CHAPTER V.
		 THE IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS.

 56. The prohibition affects only state laws.
 57. The term "law" defined.
 58. Judgments of state courts not conclusive either as to the non-existence
     or non-impairment of contracts.
 59. The obligation of a contract defined.
 60. Legislation as to remedies.
 61. The term "contracts" defined.
 62. State insolvent laws.
 63. Judgments as contracts.
 64. Municipal taxation.
 65. History of the prohibition.
 66. State grants.
 67. Express contracts of exemption from taxation.
 68. Express grants of peculiar privileges.
 69. Contracts between a state and its political subdivisions.
 70. Implied contracts in charters of incorporation.
 71. Implied corporate exemption from taxation.
 72. Implied grants of peculiar privileges.
 73. Exemption from the operation of the police power.
 74. Contracts as to matters of public concern.
 75. The withdrawal by a state of its consent to be sued.
 76. The force and effect of the prohibition as construed by the Supreme     
     Court.

The prohibition affects only state laws.
56. Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution declares that "no state shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts. This prohibition does not in terms affect the exercise of legislative power by the government of the United States, and not only is there not in the Constitution any similar prohibition with regard to the United States, but by the grant of power to Congress, "to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States," (1) authority is expressly conferred to impair the obligation of contracts between debtors and creditors; (2) and under the doctrine of the implied powers, as construed by the court, Congress may impair the obligation of contracts by authorizing the issue of notes which shall be a legal tender in satisfaction of antecedently contracted debts.(3) The constitutional prohibition is likewise inoperative with regard to the acts of any political organization which at the time of the adoption of the act in question is not one of the United States; thus, the Constitution having, under the resolution of the Convention of 1787 and the Act of Congress of February, 1788, gone into effect on the first Wednesday of March, 1789, a statute enacted by the state of Virginia in 1788 was not affected by the constitutional prohibition.(4) So, also, a statute enacted by the republic of Texas before its admission into the United States as the state of Texas could not be held to be void for repugnancy to this clause of the Constitution.(5)

The term "law" defined.
57. The prohibition of the passage by a state of any "law impairing the obligation of contracts," would, if strictly construed, include under the word "law" only statutes enacted by state legislatures, but it has been determined that the word "law " comprehends, in addition to acts of legislation, state constitutions and constitutional amendments;(6) judicial decisions of state courts of last resort, rendered subsequently to the making of the contract in question, and antecedently to the suit in which the court determines the invalidity of the contract, and altering by construction the constitution and statutes of the state in force when the contract was made;(7) and, in general, any act or order, from whatever source emanating, to which a state, by its enforcement thereof, gives the force of a law; as, for instance, a by-law or ordinance of a municipal corporation(8) or a statute enacted by the congress of the Confederacy, and enforeed during the war of the rebellion by a court of a state within the insurgent lines.(9) Obviously the law, which is alleged to have impaired the obligation of the contract must have been enacted subsequently to the making of the contract, for a law enacted antecedently to the making of the contract can be said to have entered into, and become part of, the contract.(10) The judgment of the state court in the cause, determining the particular contract to be invalid, cannot be said to be a law impairing the obligation of the contract, for otherwise the federal court of last resort would be called upon to "re-examine the judgments of the state courts in every case involving the enforcement of contracts." As Harlan, J., said, in L. W. Co. v. Easton,(11) "The state court may erroneously determine questions arising under a contract, which constitute the basis of the suit before it; it may hold a contract to be void, which, in our opinion, is valid; it may adjudge a contract to be valid, which, in our opinion, is void; or its interpretation of the contract may, in our opinion, be radically wrong; but, in neither of such cases, would the judgment be reviewable by this court under the clause of the Constitution protecting the obligation of contracts against impairment by state legislation, and under the existing statutes defining and regulating its jurisdiction, unless that judgment in terms, or by its necessary operation, gives effect to some provision Of the state constitution, or some legislative  enactment of the state, which is claimed by the unsuccessful party to impair the obligation of the particular contract in question." (12) It must, therefore, appear in any cause in which it is sought to reverse in the Supreme Court of the United States, a decree or judgment of a state court for contravention of the constitutional prohibition of the impairment of contracts, that in the particular case the state court enforced to the prejudice of the plaintiff in error some act of state, either in the form of a state constitution, or an act of the state legislature, or a judgment of a court in another case, or an act of an extrinsic authority to which the state by its adoption thereof gave the force of law, and that the act of state, whatever its form, was, as affecting the contract, put into operation subsequently to the making of the contract.

Judgments of state courts not conclusive either as to the non-existence or non-impairment of contracts.
58. In questions under this clause of the Constitution the courts of the United States do not accept as conclusive upon them the judgment of the state court either is to the non-existence of contracts or as to their nonimpairment,(13) for, if the decision of the state court were to be accepted without inquiry or examination, the constitutional probibition would be nugatory.

The obligation of a contract defined.
59. The obligation of a contract is the duty of performance which the law imposes on one, or other, or both, of the parties to the contract.(14) As Marshall, C. J., said in the case cited, " Any law which releases a part of this obligation must in the literal sense of the word impair it." The application of the constitutional prohibition is not dependent on the extent of the impairment of vested rights."(15)

Legislation as to remedies.
60. A state may, without impairment of the obligation of a contract, regulate, or even limit, the remedies for the enforcement of that contract, provided that it does not take away all remedies therefor, and that it leaves in force a substantial remedy.(16) Thus a state may, in the case of a corporation whose charter requires that service of process on the corporation shall be made only at its principal office, provide by subsequent legislation that such process may be served on any officer, clerk, or agent of the corporation.(17) A state may abolish imprisonment for debt as a remedy f or breach of contract; (18) it may validate technically defective Mortgages, (19) or conveyances by femes covert ;(20) it may by statute grant new trials and create new tribunals to set aside grants or reverse judgments alleged to be fraudulent;(21) it may provide speedy and equitable methods for determining the title to lands under patents granted by the state;(22) it may authorize at the request of all parties in interest the discharge of testamentary trustees of real estate ; (23) it may change the rate of interest to be paid to the purchaser in the case of the redemption of mortgaged premises sold under foreclosure; (24) it may repeal usury laws which unrepealed would have avoided the contract; (25) it may prescribe a scheme for the reorganization of an embarrassed corporation and provide that creditors who have notice of, and do not dissent from, the scheme shall be bound thereby;(26) it may reduce the limitation of time for bringing suit provided that a reasonable limit elapses after the enactment before the limitation bars a suit upon existing contracts;(27) it may require registration as a prerequisite to the legal enforcement of existing mortgages, provided that a reasonable period be allowed before the law goes into effect; (28) it may require holders of tax sale certificates to give notice to the occupant of the land, if any there be, before taking a tax deed; (29) it may require registration with municipal officials of judgments against a municipal-ity;(30) it may provide that a city shall not be sued until the claim has been presented to the city council and disallowed by it, and that, thereupon, an appeal to court, if made, shall be made within a limited time;(31) it may free shareholders of a corporation from individual liability for debts of the corporation to an amount greater than their shares, for such legislation does not impair the direct liability of the corporation;(32) it may, after a state bank has obtained judgment against a party, authorize that party to set off against the judgment circulating notes of the bank procured by him after the entry of the judgment;(33) it may, after judgment has been obtained, reduce the rate of interest thereafter to accrue on that judgment;(34) and, a disseised tenant for years being entitled to sue on the landlord's covenant for quiet possession and also on a statutory remedy for forcible entry and detainer, the state may take away the statutory remedy, provided that the action on the covenant be left unimpaired.(35) A state, having issued bonds, and having by a subsequent statute provided for the funding of those bonds on certain terms at a reduced rate of interest, may, by a later statute, prohibit the funding of a specified class of those bonds until by judicial decree their validity shall have been determined, f or the original remedy of the bondholder is not thereby impaired .(36) So also, a state, which has contracted to receive its taxes in the notes of a certain bank, may, by statute, provide that the only remedy for taxpayers whose tender of such notes may be refused shall be to pay in legal money and within a time limited to bring suit against the tax collector, judgment against whom shall be a preferred claim against the state. (37) So also where the laws of a state permit coupons of state bonds to be received in payment of state taxes, provided that in case of the refusal of such coupons when tendered the holder thereof might enforce his rights under the contract by suing out an alternative mandamus against the officer refusing the coupons, and if judgment should be rendered in favour of the holder of the coupons that he could then have forthwith a peremptory writ of mandamus for the recovery of damages and costs, the obligation of the contract was not impaired by a subsequent statute which required, in case of the refusal of the tender of the coupons, a payment of the state taxes in lawful money, and a lodging of the coupons in a state court of competent jurisdietion, and the subsequent framing of an issue to determine whether or not the coupons were genuine and legally receivable for taxes, with a right of appeal to the state court of last resort.(38)
	 On the other hand, a state, in acting upon the remedy, cannot take away all, or a substantial part, of the power for the enforcement of a contract. It, therefore, cannot forbid its courts-to entertain jurisdiction of a suit to enforce, or obtain damages for the breach of, a class of contracts legally valid when made;(39) nor can a state forbid its courts, after the abolition of slavery, to take jurisdiction of actions upon contracts made before that abolition and the consideration for which was the price of slaves; (40) nor could a state, after the restoration of peace, declare void a contract made between its citizens during the war of the rebellion stipulating for payment in confederate notes;(41) nor can a state, after the making of a contract, change to the prejudice of either party the measure of damages for its breach;(42) nor can a state, by subsequent legis ation, impose as a condition precedent to the legal enforcement of a contractual right, that he who seeks to enforce that right shall prove an extrinsic and independent fact that has no necessary connection with the right to be enforeed, as, for instance, that he never bore arms in support of, or never aided, the rebellion against the United States;(43) or that he has paid certain taxes; nor can it permit the defendant to set off damages not caused by the plaintiff, as, for instance, the defendant's loss of property resulting from the war of the rebellion;(44) nor can a state, after a judgment has been enrolled, materially increase the debtor's exemption;(45) nor can a state after the making of a mortgage enlarge the period of time allowed for the redemption after foreclosure ; (46) nor forbid a sale in foreclosure at which less than two-thirds of the value of the mortgaged premises as fixed by appraisement shall be realized ;(47) nor take away the right to compound interest, if given by the law existing at the time of the making of the contract;(48) nor repeal a statute in force at the time of making the contract which renders the stock of a shareholder liable for the debts of the corporation;(49) nor materially change the  rules of evidence which were in existence when the contract was made.(50)

The term "contracts" defined.
61. The term "contracts," as used in the constitutional prohibition, includes both executory and executed contracts,(51) comprehending, within the former class, promisory notes and bills of exchange,(52) corporate bonds,(53) municipal bonds, (54 and municipal contracts for the payment of the salaries of their employees (55) and, generally, all legally enforcible contracts to do, or not to do, any particular act; and, within the latter class, grants and judgements founded upon contracts, (56) but not judgements founded upon torts;(57) nor is marriage a contract which may not be impaired by divorce legislation.(58)
There can be no impairment of the obligation of a contract which has not been legally made. (59) Thus a vote of the majority of the qualified voters of a country at an election held under a statute incorporating a railway and authorizing an issue of the bonds of the county in payment for the stock of the railway, if the qualified voters so decide it, does not constitute a contract whose obligation would be impaired by an amendment of the state constitution, (60) or by a repeal of the statute,(61) before the subscription be made or the bonds issued. So, also bondswhich are fraudulently put into circulation by a state treasurer after they have been declared void by the state constitution cannot impose any liability upon the state.(62) And a contract which is void because its execution is beyond the powers of the municipality(63) or county (64) attempting its execution cannot irrevocably bind the municipality or county. Moreover a state cannot enter into an irrepealable contract by a conveyance of property in disregard of a public trust under which it is bound to hold and manage that property, as in the case of a conveyance of soil under navigable waters.(65) On the same principle, a state statute which is void by reason of repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States cannot constitute a contract of exemption from state taxation; as, for instance, a statute imposing taxation on national banks to an extent not permitted by the National Banking Act, and, therefore, a subsequent state statute imposing on national banks a taxation which, though a heavier burden than that imposed by the earlier statute, is yet within the limits permitted by the National Banking Act, does not impair the obligation of any contract.(66) On the same principle, statutory exemption from state taxation, if granted in violation of the constitution of the state, does not bind the state as a contract.(67)

State insolvent laws.
62. There was, for some time, a controversy as to the effect of the constitutional prohibition upon state insolvent laws. In Sturges v. Crowminshield,(68) the action being brought in a federal courtwithin the state of Massachusetts, and the plaintiff being a citizen of Massachusetts, and the defendant a citizen of New York, it was held that discharge under an insolvent law of New York, enacted subsequently to the making within that state of a contract to be performed within the state, was void as an impairment of the obligation of that contract. In McMillan v. McNeill,(69) the action being brought in a court of the state of Louisiana, the plaintiff and defendant both being citizens of South Carolina, and the contract having been made and stipulated to be performed in that state, it was held that a discharge under an antecedently -enacted law of Louisiana impaired the obligation of the contract, and as no bar to its enforcement. In F. & M. Bank v. Smith (70) the action being brought in a court of the state of Pennsylvania, and both plaintiff and defendant being residents of that state, and the contract having been made, and to be performed, in that state, it was held that a discharge under a subsequently enacted insolvent law of that state was no bar to the action. In Ogden v. Saunders(71) the plaintiff being a Citizen of Kentucky and the defendant a citizen of New York, the contract having been made in New York to be performed in that state, action having been brought in a federal court in the state of Louisiana, it was held that a discharge under an antecedently-enacted insolvent Iaw of the state of New York was no bar to the action; and in Shaw v. Robbins,(72) the same ruling was made, the action being brought in a court of the state of Ohio the plaintiff being a citizen of Massachusetts, the defendant a citizen of New York, and the discharge set up being one that had been obtained under an antecedently-enacted insolvent law of the last-mentioned state. In Boyle v. Zacharier(73) Story, J., said, "The effeet of the discharge 'Under the insolvent act is of course at rest, so far as it is covered by the antecedent decisions made by this court. The ultimate opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Johnson in the case of Ogden v. Saunders ,(74) was concurred in and adopted by judges, who were in the minority upon the the three general question of the Constitutionality of state insolvent laws, so largely discussed in that case, and(75) Marshall, C. J., expressed the same view as to the effect of the judgment in Ogden v. Saunders. In Sudyam v. Broadnax,(76) the action having been brought in a court of the state of Alabama, the plaintiff being a citizen of New York, it was held that a judicial declaration of the insolvency of a decedent's estate under the terms of an antecedently-enacted statute of Alabama was powerless to discharge a contract made by the decedent in his lifetime in New York and stipulated to be performed in that state. In Cook v. Moffat,(77) the action being brought in a federal court in the state of Maryland, the plaintiff being a citizen of New York and the defendant a citizen of Maryland, and the contract having been made in New York to be performed in that state, it was held that a discharge under an antecedently-enacted statute of Maryland was no bar to the action. In Baldwin v. Hale,(78) the action having been brought in a federal court in the state of Massachusetts, the plaintiff being a citizen of Vermont a nd the defendant a citizen of Massachusetts, and the contract having been made in Massachusetts, to be performed in that state, it was held that a discharge under an antecedently-enacted statute of Massachusetts did not bar the action. The result of the cases is, that a discharge under the insolvent laws of a state is not a bar to an action on a contract for the payment of money, first: when the law under which the discharge has been granted has been enacted subsequently to the making of the contract;(79) second: when, although the discharge has been granted under a law enacted antecedently to the making of the contract, the contract was made in another state to be performed in that other state; (80) third: when, although the discharge has been granted under a law enacted antecedently to the making of the contract, and although the contract was made and to be performed in the state in which the discharge has been granted, the action upon the contract is brought in another state, by a party who is not a citizen of the state granting the discharge, and who has not made himself a party to the proceedings in insolvency; (81) and fourth, when, although the discharge has been granted under a law enacted antecedently to the making of the contract, and although the contract was made and to be performed in the state in which the discharge has been granted, the action upon the Contract is brought in the state granting the discharge by one who is not a citizen of that state, and who has not made himself a party to the proceedings in insolveney.(82) The questions, as yet not concluded by the authority of the court, are as to the effect of the discharge as regards creditors, who, though not citizens of the state granting the discharge, volnntarily become parties to the insolvency proceedings, or, who, being citizens of the state granting the discharge, and being duly notified of the insolvency proceedings, neglect or refuse to become parties thereto.

Judgments as contracts.
63. Contracts f or the payment of money being within the protection of the constitutional prohibition of the impairment of their obligation, judgments upon such contracts are equally entitled to protection.(83) Therefore, a judgment against a municipal corporation founded upon a breach of contract is not affected by a subsequent legislative abolition of the municipality's power to levy taxes for the payment of its debts.(84) But the rights of a judgment creditor are not impaired by a state statute reducing the rate of interest thereafter to accrue upon existing judgments;(85) nor are judgments founded upon torts contracts whose obligation will be protected against subsequent legislation.(86)

Municipal taxation.
64. A state cannot take away from a municipality existing powers of taxation so as to deprive of his compensation an officer who has served his term.(87) County bonds issued by public officers under authority of law either upon the subscription, or upon the agreement to subscribe, to the stock of a railway constitute a contract between the county and the bondholders, whose obligation cannot be impaired by a subsequent legislative repeal of the statute authorizing the subscription, or by a subsequent amendment to the state constitution prohibiting such a subscription.(88) But where public officers are by statute authorized to issue bonds in aid of railway construction only upon the fulfilment of a condition precedent which is not fulfilled before the adoption of an amended state constitution prohibiting the issue of such bonds there is no eontract whose obligation is impaired by the adoption of the state constitution.(89) On the same principle, a statutory authorization of borrowing of money by a municipality is not a contract between the state and the municipal creditors whose obligation can be impaired by the subsequent exercise by the state of the power of modifying the rate of taxation or of exempting certain property from taxation,(90) but a state cannot dissolve an existing municipal corporation having a bonded debt, for 'Whose payment powers of taxation have been granted and specifically pledged, for that dissolution interferes with the exercise of such power of taxation."' Nor can a state withdraw or restrict the taxing power of a municipality so as to impair the obligation of contracts which have been made on the pledge, express or implied, that that taxing power shall be exercised for their fulfilment.(92) A statutory prohibition of the issuing by the courts of the state of a mandamus to compel the levying of a tax for the payment of the interest upon, or the principal of, municipal bonds, whose issue had been legally authorized, impairs the contract between the municipality and the bondholder.(93) In general, the statutory authorization of the contracting by a munieipality of an extraordinary debt by the issue of negotiable securities therefor conclusively implies a power in the municipality to levy taxes sufficient to pay the accruing interest upon, and the matured principal of, the debt, unless the statute conferring the authority, or the constitution of the state, or some general law in f orce at the time, clearly manifests a contrary legislative intent.(94)

History of the prohibition.
65. lt has never been doubted that contracts between individuals were protected by the constitutional provision, but it was formerly a matter of grave doubt whether or not contracts to which a state was a party were likewise entitled to protection. The history of the Constitution shows clearly that the mischiefs whieh the framers of the Constitution intended to remedy by this prohibition were, primarily, those caused by state legislation enabling debtors to discharge their debts otherwise than as stipulated in their contracts, and that the prohibition was not intended by its originators to interfere with the exercise of state sovereignty in cases of other than private contracts. This restriction on the power of the states is not to be found in either Mr. Pinckney Is, Mr. Hamilton's, or Mr. Paterson's projets as presented to the convention, nor is it implied in Mr. Madison's resolutions, nor does it appear in the draft reported by the Committee of Five on 6th August, 1787; but when Article XIII of the report of that committee was uncler consideration on 28th August, Mr. King "moved to add in the words used in the ordiance of Congress establishing new states, a prohibition on the states to interfere in private contracts," but, on motion of Mr. Rutledge, as a substitute for Mr. King's proposition, there was adopted a prohibition of state bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.(95). The journal of the convention mentions Mr. Rutledge's motion, but omits all reference to Mr. King's proposition. Mr. Madison reports Mr. King's resolution, with the mention of declarations of opinion in favour of it by Messrs. Sherman, Wilson and Madison, and objections to it by Messrs. Gouverneur Morris and Mason, on the ground that state laws limiting the times within which actions might be brought necessarily interfered with contracts, and ought not to be prohibited, and that there might be other cases in which such interference's would be proper. There does not seem to be any record of any other discussion of this subject in the convention. The Committee of Revision reported on 12th September, 1787, to the convention their revised draft of the Constitution, in which Article 1, Section 10, declares "No state shall . . . pass any . . . laws altering or impairing the obligation of contracts." In convention on Friday, 14th September, 1787, the clause was finally amended and put into the form in which it appears in the Constitution, there being, so far as is known, no debate on the subject, save by Mr. Gerry, who "entered into observations inculcating the importance of the public faith and the propriety of the restraint put on the states from impairing the obligation of contracts," and unavailingly endeavoured to obtain the insertion in the Constitution of a similar restraint upon congressional action. 6 Mr. Bancroft states,"' with reference to the Committee of Revision's report, that "Gouverneur Morris retained the clause forbidding ex post facto laws - and resolute not to countenance the issue of paper money and the consequent violation of contracts,' (98) he of himself added the words, "No state shall pass laws altering or impairing the obligation of contracts."(99) Mr. Bancroft also quotes from the official report to the Governor of Connecticut made by Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth, the deputies from that state to the Federal Convention, wherein they say, "The restraint on the legislatures of the several states respecting emitting bills of credit, making anything but money a tender in payment of debts, or impairing the obligation of contracts by ex post facto laws, was thought neeessary as a security to commerce, in which the interest of foreigners, as well as of the citizens of different states, may be affected." The clause does not appear to have been made a subject of discussion in any of the state conventions called to ratify the Constitution. Mr. Hamilton, when Secretary of the Treasury, said in his memorandum of 28th May, 1790, to President Washington on the subject of the resolutions of Congress with regard to the arrears of pay due to certain soldiers of the Revolution,(100) "The Constitution of the United States interdicts the states individually from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. This, to the more enlightened part of the community, was not one of the least recommendations of that Constitution. The too frequent intermeddlings of the state legislatures, in relation to private contracts were extensively felt, and seriously lamented; and a Constitution which promised a prevention, was, by those who felt and thought in that manner, eagerly embraced. " Mr. Madison said in the Federalist,(101) "Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social,compact, and to every principle of sound legislation. The two former are expressly prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the state constitutions, and all of them are prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Our own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that additional fences against these dangers ought not be omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the convention added this constitutional bulwark in favour of personal security and private rights; and I am much deceived, if they have not, in so doing, as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments as the undoubted interests of their constituents. The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and with indignation, that sudden changes, and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the more industrious and less informed part of the community. They have seen, too, that one legislative interference is but the first link of a long chain of repetitions; every subsequent interference being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting, which will banish speeulations on public measures, inspire a general prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the business of society. " In Sturges v. Crowninshield,(102) Marshall, C. J ., said " The fair, and, we think, the necessary construction of the sentence requires that we should give these words their full and obvious meaning. A general dissatisfaction with that lax system of legislation which followed the war of our revolution undoubtedly directed the mind of the convention to this subject. It is probable that laws, such as those which have been stated in argument, produced the loudest complaints, were most immediately felt. The attention of the convention, therefore, was particularly directed to paper money, and to acts which enabled the debtor to discharge his debt otherwise than as stipulated in the contract. Had nothing more been intended, nothing would have been expressed. But, in the opinion of the convention, much more remained to be done. The same mischief might be effected by other means. To restore public confidence completely, it was necessary not only to prohibit the use of particular means by which it might be effected, but to prohibit the use of any means by which the same mischief might be produced. The convention appears to have intended to establish a great principle, that contracts should be inviolable. The Constitution, therefore, declares that no state shall pass 'any law impairing the obligation of contracts.'"

State grants.
66. In 1810 the judgment in Fletcher v. Peck(103) established the doctrine that contracts to whieh a state is a party are within the protection of the constitutional prohibition. The facts in that case were these: in 1795 the state of Georgia enacted a statute authorizing the issue of a patent to " the Georgia Co. "for a tract of and in that state, and on 13th January, 1795, the patent was issued. By sundry mesne conveyances before 1796 title in fee to a part of the tract vested in Peck, who had purchased for value and without notice of any matter which could invalidate the title of the state's grantees. In 1796 the state of Georgia enacted a statute repealing the Act of 1795 and annulling the patent to the Georgia Co. On 14th May, 1803, Peck conveyed to Fletcher, covenanting, inter alia, that his title had been "in no way constitutionally or legally impaired by virtue of any subsequent act of any subsequent legislature of the state of Georgia." Fletcher brought covenant sur deed against Peck in the Circuit Court, declaring, inter alia, that the statute of 1796 was enacted by reason of fraud practiced in securing the enactment of the statute of 1795 and was an impairment of Peck's title. Peck pleaded that he was a purchaser for value and without notice, etc. Fletcher demurred, and the court entered judgment thereon for Peck, which judgment was affirmed in the Supreme Court on a writ of error, the ground of decision being, that the constitutional prohibition comprehends contracts executed, including grants, as well as contracts executory, and that the states being prohibited from passing "any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts," and the prohibition of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws being a restraint upon governmental action, there is not to be implied "in words which import a general prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts, an exception in favour of the right to impair the obligation of those contracts into which the state may enter. " It has, therefore, since 1810, been settled that the term "contract-" includes not only contracts between individuals, private and corporate, but also contracts, executed and executory, between the state and individuals, private and corporate. Following in the line of Fletcher v. Peck, it has been held that, a grant of land by a state to a railway corporation is a contract whose obligation is impaired by a subsequent act resuming the land,(104) that a state cannot deprive of his right to recover mesne profits from a disseisor one whose title vested under a compact between that state and another state, and who under that compact was entitled to recover mesne profits,(105) and tliat a state cannot, by statute, divest religious corporations of their title to land acquired under colonial laws antecedently to the revolution.(106)

Express contracts of exemption from taxation.
67. When in I812 the case of New Jersey v. Wilson(107) came before the Supreme Court, the doctrine of Fletcher v. Peck necessarily required the eourt to hold that the state was bound by the express contract contained in a statute which authorized the purchase of certain land for the remnant of the tribe of Delaware Indians, and which, in terms, declared that the land so purchased "shall not hereafter be subject to any tax,,, and that that contract forbade the subsequent taxation of such lands, after their sale to other parties with the state,,,,consent. The legal inviolability of a state's contract to exempt lands from state taxation having been thus established, it followed that a similar contract with regard to corporate franchises or assets was entitled to the like protection, and that contracts of exemption from state taxation, contained in corporate charters, or stipulated by subsequent agreement, if made in express terms and supported by an adequate consideration, constitute con- tracts so binding upon the state that their obligation cannot be impaired by a subsequent repeal of the charter, or by an imposition of a rate of taxation inconsistent with the state's contract.(108) Thus, the line and rolling stock of a railway cannot be taxed when its charter exempts from taxation its "property" and "shares;"(109) nor can the shares of the capital stock of a corporation be taxed in the hands of the shareholders, when the charter requires the corporation to pay to the state a tax on each share of the stock "in lieu of all other taxes;"(110) nor can the gross receipts of a corporation be taxed when its charter exempts the corporation from taxation;(111) nor can a corporation be taxed in excess of the limits specifically designated in the charter,(112) or other contract.(113) Nor can a municipal corporation, in the exercise of authority delegated to it by statute, assess a street railway for a new paving of a street, when the railway has contracted with the municipality to keep the street in repair, for the acceptance of that contract limits by necessary implication the obligation of the railway to repairs, and relieves it from liability for betterments;(114) nor can property held by a charitable corporation as an investment be taxed, when its charter exempts from taxation all property of whatever kind or description belonging to, or owned by, the corporation.(115) An adequate consideration for a charter exemption from taxation is to be found in the exercise by the corporation of the powers conferred by the charter,(116), or, in the case of corporations for charitable purposes, in the contribution of funds to the corporation for the accomplisliment of its benevolent purpose.(117) So also the building by a railway corporation of its line, under the terms of a statute amendatory of its charter and granting in express terms an exemption from taxation, constitutes a consideration for the exemption, though the original charter granted a power to the corporation, which it did not exercise, to build the line.(118) Statutory exemptions from state taxation not incorporated in charters and un-supported by a consideration moving to the state, or from the exempted corporation, do not constitute irrepealable contracts of exemption, but are subject to modification repeal in the exercise of legislative discretion; as, for instance, bounty laws offering such an exemption as a inducement for the organization of corporations develop a particular industry,(119) or voluntary grants exemption of the real property of a charity from taxation.(120)
	If the constitution of a state prohibits legislative grants of exemption from Estate taxation, such a grant, though accepted in good faith by the exempted corporation, cannot constitute a contract whose obligation is impaired by a subsequent imposition of taxation.(121) Such a constutional prohibition operates to extinguish an exemption made by contract in the case of a railway which, havig been exempted before the adoption of the constitution prohibition, had been after the adoption thereof so under foreclosure to reorganize the corporation (122) the same principle, a statutory consolidation of two railways works the dissolution of the original corporation and subjects the consolidated corporation to the operative of an amended state constitution, which took effect subquently to the incorporation of the original corporation but prior to their consolidation; and, therefore, the state legislature may, without impairment of the obligation the contract, prescribe rates for the transportation passengers by the consolidated corporation, though one the original corporations was by charter protected against such legislative regulation.(123) General statutory prohibitions of the exemption of corporations from state taxation are not binding on subsequent legislatures,(124) unless referred to in, and incorporated with, subsequently granted charters. (125) In the case of a statutory consolidation accepted by two railways, each of whose charters contained a limited exemption from taxation, a reservation by a general statute bef ore the enactment of the consolidating act and incorporated therewith, operates to extinguish the limited exemption contained in the original charters.(126) Of course, if the state in the charter reserves the right to alter, modify, or repeal that charter, that reservation authorizes any such amendment of the charter granted as will not defeat nor substantially impair the obligation of the grant or any rights that may (127) an be vested thereunder. The first suggestion of any such reservation is to be found in the judgment of Parsoms, C. J., in Wales v. Stetson,(128) which is cited by Miller, J., in Greenwood v. Freight Co.(129) A provision in a charter, or a general statute incorporated therewith, that that charter shall not be alterable in any other manner than by an act of the legislature, operates as a reserved power authorizing a statutory amendment of the charter.(130) Express contracts of exemption from state taxation are to be strictly construed.(131) Thus a charter of a railway imposing an annual tax assessed on the cost of the line, reserving the right to impose taxes on the gross earnings of the corporation and stipulating that the above several taxes shall be in lieu of other taxation, is not a contract whose obligation is impaired by a subsequent statute taxing lands owned by the railway and mortgaged as security for its bonded debt, but not used in the construction or operation of its line.(132) So a provision in the charter of a ferry company that it shall be subject to the same taxes as are now or hereafter may be imposed on other ferries," does not exempt the corporation from liability to pay an annual license fee on each of its boats, under the requirements of a municipal ordinance enacted under due legislative authority.(133) So the charter of a street railway requiring the payment to the municipality of semi-annual license as is now paid by other railway companies, is to be construed to mean that the company shall not at any future time be required to pay a greater license than that then required to be paid by other companies.(134) So a general exemption of the property of a corporation from taxation is construed as referring only to the property  held for the transaction of the business of the company.(135) And the exemption of the capital of a corporation from taxation does not necessarily exempt its stockholders from taxation on their shares of stock.(136) Nor does a statute by which lands granted to a railway company are exempted from taxation until such lands shall be sold and conveyed by that company remain operative after the full equitable title has been transferred by the railway.(137) A charter granting to a corporation all the rights, powers, and privileges "granted by the charter" of another corporation, confers an exemption from state taxation contained, not in the charter to whieh reference is made, but in a statute amendatory thereof, and the exemption thus conferred constitutes a contract whose obligation cannot be impaired by a subsequent repeal of the statute conferring by reference the right of exemption.(138) So a state may make a contract conferring the exclusive right of building a toll bridge by reference to a previously enacted statute.(139) On the other hand, the incorporation of a railway by a charter investing the company "for the purpose of making and using the said road with all powers, rights, and privileges, and subject to the disabilities and restrictions that have been conferred and imposed upon" another railway company, whose charter contained an express exemption from taxation, does not confer that exemption on the former eompany.(140) So in the case of the merger of a corporation having an exemption from state taxation for a limited period with another corporation having an unlimited exemption, the consolidating statute not granting any exemption, the consolidated corporation cannot claim as to property acquired from the first mentioned corporation any exemption beyond the limits contained in the charter of that corporation.(141) So also a grant of immunity from taxation will not pass merely by a conveyance of the property and franchises of a railroad company, although such company may hold its property exempt from taxation.(142)

Express grants of peculiar privileges.
68. Express stipulations in a charter as to the privilege thereby conferred on the corporation are also within the protection of the constitutional prohibition; thus, a provision in the charter of a toll bridge company that it shall not be lawf for any person to erect another bridge within a specified distance of the bridge thereby authorized, constitutes a contract binding the state not to authorize the construction of such other bridge,(143) but the authorization by the state of the construction of a railway viaduct does not impair the obligation of such a contract.(144) So, also, a statute forbidding the transfer by any bank of any note, bill receivable, or other evidence of debt, impairs the obligation of a contract created by the grant in a charter of a bank of power to receive, hold, and grant chattels and effects of what kind soever, and to receive deposits and discount notes.(145) on the same principle, a state is bound by its express contracts, not including appointments to publie- office, between the state and an individual for the performance of special services for a stipulated compensation,(146) by its grants of franchises and exclusive privileges, such as the privilege of supplying a municipality with water,(147) or gas,(148), by its contracts conceeding peculiar privileges to state obligations, as, for instance, stipulating that coupons of state bonds should be receivable for taxes(149) or that the circulating notes of a bank should be receivable in payment for taxes,(150) or of other debts due to the state,(151) by contracts made by a political subdivision of the state for the payment of the principal of, or interest upon, the public debt of that sub- division(152) and by the contracts of a corporation, whose sole shareholder is the state, for the payinent of the corporate debt.(153) Contracts between two or more states, under whicli private rights have vested,(154) are so far protected that neither state can annul or modify such contracts to the prejudice of the private rights so vested.

Contracts between a state and its political subdivisions.
69. There can be no contract between a state and political subdivision of a state, such as a municipality giving to the municipality a vested right to property, for all such property rights are held by the municipality in trust for the state, and are subject to revocation at the state's pleasure" Therefore, a statute imposing pecuniary penalty upon a railway, payable by it to county of the state for its failure to locate the railway on a certain line, does not constitute a contract between the county and the railway whose obligation is impaired by subsequent repeal of the statute.(156) On the same principle, a legislative charter of a railway, granting to it power to appropriate public wharves erected by a municipality under a prior legislative grant of authority, does not impair the obligation of any contract, nor infringe upon the rights of the municipality.(157) And a grant to a township of tlie power of taxation is always subject to revocation, modification, and control by the legislative authority of the state.(158)

Implied contracts in charters of incorporation.
70. The next mooted question under this clause of the Constitution was whether or not a charter of incorporation granted by a state constituted an implied contract on the part of the state, whose obligation the state could not be permitted to impair by a subsequent repeal or modification of the charter. The leading case is Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,(159) judgment in which was rendered in 1819, and the facts in which were that, in 1769, the royal governor of the province of New Hampshire, acting in the name of the king, granted to Dr. Wheelock and eleven other persons a charter, whereby they were incorporated under the title of "The Trustees of Dartmouth College," with perpetual succession, and with "the whole power of governing the college, of appointing and removing tutors, of fixing their salaries, of directiDg the course of study to be pursued by the students, and of filling vacancies created in their own body." After the charter had been granted to, and accepted by, the corporation, "property both real and personal, which had been contributed for the benefit of the college, was conveyed to and vested in the corporate body." Acts of the legislature of the state of New Hampshire, passed on 27th June, and 18th December, lSl6, increased "the number of trustees to twenty-one," gave "the appointment of the additional number to the executive of the state," and created "a board of overseers, to consist of twenty-five persons, of whom twenty-one are also appointed by the executive of New Hampshire," with power to inspect and control the most important acts of the trustees., Prior to the enactment of these statutes, one Woodward was the secretary and treasurer of the corporation, and, as such, he had in his possession the charter, corporate seal, records, and certain chattels belonging to the corporation; in 1816 the trustees removed him from office; in 1817 he was appointed secretary and treasurer of the now board of trustees, which was organized under the statutes of 1816, and, as he refused to surrender to the original corporation the property which was in his hands, that corporation brought an action of trover in a court of the state of New Hampshire against special verdict, judgment was entered in favour of the defendant by the state court of last resort, and the cause was removed by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, which reversed the judgment of the state court, the ground of decision being that the college as incorporated was a private eleemosynary corporation; that its charter, in terms, and by force of the donations of funds made on the faith of it, constituted a contract between the colonial government and the corporation as the representative of the donors of those funds; that it was an implied, but essential, condition of that contract that that charter should not be so modified, without the consent of the corporation, as to substitute governmental control for the will of the donors; that, by the revolution, the duties, as well as the powers, of government devolved on the people of New Hampshire, and the obligations imposed by the charter were the same under the state government as they had formerly been under the colonial government; and that the effect of the statutes of was to substitute the will of the state for the will of the donors, and, to that extent, to impair the obligation of the contract between the state and the corporation, as made by the charter. Marshall, C. J., in his judgment,(160) after accepting the suggestion, that "taken in its broad, unlimited sense, the clause would be an unprofitable and vexatious interference with the internal concerns of a state, would unnecessarily and unwisely embarrass its legislation, and rejader immutable those civil institutions, which were established for purposes of internal government, and which, to subserve those purposes, ought to vary with varying circumstances;" and "that as the framers of the Constitution could never have intended to insert in that instrument a provision so unnecessary, so mischievous, and so repugnant to its general spirit the term 'contraet ' must be understood in a more limited sense, " expressly conceded, that " the f ramers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain the states in the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted f or internal government, and that the instrument they have given us is not to be so construed," and that "the provision of the Constitution never has been understood to embrace other contracts, than those which respect property, or some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice," put his judgment on the ground that the charter of the college constituted a contract as hereinbefore stated. Applying to the Dartmouth College Case, the test so clearly stated by Marshall, C. J., in Ogden v. Saunders, (161) that "the positive authority of a decision is coextensive with the facts on which it is made," it is obvious that the case is an authority for the proposition, that the grant by a state of a charter of incorporation for private purposes unconnected with the administration of government constitutes a contract between the state and the corporation, whose obligation is not to be permitted to be impaired by a material modification of the terms of the charter, either expressed or implied, and that, in every such charter it is an implied condition of the contract, that the state shall not by subsequent legislation change either the purpose of the corporation, or its system of administration.

Implied corporate exemption from taxation.
71. The later cases have narrowed the doctrine of the Dartmouth College case with regard to the implied contracts created by charters, and thereby made obligatory, on the states granting them. In Providence Bank v. Billings,(162) it was decided, in 1830, that the grant corporate privileges does not carry with it any implied exemption of either the corporate franchise, or property,  from state taxation, and this principle has been re-asserted in the later cases of M. G. Co. v. Shelby County,(163) N. M. R. v. Maguire,(164) Bailey v. Maguire,(165) and Tucker v. Ferguson.(166) Following in the same line, it has bee held that the imposition in a charter of a specific form or rate of taxation is not to be construed in the absence an express contract of exemption from other taxation to constitute an implied exemption from such other tax tion;(167) and that the grant to a corporation of the right to sell its franchises does not entitle the vendee to exemption from taxation granted to the vendor.(168)

Implied grants of peculiar privileges.
72. On the same principle, it has been held that legislative grants of special or exclusive privileges are, in the interests of the public, to be strictly construed, and do not vest in the grantee any powers other than those expressly granted.(169) Thus, the charter of a corporation by a state does not constitute a contract by the state, either with the corporation or with the creditors thereof, that the corporation shall not subsequently be dissolved after due legal proceedings founded upon a forfeiture of the corporate franchises either for misuser or for non-user.(170) So, also, the creation of a corporation with the power to erect a toll bridge, or to operate a ferry, does not impliedly bind the state not to license the establishment of a competing bridge or ferry, either toll or f ree.(171) The grant to a contractor of the sole privilege of supplying a municipality with water -from a designated source is not impaired by the grant to another party of the privilege of supplving it with water from another source;(172) and a municipality whieh has granted to a company the right to erect and operate an electrie lighting plant does not impair the obligation of the contract by erecting a plant for itself.(173) Nor does the grant to a quasi-public corporation of the right to sell its franchises by implication extend to the vendee any exemption from rate regulation which was possessed by its vendor;(174) nor may a vendee which is exempt from such regulation claim exemption as to property which it acquires from a company which was not exempt.(175)

Exemption from the operation of the police power.
73. There is no implied contract in a charter that the state will exempt the corporate franchises and property from the operation of such legislation as the state may deem necessary to secure the welfare of its citizens.(176) The granting, therefore, of a charter to an insurance company does not invalidate a subsequent statute which requires that company to make a full return showing its business condition to the proper officers of the state.(177) Nor can a state surrender by implication the right to regulate by subsequent legislation the location of railway, stations and the stoppage of trains at those stations;(178) nor to require by such legislation the fencing of all tracks used by railway companies within the state.(179) Nor can a state by implication exempt a railway company from liability in damages for fires caused by its locomotives,(180) or for injury to property in the construction of its road.(181) On the same principle, the grant of a franchise to a railway does not preclude a municipality from making reasonable regulations as to the use of its streets.(182) A state which, by charter, has authorized a railroad to consolidate with other roads, may forbid its future consolidation with competing roads.(183) A state may place reasonable limitations upon the rates of fare and freight charged by its railways.(184) It may, in the case of a railway whose charter authorizes the company from time to time to fix, regulate and receive tolls and charges, vest in a commission by a subsequent statute the power of fixing those rates.(185) It may by statute regulate the rates of a water corporation whose charter vested the power of fixing the rates in a board of commissioners, some of whom were appointed by the company.(186) And it has been said that where a water company was organized under a statute which provided that the commissioners should not reduce the rates below a given point, the state may by subsequent statute authorize the commissioners to reduce the rates below that point.(187) Indeed, while a state may, by an express agreement,(188) bind itself not to regulate the rates charged by a quasi-public corporation, such as a water-supply (189) or street railway (190) company, a state cannot, even by an express contract, bargain away its right to enact such legislation as may, be necessary, to secure the safety or to protect the health or the morals of its citizens. It may amend statutes which regulate the construction of railroads within its limits.(191) It may forbid the continued prosecution of their respective trades by corporations chartered by it for the purpose of rendering dead animals into fertilizers,(192) or manufacturing and selling liquors,(193) or selling lottery tickets and drawing lotteries.(194) And, upon this principle, it ha s also been held that a state may, in derogation of a previous grant of the exclusive privilege of slaughtering cattle, authorize others to conduct the same business.(195)

Contracts as to matters of public concern.
74. In Dartmouth College v. Woodward,96 Marshall, C. J., conceded that "the framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain a state from the regulation of its civil institutions adopted for internal government." On this principle, there ca n be no implied contract on the part of a state that it will not amend its constitution, in so far as that constitution deals with the administration of the public concerns of the state. (197) Nor can a state legislature bind subsequent legislatures as to the exercise of the powers of sovereignty over the political subdivisions of the state, and over its municipal corporations with regard to subject-matters of public and not of private interest, as, for instance, the location of a county seat,(198) or the boundaries of its municipalities,(199) or the sale of property held by a municipality for public purposes, such as water works,(200) or the appropriation under state authority of municipal obligations by their holders as a set-off against municipal claims against those holders;(201) It nor does the appointment by the state of a public officer for a fixed term for a stipulated compensation constitute a contract between the state and the appointee whose obligation is impaired by either the reduction of his compensation or his removal from office,(202) but after the duties have been performed by the appointee of a municipal corporation during the tum of his office there is a contract whose obligation is impaired by a subsequent statute abolishing the power of taxation for the payment of his compensation. (203) Of course, in the case of an officer appointed under a statute which in terms defines the tenure of the office to be according to law, a subsequent statute removing him is not an impairment of the contract.(204)

The withdrawal by a state of its consent to be sued.
75. The state's consent to be sued being voluntary and of grace, that consent does not constitute a contract whose obligation can be impaired by a subsequent repeal of the statute permitting such suit,(205) especially where the statute authorizing the suit has provided no means for the enforcement of any judgment that may be rendered against the state. Under such circumstances the state may, by subsequent legislation, withdraw its consent to be sued.(206) In this connection, that which was forcibly said by Mathews, J., in the judgment of the court in the case of In re Ayers,(207) may well be borne in mind. The learned judge said: "It cannot be doubted that the XI Amendment to the Constitution operates to create an important distinction between contracts of a state with individuals and contracts between individual parties. In the case of contracts between individuals, the remedies for their enforcement or breach, in existence at the time they were entered into, are a part of the agreement itself, and constitute a substantial part of its obligation." That obligation ... cannot be impaired by any subsequent legislation. Thus, not only the covenants and conditions of the contract are preserved, but also the substance of the original remedies for its enforcement. It is different with contracts between individuals and a state. In respect to these, by virtue of the XI Amendment to the Constitution, there being no remedy by a suit against the state, the contract is substantially without sanction, except that which arises out of the honour and good faith of the state itself, and these are not subject to coercion. Although the state may, at the inception of the contraet, have consented as one of its conditions to subject itself to suit, it may subsequently withdraw that consent and resume its original immunity, without any violation of the obligation of its contract in the constitutional sense."(209) Yet, as was pointed out by Bradley, J., in Hans v. Louisiana,'(210) 'where property or rights are enjoyed under a grant or contract made by a state, they cannot wantonly be invaded. Whilst the state cannot be compelled by suit to perform its contracts, any attempt on its part to violate property or rights acquired under its contracts may be judicially resisted; and any law impairing the obligation of contracts, under which such property or rights are held is void and powerless to affect their enjoyment."

The force and effect of the prohibition as construed by the Supreme Court.
76. The force and effect of the prohibition, as construed by the court, is, that a state may not, by any law or by any act to which the state, by its enforcement thereof, gives the force of a law, deprive a party of the legal right of enforcing, or obtaining compensation for the breach of, an express contract, executed or executory, between individuals, or between a state and individuals, but a state may regulate or limit the remedies of the contracting parties, provided that it leaves in force a substantial part of the legal remedies which subsisted at the time of the making of the contract.

(1) Article I, Section 9.
(2) Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 194. See also Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 188; 30 Stat. 544, c. 541; 32 Stat. 797, c. 487.
(3) Supra, Chap. II.
(4) Owings v. Speed, 5 Wheat. 420.
(5) League v. De Young, 11 How. 185, 203. See also Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 343, 378.
(6) R. Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511; White v. Hart, 13 id. 646; Gunn v. Barry, 15 id. 610; County of Moultrie v. Rockingham T. C. S. Bank, 92 U. S. 631; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 id. 595; Keith v. Clark, 97 id. 454; N. 0. G. Co. v. L. L. Co., 115 id. 650; Fisk v. Jeffersou Police Jury, 116 id. 131; Shreveport v. Cole, 129 id. 36; Bier v. McGehee, 148 id. 137; Hanford v. Davies, 163 id. 273; H. & T. C. Ry. v. Texas, 170 id. 243.
(7) Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175; Havemeyer v. Iowa Countv, 3 id. 294; Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 id. 50; The City v. Lamson, ibid. 477; Olcott v. The Supervisors, 16 id. 678; Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U. S. 677; County of Ralls v. Douglass, 105 id. 728; Pleasant Township v. A. L. I. Co., 138 id. 67; Loeb v. Columbia Township Trustees, 179 id. 472, 492; Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 id. 506. This doctrine was first suggested by Taney, C. J., who said, in O. L. I. & T. Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 432: "The sound and true rule is, that if the contract when made was valid by the laws of the state, as then expounded by all the departments of its government and administered in its courts of justice, its validity and obligation cannot be impaired by any subsequent act of the legislature of the state or decision of its courts, altering the construction of the law;" and in Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 206, Swayne, J., quoted the dictum of Taney, C. J., and declared it to be "the law of this court."
(8) Walla Walla v. W. W. W. Co., 172 U. S. 1; St. P. G. L. Co. v. St. Paul, 181 id. 142; Detroit v. D. C. S. R.. 184 id. 368.
(9) Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176; Ford v. Surget, 97 id. 594; Stevens v. Griffith, Ill id. 48.
(10) L. W. Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388, 391; Denny v. Bennett, 128 id. 489; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 id. 662; Pleasant Township v. A. L. I. Co., 138 id. 67; Brown v. ;Smart, 145 id. 454; Bier v. McGehee, 148 (13) State Bank v. Knopp, 16 How. 369; 0. L. 1. & T. Co. v. Debolt, ibid. 416; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Bl. 436; Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116; Delmas v. Ins. Co., 14 id. 661; Wright v. Nagle, 101 U. S. 791; Willia ms v. Louisiana, 103 id. 637; L. & N. R. v. Palmes, 109 id. 244; Pleasant Township v. A. L. 1. Co., 138 id. 67; Bryan v. Board of Education, 1 51 id. 639; M. & 0. R. v. Tennessee, 153 id. 486; Shelby County v. Union & Planters' Bank, 161 id. 149; Woodruff v. Mississippi, 162 id. 291; Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 id. 488; C., B. & Q. R. v. Nebraska, 170 id. 57; McCullough v. Virginia, 172 id. 102; Walsh v. C., H. V. & A. R., 176 id. 469; 1. C. R. v. Chicago, ibid. 646; H. & T. C. R. v. Texas, 177 id. 66; Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 id. 223; Board of Liquidation v. Louisiana, ibid. 622; F. W. Co. v. Freeport City, 180 id. 587; St. P. G. L. Co. v. St. Paul, 181 id. 142; Wilson v. Standefer, 184 id. 399; cf. Wagonner v. Flack, 188 id. 595.
id. 137; P. I. Co. v. Tennessee, 161 id. 193; G. & S. 1. R. v. Hewes, 183 id. 66; Pinney v. Nelson, ibid. 144; D. G. Co. v. U. S. G. Co., 187 id. 611; 0. W. Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 id. 437; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 id. 189. See also C., M. & St. P. Ry. v. Solan, 169 id. 133; K. W. Co. v. Knoxville, 189 id. 434.
(11) 121 U. S. 388, 392.
(12) See also R. Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. 177, 181; R. Co. v. McClure, 10 id. 511, 515; Knox. v. Exchange Bank, 12 id. 379, 383; Delmas v. Ins. Co., 14 id. 661, 665; University v. People, 99 U. S. 309, 319; C. L. I. Co. v. Needles, 113 id. 574; N. 0. W. W. v. L. S. Co., 125 id. 18; Kreiger v. Shelby R., ibid. 39; H. Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, 141 id. 679; St. P., M. & M. Ry. v. Todd County, 142 id. 282; Missouri v. Harris, 144 id. 210; Wood v. Brady, 150 id. 18; C. L. Co. v. Laidley, 159 id. 103; Hanford v. Davies, 163 id. 273; Turner v. Wilkes County Comrs., 173 id. 461; Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 id. 506; G. & S. 1. R. v. Hewes, 183 id. 66; N. 0. W. Co. v. Louisiana, 185 id. 336; N. M. B. & L. Assn. v. Brahan, 193 id. 635.
(14)Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 VV-heat. 197. See also Bedford v. E. B. & L. Assn., 181 U. S. 227, 241.
915) Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1. But where a charter authorizing the consolidation of railways was modified by a statute prohibiting the consolidation of competing roads before such consolidation had been attempted, the court said: "Where the charter authorizes the company in sweeping terms to do certain things which are unecessary to the main object of the grant, and not directly and immediately within the contemplation of the parties thereto, the power so conferred, so long as it is unexecuted, is within the control of the legislature and may be treated as a license, and may be revoked, if a possible exercise of such power is found to conflict with the interests of the public." "We cannot recognize a vested right to do a manifest wrong: " Pearsall v. CG. N. Ry., 161 U. S. 646, 673, 675. See also A. Ry. v. New York, 176 id. 335, 345.
(16) And it may, of course, grant an additional remedy: N. 0. C. & L. R. v. New Orleans, 157 U. S. 219 ; Wagonner v. Flack, 188 id. 595. See also Wilson v. Standefer, 184 id. 399.
(17) R. Co. v. Hecht, 95 U. S. 168; C. M. L. I. Co. v. Spratley, 172 ia. 602.
(18) Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370; Penniman's ('age, 103 U. S. 714.
(19) Gross v. U. S. Mtge. Co., 108 U. S. 477.
(20) Randall v. Kreiger, 23 Wall. 137.
(21) League v. De Young, 11 How. 185.
(22) Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280.
(23) Williamson v. Suydam, 6 Wall. 723.
(24) C. M. L. 1. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U. S. 51; Hooker v. Burr, 194 id. 415.
(25) Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143.
(26) Gilfillan v. U. C. Co., 109 U. S. 401.
(27) Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628; Barrett v. Holmes, 102 id. 651; Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 id. 668; In re Brown, 135 id. 701; Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 id. 245. See also Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 id. 55; 0. W. Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 id. 437.
(28) Vance v. Vance, 108 U. S. 514.
(29) Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. 68.
(30) Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203.
(31) 0. W. Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 437.
(32) Ochiltree v. R. Co., 21 Wall. 249.
(33) Blount v. Windley, 95 U. S. 173.
(34) Morley v. L. S. & M. S. Ry., 146 U. S. 162.
(35) Drehman v. Stifle, 8 Wall. 595.
(36) Guarantee Co. v. Board of Liquidation, 105 U. S. 622.
(37) Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69.
(38) Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769; Moore v. Greenhow, 114 id. 338.
(39) Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 552.
(40) White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646.
(41) Delmas v. Insurance Co., 14 Wall. 661-
(42) Effinger v. Kenney, 115 U. S. 566; W. & W. R. v. King, 91 id. 3.
(43) Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234.
(44) Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314.
(45) Guinn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610.
(46) Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118. See also Bradley v. Lightcap, 195 id.
1; of. Hooker v. Burr, 194 id. 415.
(47) Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 id. 608;
Gantly v. Ewing, 3 id. 707.
(48) Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668 ; cf. Morley v. L. S. & M. S. Ry.,
146 id. 162.
(49) Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10.
(50) Bryan v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 685.
(51) " Contract " is, as Field, J., said in Louisiana v. Mayor of New Orleans, 09 U. S. 285, 288, " used in the Constitution in its ordinary sense as ignifying the agreement of two or more minds for consideration proceeding from one to the other to do or not to do certain acts." In Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 197, Marshall, C. J., said: " A contract is an agreement in which a party undertakes to do or not to do a particular thing." Marshall, C. J., said, in FI-etcher v. Peek, 6 Cr. 87, 136: "A contract is a compact between two or more parties, and is either executory or executed. An executory contract is one in wbich a party binds himself to do, or not to do, a particular thing....A contract executed is one in which the object of contract is performed, and this, says Blackstone, differs in nothing from a grant....Since then, in fact, a grant is a contract executed, the obligation of which still continues, and since the Constitution uses the general term 'contracts,' without distinguishing between those which are executory and those which are executed, it must be construed to comprehend the latter as well as the former." In Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 629, Marshall, C. J., said: "The provision of the Constitution never has been understood to embrace other contracts than those which respect property or some object of value and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice." Daniel, J., said, in Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402, 416: "The contracts designed to be protected ...are contracts by which perfect, certain, definite, fixed, private rights of property are vested."
(52) Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; McMillan v. McNeill, ibid. 209; Farmers & Mechanics' Bank v. Smith, 6 id. 131; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 id. 213; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 635; Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 id. 67; Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. 295; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223.
(53) State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds Case, 15 Wall. 300.
(54) County of Moultrie v. Rockingham T.C.S. Bank, 92 U.S. 631; Mobile v. Watson, 116 id. 289. But see Meriwether v. Garrett,102 id. 472.
(55) Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U.S. 131.
(56)Blount v. Windley, 95 U.S. 173; Memphis v. U.S., 97 id. 293; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 id. 358; Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 id 278; Ralls County Court v. U.S. ifid. 733; Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 id. 716; Mobile v. Watson, 116 id. 289; cf. Morley v. L.S.& M.S. Ry., 146 id. 162.
(57) Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285; Freeland v. Williams, 131 id. 405.
(58) Hunt v. Hunt, 131 U.S. clxv; Maynard v. Hill, 125 id. 1990.
(59) Aspinwall v. Daviess County, 22 How. 364; Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217; Wadsworth v. Supervisors, 102 id. 534; Norton v. Board of Comrs. of Brownsville, 129 id. 479; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 id. 662; Lake County v. Graham, ibid. 674; Campbell v. Wade, 132 id. 34; Pleasant Township v. A. L. 1. Co., 138 id. 67; New Orleans v. N. 0. W. W., 142 id. 79; H. G. L. Co. v. Hamilton City, 146 id. 258; 1. C. R. v. Illinois, ibid. 387; Bier v. McGehee, 148 id. 137; Citizens' S. & L. Assn., v. Perry County, 156 id. 692; Woodruff v. Mississippi, 162 id. 291; C. M. L. 1. Co. v. Spratley, 172 id. 602 ; Los Angeles v. L. A. W. Co., 177 id. 558; Weber v. Rogan, 188 id. 10; Zane v. Hamilton County, 189 id. 370; U. R. v. City of New York, 193 id. 416; cf. C., M. & St. P. Ry. v. Solan, 169 id. 133; Gunnison County Comrs. v. Rollins, 173 id. 255; H. & T. C. R. v. Texas, 177 id. 66; Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 id.
(60) Aspinwall Daviess County, 22 How. 364. 
(61) Wadsworth v. Supervisors, 102 U.S.534; cf. Campbell v. Wade, 132 id. 34.
(62) Bier v. McGehee, 148 U. S. 137. S. 479; Pleasant
(63) Norton v. Board of Comrs. of Brownsville, 129 U.S. 479; Pleasant Township v. A. L. I. Co., 138 id. 67.
(64) Lake County v. Rollins, 130 County, 189 id. 370; cf. Gunnison County Comrs. v. Rollins, 173 id. 255; H.& T. C. R. v. Texas, 177 id. 66.
(65) I. C. R. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, 460. Two justices took no part in the decision and three justices dissented. See also I. C. R. v. Illinois, 184 id. 77; M. T. Co. v. Mobile, 187 id 479; In Pearsall v. G.N.Ry., 161 id. 646, where a charter authorizing the consolidation of railways was modified by a statute prohibiting the consolidation of competing roads, before any such consolidation had been attempted, the court said: "We cannot recognize a vested right to do a manifest wrong." And see L.& N.R. v. Kentucky, 183 id. 503, 518.
(66) People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 94 U. S. 415.
(67)Trask v. Maguire, 18 Wall. 391; Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217; Shields v. Ohio, 95 id. 319; R. Cos. v. Gaines, 97 id. 697; K. & W. R. v. Missouri, 152 id. 301; P. I. Co. v. Tennessee, 161 id. 193; G. & S. 1. R. v. Hewes, 183 id. 66; cf. Lake County v. Graham, 130 id. 674.
(68) 4 Wheat. 122.
(69) 4 Wheat. 209.
(70) 6 Wheat. 131.
(71) 12 Wheat. 213.
(72) 12 Wheat. 369, note.
(73) 6 pet. 643.
(74) 12 Wheat. 213, 358.
(75) P. 635.
(76) 14 Pet. 67.
(77) 5 How. 295.
(78) 1 Wall. 223.
(79) Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; F. & M. Bank v. Smith, 6 d. 131.
(80) McMillan v. McNeill, 4 Wheat. 209; Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. 295.
(81) Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Shaw v. Robbins, ibid. 369, note. See also Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489.
(82) Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223.
(83) Blount v. Windley, 95 U. S. 173.
(84) Memphis v. U. S., 97 U. S. 293; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 id. 358; Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 id 278; Ralls county court v. U. S., ibid. 733; Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, Ill id. 716; Mobile v. Watson, 116 id. 289; Scotland County Court v. U. S., 140 id. 41.
(85) Morley v. L. S. & M. S. Ry., 146 U. S. 162.
(86) Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285; Freeland v. Williams, 131 id. 405.
(87) Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U. S. 131.
(88) County of Moultrie v. Rockingham T. C. S. Bank, 92 U. S. 631.
(89) R. Co. v. Pale-oner, 103 U. S. 821.
(90) Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Bl. 510.
(91) Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289. But see Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 id. 472.
(92) Memphis v. U.S., 97 U. S. 293; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 id. 358; Ralls County Court v. U.S., 105 id. 733; Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 id. 716; Seibert v. Lewis, 122 id. 284; Scotland County Court v. U. S., 140 id. 41.
(93) Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278.
(94) Ralls County Court v. U. S. 105
(96) Madison Papers, 5 Elliot's Debates, 546.
(97) Hist. of the Constitution, 214.
(98) G. Morris, by Sparks, III, 323.
(99) Gilpin,1552, 1581.
(100) Works of Hamilton, Lodge's Edition, Vol. II, p. IL47.
(101) No. XLIV, Lodge's Edition.
(102) 4 Wheat.205.
(103) 6 Cr. 87.
(104) Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203; H. & T. C. Ry. v. Texas, 170 U. S. 243; cf. A. Ry. v. New York, 176 id. 335.
(105)Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1.
(106) Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cr. 43.
(107) 7 Cr.164
(108) Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Bl. 436; Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50; W. & R. R. v. Reid, 13 id. 264; R. & G. R. v. Reid, ibid. 269; Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 id. 244; P. R. v. Maguire, 20 id. 36; New Jersev v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104; University v. People, 99 id. 309; Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 id. 362; W. & W. R. v. Alsbrook, 146 id. 279; M. & 0. R. v. Tennessee, 153 id. 486; Shelby County v. Union & Planters' Bank, 161 id. 149; Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 id. 223; Citizens' Bank v. Parker, 192 id. 73; ef. G. & S. I. R. v. Hewes, 183 id. 66.
(109) W.& R.R. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264; C. R. & B. Co. v. Wright, 164 U. S. 327.
(110) Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679; Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 id. 134 , 163 id. 416; Shelby County v. Union & Planters' Bank, 161 i& 149.
(111) P. R. v. Maguire, 20 Wall 36.
(112) R. & G. R. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 269.
(113) New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104.
(114) Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50.
(115) University v. People, 99 U. S. 309; Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 id. 362.
(116) C. Ry. v. C. S. R., 166 U. S. 557.
(117) University v. People, 99 U. S. 309; Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 id. 362.
(118) Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 Wall.244.
(119) Salt Co. v. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373; Welch v. Cook, 97 U. S. 5 W. & M. Ry. v. Powers, I 91 id. 379.
(120) Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; Grand Lodge v. Orleans, 166 U. S. 143.
(121) R. COL v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697; G. & S. 1. R. Co. v. Hewes, 183 53; N. C. Ry. v. Mary 66; cf. Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 id. 223, 2 187 id. 258.
(122) Trask v. Maguire, 18 Wall. 391; Morgan v. Louisiana 93 U. S. 217; People v. Cook, 148id. 397. See also Memphis city Bank v. Tennessee, 161 id.186;P. Ins. Co. v. Tennessee, ibid. 193.
(123) Shields v. Ohio,(95) U. S. 319.
(124) New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104.
(125) Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13; Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454.
(126) R. Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359.
(127) Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U. S. 466; S. C. S. Ry. v. Sioux City, 138 id. 98; L. W. Co. v. Clark, 143 id. 1; H. G. L. Co. v. Hamilton City, 146 id. 258; People v. Cook, 148 id. 397; N. Y. & N. E. IR. v. Bristol, 151 id. 556; Bryan v. Board of Education, ibid. 639; C. Ry. v. C. S. R. 166 id. 557; Covington v. Kentucky, 173 id. 231; Citizens' Savings Bank v. Owensboro, ibid. 636; Looker v. Maynard, 179 id. 46; G. & S. 1. R. v. Hewes, 183 id. 66; B. W. S. Co. v. Mobile, 186 id. 212; cf. Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 id. 223, 239. See also Pearsall v. G. N. Ry., 161 id. 646; N. C. Ry. v. Maryland, 187 id. 258; Wright v. M. M. L. I. Co., 193 id. 657.
(128) 2 Mass. 146.
(129) 105 U.S. 13, 19.
(130) Pennsylvania college Cases, 13 wall. 19o; miller v. State, 15 id. 478; Holyoke Company v. Lymarn, ibid. 500.
(131) Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527; R. Cos. v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697; RY. Co. v. Philadelphia, 101 id. 528; Picard v. E. T., V. & G. R., 130 id. 637; Y. & M. V. R. v. Thomas, 132 id. 174; W. & W. R. v. Albrook, 146 id. 279; W. & St. P. L. Co. v. Minnesota, 159 id., 526; P. F. & M. I. Co. v. Tennessee, 161 id. 174; Central R. & B. Co. v. Wright, 164 id. 327; Pord v. D. & P. L. Co., ibid. 662; Citizens' Savings Bank v. Owensboro, 173 id. 636; Wells v. Savannah, 181 id. 531; Orr v. Gilman, 183 id. 278; Chicago Theological Seminary v. Illinois, 188 id. 662; of. Citizens, Bank v. Parker, 192 id. 73.
(132) Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527. See also Ford v. D. & P. L. Co., 164 U. S. 662.
(133) W. P. Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365,
(134) Ry. Co. v. Philadelphia, 101 U. S. 528.
(135) Ford v. D. & P. L. Co., 164 U. S. 662.
(136) New Orleans v. citizens' Bank, 167 U. S. 371; cf. Shelby County v. Union & Planters' Bank, 161 id. 149.
(137) W. & St. P. L. Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526.
(138) Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244.
(139) Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51.
(140) R. Cos. v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697. See also G. & S. I. R. v. Hewes, 183
(141) Tomlinson v. Branach, 15 Wall. 460; W. & W. R. v. Alsbrook, 146 U. S. 279. See also P. G. & C. Co. v. Chicago, 194 id. 1.
(142) Picard v. E. T., V. & G. R., 130 U. S. 637; People v. Cook, 148 id. 397; N. C. Ry. v. Maryland, 187 id. 258. See aw N. & W. R. v. Pendleton, 156 id. 667; C. & L. T. R. Co. v. Sandford, 164 id. 578.
(143) Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116; Binghamton Bridge, 3 id. 51; cf. Williams v. Wingo, 177 U. S. 601.
(144) Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall.116.
(145) Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301.
(146) Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5; cf. Missouri v. Walker, 125 id. 339.
(147) N. 0. W. W. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674; St. T. W. W. v. N. 0. W. W ., 120 id. 64; Walla Walla v. W. W. W. Co., 172 id. 1. See also Los Angeles v. L. A. W. Co., 177 id. 558; F. W. Co. v. Freeport, 180 id. 587; S. W. W. Co. v. Skaneateles, 184 id. 354.
(148) N.0.G. Co. v. L.L.Co., 115 U.S. 650; L.G.Co. v. C.G.Co., ibid. 683.
(149) Hartman v. Greenbow, 102 U. S. 672; Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 id. 270; Royall v. Virginia, 116 id. 572, 121 id. 102; McGahey v. Virginia, 135 id. 662; McCullough v. Virginia, 172 id. 102.
(150) Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44; Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. 454.
(151) Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190; Paup v. Drew, ibid. 218; Trigg v. Drew, ibid. 224.
(152) Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432.
(153) Curran v. Arkansas, 15 H-ow. 304; Barings v. Dabney, 19 Wall. 1.
(154) Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; C. & C. Bridge Co. Kentucky, 154
(155) Maryland v. B. & 0. R., 3 How. 534; East Hartford v. H. Bridge Co., 10 id. 511; R. Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166; New Orleans v. N. 0. W. W., 142 id. 79; cf. Essex Pub. Road Board v. Skinkle, 140 id. 334.
(156) Maryland v. B. & 0. R., 3 How. 534.
(157) R. Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166.
(158) Williamson v. New Jersey, 130 U. S. 189.
(159) 4 Wheat. 518.
(160) Wheat. pp.628, 629.
(161) 12 Wheat. 333.
(162) 4 Pet. 514.
(163) 109 U. S. 398.
(164) 20 Wall. 46.
(165) 22 Wall. 215.
(166) 22 Wall. 527.
(167) License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462; Delaware R. Tax, 18 id. 206; Eri Ry. v. Pennsylvania, 21 id. 492; Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 93 U. S. 116 S. C. S. Ry. v. Sioux City, 138 id. 98; N. 0. C. & L. R. v. New Orleans 143 id. 192; W. & W. R. v. Alsbrook, 146 id. 279; Shelby Co. v. Union Planters' Bank, 161 id. 149; New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 id. 371.
(168) People v. Cook, 148 U. S. 39 7; Picard v. East T., V. & G. R., 130 id. 637; K. & W. R. v. Missouri, 152 id. 301; N. C. Ry. v. Maryland, 187 id 258. Bee also Shields v. Ohio, 95 id. 319; St. L. & S. F. Ry. v. Gill, 156 id 649; N. & W. R. v. Pendleton, ibid. 667; P. F. & M. 1. Co. v. Tennessee 161 id. 174; Memphis City Bank v. Tennessee, ibid. 186; P. I. Co. v. Tennessee, ibid. 193; C. & L. T. R. Co. v. Sandford, 164 id. 578; G. R. & I. Ry. v. Osborn, 193 id. 17.
(169) Rice v. R. Co., 1 Bl. 358; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,
11 Pet. 544; Mills v. St. Clair County, 8 How. 581; Perrine v. C. & D. C. Co., 9 id. 172; R. & P. R. v. L. R., 13 id. 81; 0. L. I. & T. Co. v. Debolt, 16 id. 416; Jefferso Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Bl. 436; The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51, 75; G. R. & B. Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174; Stein v. B. W. S. Co., 141 id. 6 7; H. G. L. Co. v. Hamilton City, 146 id. 258; M. & St. L. Ry. v. Gardner, 177 id. 332; L. & N. R. v. Kentucky, 183 id. 503; Joplin v. S. M. L. Co., 191 id. 150; Stanislaus County v. S. J. & K. R. C. & I. Co., 192 id. 201; Shaw v. Covington, 194 id. 5 93. See also Owensboro v. 0. W. S. Co., 191 id. 358.
(170) Mumma v. The Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 281, 286; C. L. 1. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574, 584.
(171) Panning v. Gregoire, 16 How. 524; Turnpike Co. v. State, 3 Wall. 210; Wright v. Nagle, 101 U. S. 791; W. & B. Bridge Co. v. W. B. Co., 138 id. 287; Williams v. Wingo, 177 id. 601.
(172) Stein v. B. W. S. Co., 141 U. S. 67.
(173) Joplin v. S. M. L. Co., 191 U. S. 150. See also N. W. Co. v. Newburyport, 193 id. 561.
(174) Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; St. L. & S. F. Ry. v. Gill, 156 id. 6 49;
(175) P. G. & C. Co. v. Chicago, 194 U. S. 1.
(176) C., B. & Q. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Peik v. C. & N. W. Ry., ibid. 164; W. & St. P. R. v. Blake, ibid. 180; Boyd v. Alabama, ibid. 645; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 id. 25; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, ibid. 659; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 id. 526; Stone v. P. L. & T. Co., 116 id. 307; G. R. & B. Co. v. Smith, 128 id. 174; P. R. v. Miller, 132 id. 75; C., M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 id. 418; W. & B. Bridge Co. v. W. Bridge Co., 138 id. 287; New York v. Squire, 145 id. 175; M. & St. L. Ry. v. Emmons, 149 id. 364; E. I. Co. v. Ohio, 153 id. 446; N. & W. R. v. Pendleton, 156 id. 667; Pearsall v. G. N. Ry., 161 id. 646; L. & N. R. v. Kentucky, ibid. 677; St. L. & S. F. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 id. 1; C., B. &. Q. R. v. Chicago, 166 id. 226; L. I. W. Co. v. Brooklyn, ibid. 685; W.R. v. Defiance, 167 id. 88; C., B. & Q. R. v. Nebraska, 170 id. 57; A. Ry. v. New York, 176 id. 335; F.W.Co. v. Freeport, 180 id. 587; K. 1. Co. v. Harbison, 183 id. 13; L. & N. R. v. Kentucky, ibid. 503; Stanislaus County v. S. J. & K. R. C. & 1. Co., 192 id. 201; cf. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. v. Pennsylvania, 153 id. 628; C. M. L. 1. Co. v. Spratley, 172 id. 602.
(177) E. 1. Co. v. Ohio, 153 U. S. 446.
(178) R. Co. v. Hamersley, 104 U. S. 1.
(179) M. & St. L. Ry. v. Tennessee, 149 U.S. 364.
(180) St. L. & S. F. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1.
(181) P. R. v. Mille 132 U. S. 75.
(182) Baltimore v. B. T. Co., 166 U. S. 673; W. R. v. Defiance, 167 id. 88. See also C., B. & Q. P.. v. Nebraska, 170 id. 57; L. G. L. Co. v. Murphy, ibid. 78.
(183) Pearsall v. G. N. Ry., 161 U. S. 646.
(184) C., B. & Q. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Ruggles v. Illinois, 109 id. 526; G. R. & B. Co. v. Smith, 128 id. 174; M. E. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 id. 467; L. & N. R. v. Kentucky, 183 id. 503. In Reagan v. F. L. & T. Co., 154 id. 362, 393, after admitting that a state has the general power to regulate rates, the court suggested, but did not decide, that 'there might be an implied grant to the railway of the right to reasonable tolls.
(185) Stone v. F. L. & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307; Stone v. 1. C. R., ibid. 347; C., M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 id. 418. See also Owensboro v. 0. W. Co., 191 id. 358.
(186) S. V. W. W. v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347; cf. F. W. Co. v. Freeport,
(187) Stanislaus County v. S. J. & K. R. C. & I. Co., 192 U. S. 201. In this case, however, the state constitution had reserved to the legislature the power to amend or repeal the law in question.
(188) Even an express grant of exemption from regulation does not by implication extend to a purchaser from the grantee: Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; St. L. & S. F. Ry. v. Gill, 156 id. 649; N. & W. R v. Pendleton, ibid. 667; C. & L. T. R. Co. v. Sandford, 164 id. 578; G. R. & I. Ry. v. Osborn, 193 id. 17; and see P. G. & C. Co. v. Chicago, 194 id. 1.
(189) Los Angeles v. L. A. W. Co., 177 U. S. 558; cf. K. W. Co. v. Knoxville, 189 id. 434.
(190) Detroit v. D. C. S. Ry., 184 U. S. 368; Cleveland v. C. C. Ry., 194 id. 517; Cleveland v. C. E. Ry., ibid. 538; of. F. W. Co. v. Freeport, 180 id.587; L. & N. R. v. Kentucky, 183 id. 503, 518.
(191) C., B. & Q. R. v. Nebraska., 170 U. S. 57.
(192) Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659.
(193) Beer Co. v. M usetts, 97 U. S. 25.
(194) Stone v. M ppi, 101 U. S. 814; Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 id. 488.
(195) Butchers' Union v. C. C. Co., Ill U. S. 746.
(196) 4 Wheat. 629.
(197) Church v. Kelsey, 121 U. S. 282.
(198) Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548.
(199) U. S. 'v. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284.
(200) New Orleans v. Morris, 105 U. S. 600.
(201) Amy v. Shelby County, 114 U. S. 387.
(202) Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; cf. Crenshaw v. U.S., 134 U.S. 99; Pennie v. Reis, 132 id. 464.
(203) Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U.S. 131.
(204) Head v. University, 19 Wall. 526.
(205) Beers v. Arkansas, 20 I-low. 527; Bank of Washington v. Arkansas, ibid. 530.
(206) R. Co. v. Tennessee, 10 1 U. S. 337; R. Co. v. Alabama, ibid. 832; Baltzer v. North Carolina, 1 61 id. 240.
(207) 123 U. S. 504.
(208) Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U.S. 203.
(209) Beer v. Arkansas 20 How. 527; R. Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337.
(210) 134 U.S. 1. See also McGahey v. Virginia, 135 id. 662.


				 CHAPTER VI.
		 EX POST FACTO LAWS AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER.

 77. The constitutional provisions.
 78. The distinction between retrospective and ex post facto laws.
 79. Ex post facto laws defined.
 80. Illustrations of ex post facto Iaws.
 81. Illustrations of laws which are not ex post facto.
 82. Bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties.

The constitutional provisions.
77. Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution declares that "no state shall ... pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law." Section 9 of Article I of the Constitution, restricting the powers of Congress, declares that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."

The distinction between retrospective and ex post facto laws.
78. Ex post facto laws relate to criminal, and not to civil, procedure.(1) They are necessarily retrospective, but all retrospective laws are not ex post facto.(2) State laws which operate retrospectively, or which divest antecedently vested rights of property, are not prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, if they are not ex post facto laws, and if they do not impair the obligation of contracts.(3) A state legislature, unless restrained by the constitution of the state, may, theref ore, enact statutes setting aside a decree of a court of probate, refusing to allow probate of a will, and granting a rehearing by the court of probate with liberty of appeal therefrom, after the time limited by existing laws for an appeal has passed;(4) declaring that the relation of landlord and tenant exists between parties as to whom the courts of the state have decided that that relation does not exist;(5) curing defective acknowledgments of deeds by femes covert;(6) construing by a declaratory statute, after the death of a decedent, existing tax laws so as to subject to a collateral inheritance tax the distributive shares of nonresident distributees;(7) directing a county court to set aside an inquisition condemning certain land for the use of a railway and t o order a new inquisition;(8) directing the imposition of a tax according to an assessment theretofore made; (9) authorizing the sale of lands on which the state has a lien for debts due to it; (10) and establishing new remedies for the collection of taxes already delinquent.(11) Upon the same principle, Congress having passed an act for the admission of a territory as a state, and having in that act omitted to provide for the disposal of causes pending in the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal from the territorial courts, may by a subsequent act properly make provision for such causes, for such legislation is remedial; (12) and it may provide for a review of the actions of a commission ereated by it, by a transf er of its proceedings and decisions to judicial tribunals for examination and determination de novo.(13) So also Conngress may by statute impose a tax retrospectively.(14)'

Ex Post facto laws defined.
79. ln Fletcher v. Peck,(15) in Marshall, C. J., defines an Ex Post facto law to be' one "which renders an act punisbable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed." in Cummings v. Missouri,(16) Field, J., defines an ex post facto law, as one which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed; or changes the rules of evidence by which less or different testimony is sufficient to convict than was required." In Calder v. Bull,(17) Chase, J., classified ex post facto laws as follows:-"first, those that make an action, done before tlie passing of a law, and which was innocent when done, eriminal, and punish sueh action; second, those that aggravate a crime, or make it greater than it was when committed; third, those that change the punisbment and inflict greater punishment than the law annexed to the erime when committed; and, fourth, those that alter the legal rules of evidence and receive less or different testimony to convict the offender than that required at the time of the commission of the offense." That classification has been repeatedly quoted with approval.(18)

Illustrations of ex post facto laws.
80. Laws have been held to be ex post facto, which, after the commission of an act, alter the situation of the accused to his disadvantage, as, for instance, by providing that the plea of autrefois convict should not at a second trial be a def ense in the case of a prisoner convicted of murder in the second degree under an indictment charging murder in the first degree, the law having been at the time of the commission of the crime that such a plea was a defense; (19) or by requiring a clergyman,(20) or a lawyer (21) as a condition precedent to the practice of his profession, to take an oath that he has not done an act, for the doing of which, when done, deprivation of office was not a legal penalty; or by requiring one who applies to a court to open a judgment rendered against him in absentia, to take oath, as a condition precedent to his obtaining the desired relief, that he lns not done an act for the doing of which the deprivation of the right to sue in courts of justice was not by law antecedently imposed as a penalty;(22) or by adding to the death penalty for murders already committed, the witholding from the convict of all knowledge as to the date of his execution and the keeping of him in solitary eonfinement until that time;(23) or by reducing from twelve to eight the number of jurors necessarv for the trial of felonies committed before the enactment of the law.(24) In the case la-st cited it was pointed out that while, as a general rule, the accused has no vested rights in particular modes of procedure, yet he cannot be deprived of any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him.(25) So also, Congress cannot provide, by statute, that an act, which is not an offense against the law at the time of its doing, may become such by a subsequent independent act with which it has no necessary connection; as, for instance, that subsequent bankruptcy, either voluntary or involuntary, shall render criminal and punishable by imprisonment the obtaining of goods with intent to defraud at any time within three months before the commission of the act of bankruptcy.(26)

Illustrations of laws which are not ex post facto.
81. On the other hand, a law changing the venue in a criminal case, though passed subsequently to the Commission of the offense, is not ex post facto; 27 nor is a law open to that objection, which, though passed after the commission of an offense, requires that the persons selected for jury service shall possess good intelligence, sound judgment and fair character,(28) or which enlarges the class of persons who may be competent to testify as witnesses at the trial, as, for instance, by repealing a statutory prohibition of the admission of the testimony of convicted felons,(29) or which provides that "comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine, shall be permitted to be made by witnesses, and such writings and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same may be submitted to the court and jury as evidence of th e genuineness or otherwise of the writing in dispute,"(30) or which allows to the prosecution an appeal from the superior to the supreme court of the state,(31) or which lessens the number of judges in the appellate court,(32) or which limits the number of spectators at executions for murder;(33) nor is a law ex post facto whicb denies the exercise of the right of franchise to bigamists, or polygamists, for "the disfranchisement operates upon the existing state and condition of the person, and not upon a past offense;" (34) nor is a law unconstitutional which prohibits the continuance of the practice of medicine by those who do not register them selves in accordance with its provisions,(35) or which excludes from the practice of medicine those who have been convicted of felonies prior to its enactment; (36) nor can constitutional objection be raised to a law which provides that whoever has been twice convicted of crime shall, upon conviction of a felon y committed after the passage of the act, be deemed to be an habitual criminal, and be punished by imprisonment for twenty-five years.(37) W hile a law which endeavors to reach acts already committed and which provides a like punishment for the same act in the future is void in so far as it is retrospective, it is, however, valid as to offens es which are committed after its passage.(38)

Bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties.
82. A bill of attainder is defined by Field, J., in Cummings v. Missouri,(39) as "a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judieial trial, and he adds, "If the punishment be less than death, the act is termed a bill of pains and penalties. Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties " It has been held that a state constitution requiring clergymen, as a condition precedent to the exercise of their profession, to take oath that they had not committed certain designated acts, some of which were at the time offenses subject to legal penalties, and others of which were innocent acts,(40) and that a state statute requiring one who applied to a court to open a judgment rendered against him in absentia, to take oath that he had not committed certain designated public offenses,(41) and that an act of Congress requiring a lawyer, as a condition precedent to the exercise of his profession, to take an oath that he had not voluntarily borne arms against the United States, etc.,(42) constituted in each case a bill of pains and penalties and was, therefore, subject to the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder, inasmuch as, by legislative action, and without judicial investigation, the statute imposed a punishment for an act done before the enactment of the statute, the oath being offered to the party incriminated as a means of compelling ala admission of guilt.

(1) Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, 110; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456; League v. Texas, 184 U. S. 156.
(2) Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386.
(3) Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall.386; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr.138;Ogden v.Saunders, 12 Wheat. 266; 'Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, 110; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456; B. & S. R. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395; Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469; League v. Texas, 184 U. S. 156.
(4) Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386.
(5) Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380.
(6) Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88.
(7) Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456.
(8) B. & S. R. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395.
(9) Locke v. New Orleaas, 4 Wall. 172.
(10) Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469.
(11) League v. Texas, 184 U. S. 156.
(12) Freeborn v. Smith, 2 Wall. 160.
(13) Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445.
(14) Stockdale v. 1. Cos., 20 Wall. 323.
(15) 6 Cr. 138.
(16) 4 Wail. 325.
(17) 3 Wall. 386.
(18) Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 id. 377; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 id. 565; Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 id. 589.
(19) Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221.
(20) Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277.
(21) Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333. But see Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189.
(22) Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234.
(23) Medley, Petitioner, 134 U. S. 160.
(24) Thompson v. Utah 170 U. S. 343.
(25) P. 352.
(26) U. S. v. Fox, 95 U. S. 670.
(27) Gut v. The State, 9 Wall. 35 ; Cook v. U. S., 138 U. S. 157.
(28) Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565.
(29) Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574.
(30) Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380.
(31) Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589.
(32) Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377.
(33) Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U. S. 483.
(34) Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. S. 15.
(35) Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505.
(36) Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189.
(37) McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311.
(38) Jaehne v. New York, 128 U. S. 189.
(40) Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277.
(41) Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234.
(42) Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333.


				 CHAPTER VII.
		 THE PROHIBITION OF STATE BILLS OF CREDIT.

83. Bills of credit defined.
84. What axe, and what awe not, bills of credit.

Bills of credit defined.
83. Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution declares that "no state shall .... emit bills of credit." Bills of Credit within the meaning of this constitutional provision are promissory notes issued by a state government on its credit "intended to circulate throughout the community, for its ordinary purposes as money, "and redeemable on demand, or at a day certain in the future.(1)

What are, and what are not, bills of credit.
84. A state, therefore, may not issue interest-bearing certificates in denominations "not exceeding $10, nor less than 50 cents" receivable by the state in payment of taxes, and of debts due to the state, and payable to officers of the state in discharge of salaries and fees of office, and redeem-able by the state under an arrangement that there shall be withdrawn "annually from circulation one-tenth part of the certificates." (2) Nevertheless, a state may incorporate a bank, of which that state shall be the sole shareholder, and it may authorize that bank to issue notes as eirculation, without contravening the constitutional prohibition, the distinction being that such notes are issued, not on the credit of the state, but on the credit of the capital and assets of the bank.(3) Coupons of state bonds, though negotiable and receivable for taxes due to the state,(4) and warrants drawn in payment of appropriations made by the legislature, payable upon presentation if there be funds in the treasury, and issued to individuals in payment of debts due to them,(5) cannot properly be called bills of credit, for they are not intended to circulate as money.

(1) Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet- 411; Byrne v. Missouri, 8 id. 40; Briscoe V. Bank of Kentucky, 11 id. 257.
(2( Craig v. Missouri 4 Pet. 410 - B e iv. Missouri 8 id. 40.
(3) Briscoe v. Bank of Kentuay, 11 Pet. 257; Darrington V. The Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 12.
(4) Virginia Coupons Case, 114 U. S. 269, 284.
(5) H. & T. C. R. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66, 89.


				 CHAPTER VIII.
				STATE COMPACTS.

85. What compacts are permitted, and what are forbidden.

What compacts are permitted, and what are forbidden.
85. Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution declares that "no state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation .... No state shall, without the consent of Congress .... enter into any agreement or compact with another state." This coiastitutional prohibition forbids compacts between a state and foreign nations, and also compacts between states of the United States, to which the assent of Congress has not been given. It is, therefore, decisive against the validity of the confederation entered into by the insurgent states in 1861.(1) It also forbids a governor of a state to enter into an agreement with a foreign government for the extradition of a prisoner.(2) But states may, with the consent of Congress, enter into agr@ents touching confficting boundaries,(3) and, in such cases, t;he consent of Congress does not necessarily have to be given by congressional legislation expressly assenting to each of the stipulations of the agreement between the states, but that consent may be inferred from the legislation of Congress touching the subject-matter of the agreement.(4) The prohibition of state compacts does not invalidate agreements entered into before the adoption of the Constitution.(5)

(1) Withams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176; Sprott V. U. S., 20 Wall. 459; Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 594; U. S. v. Keehler, 9 Wan. 83.
(2) Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540.
(3) Rhode Iidand v. Mas*achusetts, 12 Pet. 724; Miswuri v. Iowa, 7 How. 660; Florida v. Georgia, 17 id. 478; Alabama v. Georgia, 23 id. 505; Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39; Poole v.  Fleeger 11 Pet. 185.
(4) Virginia v. west virginia, 11 wall. 39; Virginia v. Tennewee, 148 U. S. 503; cf. St. L. & S. P. Ry. V. James, 16, id. 545, 562.
(5) Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S. 155.


				 CHAPTER IX.
			    FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE.

86. The eonstitutional provision.
87. The concurrent juriodictiou of the federal and state courts.

The constitutional provision.
86. Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution declares that a person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime." The words "treason, felony, or other crime," as Taney, C.J., said in Kentucky v. Dennison,(1) "in their plain and obvious import, as well as in their legal and technical sense, embrace every act forbidden and made punishable by a law of the state. The word 'crime' of itself includes every offense, from the highest to the lowest in the grade of offenses, and includes what are called 'misdemeanors,' as well as treason and felony."(2) This constitutional provision imposes on the executive of the state in which the fugitive has taken refuge the duty of surrendering the fugitive upon demand made by the executive of the state from whieh the fugitive has fled, and upon proof made that he has been legally charged with crime, and this duty has been recoignized by the act of Congress of 12th February, 1793,(3) but if the governor of the state to which the fugitive has fled refuses to deliver him up to justice, "there is no power delegated to the general government, either through the judicial department or any other department, to use any coercive means to compel him."(4) The Supreme Court of the United States, therefore, will not issue a mandamus to compel the performance by a goveriaor of a state of his constitutional duty of surrendering to another state a fugitive from the justice of that state.(5) This provision of the Constitution does not give to the person extradited any constitutional right to insist that he shall not be tried for any offense other than that set forth in the requisition papers without first having an opportunity to return to the state from which he was extradited.(6) And a fugitive from justice who has been abducted from the state to which he fled may thereafter be tried in the state to which he has been forcibly carried, without violating any right or immunity secured to the accused by the Constitution of the United States.(7)

The concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state courts.
87. An alleged fugitive from justice may petition a court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of his detention, but as the responsibility of determining whether or not the alleged fugitive from justice be in fact a fugitive from justice, rests upon the executive of the state to which the fugitive has fled, a court of the United States will not discharge the fugitive upon the hearing of the writ of habeas corpus because, in its judgment the proof that the prisoner is a fugitive from justice is, though satisfactory to the executive, not as complete as might have been required.(8) When, however, it is shown conclusively that the accused was not within the state at the time the crime was committed, he will be discharged upon the hearing of the writ.(9) The alleged fugitive may also apply, by petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to a court of the state within which he is detained in custody of the purpose of being delivered to the justice of another state, for the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over such petitions for writs of habeas corpus is not exclusive of the jurisdiction of the courts of the states in such cases, and the agent of the state demanding the surrender of the alleged fugitive is in no senpe an officer of the United States, nor otherwise exempt from the process of the courts of the states.(10)

(1) 24 How. 99.
(2) See also Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642.
(3) I Stat. 302; Rev. Stat ., secs. 5278, 5279.
(4) Per Taney, C. J., in Kentucky v. DeniLison, 24 How. 109.
(5) Kentu&y v. De@n, 24 How. 66.
(6) Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U. S. 537; cf. Cosgrove v. WixLney, 174 i& 64.
(7) Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 700.
(8) Ex parte Reggel, 114 -[T. S. 642; Roberts z7. Reilly, 116 id. 80; Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 id. 231- See also Cook v. Hart, 146 id. 183; Pearce v. Texas, 155 id. 311.
(9) Hyatt v. People, 188 U. S. 691.
(10) Robb v. Connolly, Ill U. S. 624.

.