, and are not subsequent to
simple cognition.
"Many see in the position advocated by Heidegger the main shift
in the history of continental philosophy in the twentieth
century: from transcendental to existential phenomenology."
(Routledge Guidebook to Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations,
p147).
Answering your question Ruell, on why Heidegger is seen to be so
influential
Continental philosophy had a separate history before the shift
between Husserl and Heidegger, and this history before hand
would be what 'Descartes and Continental Philosophy' studies. I
am still curious how much one can give group identity to
continental philosophy however.
I mean we are a continental philosophy society. Why is that so?
#Post#: 11--------------------------------------------------
Re: The Evolution of Phenomenology from Transcendental Phenomeno
logy, and Periods of Continental Phi
By: xavierhn Date: July 17, 2017, 6:21 am
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I know of two senses of the expression continental philosophy.
When we say continental philosophy it's usually in the
contemporary sense of intellectual movements (ranging from
German idealism, phenomenology, structuralism). All of these
'movements' (a shaky notion) are full of diverse and ulitmately
unique thinkers, so continental here merely plays the role of a
'label' for a quick contrast to divergent movements elsewhere,
say pragmatism in American, empiricism, or logical positivism.
In the historical sense, as the other sense, continental simply
refers to mainland European Philosophers after Descartes up to
Kant (Spinoza, Rousseau, Wolff, Leibniz, Voltaire etc.) as
opposed to Philosophers from Britain.
I think there is very limited use, and, therefore, little
meaning in using 'continental' to characterise or summise a
thinker, other than to distinguish a few influences amongst
others. It's a similiar linguistic expression to
'existentialism' as Sartre coined it, identifying a fabricated
'lineage' of thinkers which underlie only Sartre's concerns and
his style of thinking. As to why we are using it, well ask
Pederson! He came up with the idea of creating a 'continental
philosophy society' as opposed to the Russellian one -- I took
to be a certain decrying: 'We are interested in reading thinkers
that take politics, art, philosophy and history as belonging
together and of equal importance, rather than holding logic, or
the hard sciences as torch bearers for a brighter future'.
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